State v. Flores
| Docket Number | 04-22-00513-CR,04-22-00514-CR,04-22-00515-CR,04-22-00516-CR,04-22-00517-CR,04-22-00518-CR,04-22-00519-CR |
| Decision Date | 30 August 2023 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas v. Jaime Francisco FLORES, JR., The State of Texas v. Gracie Yvette Lopez, The State of Texas v. Cristal Ann Ramirez, The State of Texas v. Martin Eli Perez, The State of Texas v. Rodney Ortiz, The State of Texas v. Enrique Cibrian |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 229th Judicial District Court, Duval County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 19-CRD-43, 21-CRD-07, 21-CRD-12, 21-CRD-93 22-CRD-15, 22-CRD-16, 22-CRD-07 Honorable Baldemar Garza Judge Presiding
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I Valenzuela, Justice
In seven cases, grand jurors of Duval County indicted Jaime Francisco Flores, Jr., Gracie Yvette Lopez, Cristal Ann Ramirez, Martin Eli Perez, Rodney Ortiz, and Enrique Cibrian (collectively, Appellees) for third-degree felony smuggling of persons. Appellees moved to quash their indictments by challenging the statute on several constitutional grounds. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motions. The State appeals all seven cases, which we consolidated for briefing and argument. Because we reject Appellees' constitutional claims, we reverse the trial court's orders and remand the causes for further proceedings.
Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a) prohibits the smuggling of persons by three distinct manner and means. Only one-section 20.05(a)(1)(A)-is applicable here.
In 1999, section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was specifically enacted to target "coyotes" who transported noncitizens across the Rio Grande River and through Texas and exposed them to dangerous conditions.[1] In 2011, the statute was broadened to eliminate the exposure-to-danger element and instead make it an enhancement. Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1014, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999. Amended by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 223 (H.B. 260), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 333 (H.B. 11), § 14, eff. Sept. 1, 2015; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 572 (S.B. 576), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2021 (current version at Tex. Penal Code § 20.05).
In 2015, as part of House Bill 11, the legislature added a new basis of liability-(a)(2) harboring a noncitizen-while limiting (a)(1) liability to those who smuggle persons with "the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit." Id. (). In 2021, the legislature eliminated "the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit" element from (a)(1), instead making it an enhancement. Id. ().
Appellees were each arrested after stops for traffic violations. All were transporting suspected noncitizens in their vehicles. All six appellees were charged with violating section 20.05(a)(1)(A). Flores,[2] Lopez,[3] Ramirez,[4] Perez, and Cibrian were indicted under the 2015 version of the statute. Ortiz[5] was indicted under the 2021 version.
Appellees moved to quash their indictments by challenging the statute on preemption, Fourth Amendment, vagueness, and equal protection grounds. The State responded and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Appellees argued, essentially:
At the evidentiary hearing on the motions to quash, Appellees clarified that they only challenged section 20.05(a)(1)(A). They relied on its legislative history and noted that throughout the legislative debate, the witnesses Appellees presented information about Operation Lone Star, which was specifically launched to "secure the border and combat the smuggling of people and drugs into Texas." They also argued that in Duval County, the statute is strictly used to prosecute smugglers of individuals from South or Central America or the Caribbean who are Hispanic or Black. And, although the statute is not facially an immigration statute, Appellees argued the only way it is used is as an immigration statute.
Appellees offered and the trial court admitted, for the limited purposes of the hearing,[6] the offense reports from most of the arrests of Appellees. Appellees called a single witness, Sergeant Modesto Saavedra with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Duval County Sheriff's Office. He testified, in part, that section 20.05 "is to deal with transport of, uh, migrants." He explained that in every stop in which he has arrested someone under section 20.05, "the subjects identify themselves as undocumented aliens." In all the cases, he considers it an unwritten element of the section 20.05(a)(1)(A) offense that there is probable cause to believe the persons transported are noncitizens. He stated that circumstance drove the arrests in these cases. Saavedra also testified about the various dangers human smugglers pose to the transported noncitizens such as assault, ransom, rape, murder, abandonment, and trafficking. He noted that all arrests for human smuggling have followed stops for traffic violations.
In response to the preemption challenge, the State noted that the statute focuses on the transporter. The statute does not target those who transport noncitizens-it targets those who transport any passenger with the intent to conceal that passenger from law enforcement. The State also argued it uses the smuggling statute to capture conduct related to the "transporting of men, women, and children throughout our state for purposes such as forced labor, prostitution, and/or other prohibited conduct." The State argued it needs the smuggling statute because it cannot prove trafficking or other crimes because the federal government deports the noncitizens, leaving them unavailable to testify. The State noted that although other states' smuggling statutes have been struck down on preemption grounds, those statutes criminalized conduct directly related to an individual's noncitizen status, and the statute at issue here does not.
In response to the remaining claims, the State argued that the Fourth Amendment challenge has no merit because "[e]very stop starts with probable cause." It further argued the statute is not vague because it is clear as to what kind of conduct it criminalizes. In responding to the equal protection argument, the State again focused on the fact that the statute only criminalizes the conduct of the transporter, not the noncitizens. The goal of the statute, in fact, is to protect the individuals being transported from unscrupulous traffickers. Because the noncitizens are often deported quickly, there is no way for the State to use them as witnesses against traffickers. The State uses the smuggling statute, which requires only proof of transport and concealment, because that is how it can protect "not just the citizens of the state, but any individual who is present here in our state."
The trial court granted the motions to quash and set aside the indictments without providing a basis for its ruling. The State appeals. In their brief, Appellees focus solely on their preemption and Fourth Amendment arguments. Because the trial court could have ruled on any of the four constitutional grounds, we address them all.
In reviewing the dismissal of an indictment, we apply a bifurcated standard. State v. Krizan-Wilson, 354 S.W.3d 808, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We give "almost total deference to a trial court's findings of facts that are supported by the record, as well as mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness." Id. "However, the court of appeals applies a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations." Id.; see also Estrada v. State, 629 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (reviewing trial court's decision on motion to quash an indictment de novo).
"Federalism central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012). "From the existence of two sovereigns follows the...
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