State v. Fletcher

Decision Date14 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 62049,62049
Citation619 S.W.2d 57
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Carl FLETCHER, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Lee Nation, Kansas City, for appellant.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Paul R. Otto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County where appellant was convicted of kidnapping, rape, robbery first degree, and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to fifteen years each for the kidnapping and rape convictions, thirty years for robbery, and life imprisonment for armed criminal action. It is the sentence for armed criminal action that provides this Court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo.Const. Art. V, § 3.

As appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, it suffices to say that the state's evidence showed that appellant was one of two black males who approached the victim's van as the victim and her eight-year-old daughter left a dance class, and who asked for a ride under the guise of needing gasoline for their motorcycle. When the victim consented to this request, one of the men pulled a gun, and told the victim that if she made a false move, she would be killed. The robbery, rape, and kidnapping charges arose from incidents occurring in the van later that evening as the victim was forced to drive around Kansas City. The armed criminal action charge stemmed from the rape.

Appellant first maintains that under Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. banc 1980), vacated, Missouri v. Sours, 446 U.S. 962, 100 S.Ct. 2935, 64 L.Ed.2d 820 (1980), on remand Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. banc 1980), cert. den., Missouri v. Sours, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 953, 67 L.Ed.2d 118 (January 26, 1981), his armed criminal action conviction must be reversed. Appellant is correct.

Appellant next alleges error in the submission of several instructions charging appellant with acting in concert with another. The particular instructions complained of were:

No. 11: "As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

"First, that on or about May 17, 1979 a certain person with the aid or attempted aid of defendant committed the offense of kidnapping of Rose Mary Davis, and

"Second, that the defendant, either before or during the commission of the offense of kidnapping with the purpose of promoting its commission aided such other person in committing that offense, and

"Third, that on or about May 17, 1979 in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant or a certain person removed Rose Mary Davis from 6614 Blue Ridge Blvd., and

"Fourth, that such removal was without the consent of Rose Mary Davis by means of forcible compulsion, and

"Fifth, that the defendant or a certain person removed Rose Mary Davis for the purpose of facilitating the commission of rape then you will find the defendant guilty under Count I of kidnapping.

"However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.

"If you do find the defendant guilty under Count I of kidnapping, you will assess and declare the punishment at imprisonment for a term of years fixed by you but not less than five years and not to exceed fifteen years."

No. 12: "As to Count I, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about May 17, 1979 in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant or a certain person removed Rose Mary Davis from 6614 Blue Ridge Blvd., you must find the defendant not guilty under Count I of kidnapping."

No. 15: "As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

"First, that on or about May 17, 1979 a certain person, armed with a deadly weapon, with the aid or attempted aid of defendant committed the offense of robbery in the first degree of Rose Mary Davis, and

"Second, that the defendant, either before or during the commission of the offense of robbery in the first degree with the purpose of promoting its commission, aided such other person in committing that offense, and

"Third, that on or about May 17, 1979 in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant or a certain person stole miscellaneous United States Currency in the charge of Rose Mary Davis, and

"Fourth, that the defendant or a certain person in doing so threatened the immediate use of physical force on or against Rose Mary Davis for the purpose of preventing resistance to the taking of the property, and

"Fifth, that in the course of stealing the property, the defendant or a certain person, a participant with the defendant in the crime, was armed with a deadly weapon,

then you will find the defendant guilty under Count III of robbery in the first degree.

"However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.

"If you do find the defendant guilty under Count III of robbery in the first degree, then you will assess and declare the punishment at:

"1. Life imprisonment, or

"2. Imprisonment for a term of years fixed by you but not less than ten years and not to exceed thirty years."

No. 16: "As to Count III, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about May 17, 1979 in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant or a certain person stole miscellaneous United States Currency in the charge of Rose Mary Davis, you must find the defendant not guilty under Count III of robbery in the first degree."

Appellant argues that the insertion of the phrase "a certain person" in the instructions was error in that it tended to negate his alibi defense, i. e., the jury could have accepted his defense yet still have returned a verdict of guilty on the ground that the instruction directed them to find appellant guilty if some other "certain person" committed the acts described.

We find no error in the use of the phrase "a certain person." The phrase is specifically provided for in MAI-CR 2.12. The converse instructions...

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13 cases
  • State v. Haggard
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1981
    ...62879.) This court also issued opinions in three cases today reversing armed criminal action, relying on Sours and Haggard : (1) State v. Fletcher, 619 S.W.2d 57 (Mo.banc 1981), affirming kidnapping, rape and robbery convictions, but vacating a life sentence for armed criminal action; (2) S......
  • State ex rel. Bulloch v. Seier, 71012
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1989
    ...v. Butler, [441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) ] were permitted to journey such an imperious path of nonconformance." 619 S.W.2d at 57. But that was merely the tip of the iceberg. Immediately upon the heels of Haggard, the same mistaken notion was pressed upon the following ......
  • State v. Harvey
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1983
    ...our prior decisions appellant's claim would have been sustained routinely. See State v. Arnold, 628 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Mo.1982); State v. Fletcher, 619 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Mo. banc 1981). See also State v. Greer, 619 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo. banc 1981). We delayed decision in this case, however, pending......
  • State v. Jordan
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 23, 1983
    ...and harmless." State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Mo. banc 1981). Also see State v. Zagorski, 632 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Fletcher, 619 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. banc The defendant also contends the trial court committed reversible error in overruling his objection to a part of the stat......
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