State v. Flores

• Decision Date: 20 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19207.,19207.
• Citation: 319 Conn. 218,125 A.3d 157
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Teudi FLORES.

319 Conn. 218

125 A.3d 157

STATE of Connecticut

v.Teudi FLORES.

No. 19207.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 30, 2015.

Decided Oct. 20, 2015.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Leonard C. Boyle, deputy chief state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Toni M. Smith–Rosario and Roger Dobris, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, MCDONALD, ESPINOSA, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

McDONALD, J.

The defendant, Teudi Flores, was convicted on conditional pleas of nolo contendere of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a–277(b), home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a–100aa(a), robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a–135(a), four counts of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–103(a), and stealing a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a–212(a). The defendant entered these pleas following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of statements he made to the police following his arrest in which he confessed to these and other crimes.¹ The defendant appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgments of conviction, arguing that his statements should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal search, in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution,² because the warrant authorizing the search of his apartment was unsupported by probable cause. Specifically, the defendant argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant application, which was based solely on hearsay statements made by a named informant, failed to establish probable cause because it did not provide facts from which the issuing judge could determine that the informant's tip was reliable. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts.³ On January 29, 2010, Detectives John Cerejo and Angelo Stavrides of the Meriden Police Department applied for a search and seizure warrant for the third floor apartment located at 215 Camp Street in Meriden (apartment). After reciting the detectives' training and experience as law enforcement officials, the affidavit in support of their application averred in relevant part: "On January 27, 2010, Rafley Santiago was arrested by Meriden [p]olice for crimes related to being in possession of a stolen dirt bike, and various other motor vehicle charges. Santiago requested to speak with someone regarding information he had, that would be of interest to [p]olice.... Stavrides notified Santiago of his Miranda⁴ rights, which he waived.... Stavrides conducted an interview of Santiago. The interview was audio recorded, in a patrol interview area, at [p]olice [h]eadquarters.... Santiago stated among other things that he regularly purchases marijuana, approximately every [three] days, from [the] 215 Camp Street, third floor apartment. He stated [that] he has been making such purchases, for the last month or two. Santiago stated he purchases [one] or [two] bags of marijuana each time, from a male subject he only knew as ‘John.’ He stated he pays ‘John’ $10 for each bag of marijuana. Santiago stated [that] ‘John’ has long hair, and many people frequent the apartment.... Each of the estimated [twenty] purchases Santiago made from [the] apartment, all came from within that apartment, within the last two months. Santiago stated [that] the last time he purchased marijuana [from the apartment] was [four] days prior to the date of the statement he made to ... Stavrides. Santiago's last purchase was made on Saturday, January 23, 2010." (Footnote added.)

The affidavit also described the officers' knowledge regarding the conduct of individuals who are involved in the sale and use of controlled substances, including that, through their experience, they know that such persons routinely store illegal contraband in the location from which they base their sales.

A search warrant was issued on January 29, 2010, on the basis of the facts contained in the affidavit, and the warrant was executed on February 3, 2010. The search uncovered, inter alia, approximately one half of one pound of marijuana, packaging materials, two scales, and proof of residence of the defendant. The defendant was arrested and taken to police headquarters where he indicated that he wished to speak to the police about recent illegal activity in which he had been involved. After waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant confessed to multiple other crimes.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confessions on the ground that they were the product of an illegal search because the warrant was issued without probable cause and was based on stale facts. He argued that his confessions were "a direct result of the illegal search ... of [his] apartment," and therefore must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The defendant further argued that, because his statements were made in close temporal proximity to his arrest and no intervening circumstances otherwise induced him to confess, his statements were not sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality so as to render them admissible. See State v. Hammond, 257 Conn. 610, 626–27, 778 A.2d 108 (2001) (evidence obtained by illegal means may nonetheless be admissible if connection between evidence and illegal means is sufficiently attenuated). The trial court denied his motion to suppress, concluding that the warrant application was not based on stale facts and was supported by probable cause. The court further concluded, alternatively, that there was sufficient attenuation between the original search and the defendant's voluntary statements so as to render his confessions admissible even if the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. The defendant thereafter entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to the charges previously set forth.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgments, concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause because the affidavit contained information supplied by a named informant, Santiago, who met with the police in person, so as to allow the police to assess his credibility and demeanor, and because Santiago made statements against his penal interest by telling police that he regularly purchased marijuana from the apartment.

State v. Flores, 144 Conn.App. 308, 317, 72 A.3d 1202 (2013). The court concluded that these factors provided a "substantial factual basis" for the issuing judge's determination that probable cause existed to search the apartment for items related to the sale and possession of a controlled substance. Id. The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the warrant affidavit was based on stale facts because the warrant was executed only eleven days after Santiago's last purchase of marijuana, and, because Santiago indicated that he regularly purchased marijuana from the apartment over a protracted period, the minimal passage of time was not significant. Id., at 317–19, 72 A.3d 1202.

We granted the defendant's petition for certification to determine whether the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Flores, 310 Conn. 917, 76 A.3d 632 (2013). Contrary to the defendant's claims, which are the same as the claims he made in his motion to suppress, we agree with the state that the warrant was supported by probable cause and was not based on stale facts. We therefore need not reach the defendant's argument regarding the attenuation doctrine.

Certain well established legal principles guide our analysis of this issue. The fourth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires a showing of probable cause prior to the issuance of a search warrant. "Probable cause to search exists if ... (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction ... and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.... Although [p]roof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence ... [f]indings of probable cause do not lend themselves to any uniform formula because probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.... Consequently, [i]n determining the existence of probable cause to search, the issuing [judge] assesses all of the information set forth in the warrant affidavit and should make a practical, nontechnical decision whether ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Shields, 308 Conn. 678, 689–90, 69 A.3d 293 (2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1040, 188 L.Ed.2d 123 (2014). This determination is made "pursuant to a ‘totality of circumstances' test." State v. Velasco, 248 Conn. 183, 189–90, 728 A.2d 493 (1999) ; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

This court has recognized that "because of our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause, and mindful of the fact that [r]easonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes probable cause ... we evaluate the information contained in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the issuing judge's probable cause finding.... We therefore review the issuance...