State v. Flowers

• Citation: 109 N.C. 841,13 S.E. 718
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decision Date: 27 October 1891
• Parties: State v. Flowers.

13 S.E. 718

109 N.C. 841

State

v.Flowers.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 27, 1891.

Perjury—Indictment—Justices op the Peace— Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases.

1. Under Acts N. C. 1889, c. 83, prescribing a form for indictments for perjury, and requiring them to state the court in which the perjury-was committed, it is not error, in an indictment for perjury committed at a trial in a justice's court, to give, in addition to the name of the court, the names of the justices who sat at the trial.

2. An indictment for perjury under Acts N. C. 1889, c. 83, which fails to allege that defendant knew the false statement alleged to have been made by him to be false, or that he was ignorant whether or not the statement was true, is defective, since the act specially requires such allegations; but such defect is not ground for quashing the indictment, the proper action being for the court to hold the prisoner, and permit the solicitor to send a new bill curing the defect,

3. Code N. C. § 1159, authorizing two justices of the peace to sit together in criminal proceed ings, and giving them the same powers and duties as are given to any justice sitting alone, was authorized by Const. N. C. art. 4, § 12, empowering the general assembly to allot and distribute the judicial power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to the supreme court in such manner as they may deem best.

Appeal from superior court, Wake county; Spier Whitaker, Judge.

Indictment of D. L. Flowers for perjury. Defendant's motion to quash the indictment was allowed, and the state appeals. Reversed.

The Attorney General, for the State.

F. H. Busbee, for appellee.

CLark, J. The indictment is drawn under chapter 83, Acts 1889, which provides a simple form of indictment for perjury. A motion to quash below was allowed, which action defendant's counsel seeks to sustain on the ground that the indictment charges the perjury to have been committed upon the trial of an action "in the court of Robert Sanders and W. R. Creech, justices of the peace" in and for said county, acting and sitting together, etc. We fail to see the force of the objection. If the names of the justices had been left out, the charge of the commission of the perjury " in a court of a justice of the peace" would have been a compliance with the statute. The addition of the names of the justices could not possibly prejudice the defendant in any manner, and really gave him additional information. Indeed, it is probably better, and certainly is fairer to the defendant, that, when the perjury is alleged to have been committed on a trial before a justice, the name of such justice should be charged. At the most, though the names of the justices were not required to be charged, their use was mere harmless surplusage.

Nor can there be more force in the argument that a court of two justices of the peace is a tribunal unknown to our constitution. Code, § 1159, authorizes two justices to sit together in criminal proceedings, and gives them the same "powers and duties" as are given to any justice sitting alone. The constitution, art. 4, § 12, empowers the general assembly to "allot and distribute" the judicial power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to the supreme court "in such manner as they may deem best." It was therefore competent for the legislature to thus bestow the "powers and duties" mentioned on two justices, as in like manner they have bestowed prescribed powers and duties on three or five justices by the title of inferior courts, or on one judge in a criminal court. It sufficiently appears in the indictment that, the action in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed was a criminal proceeding, and of such the two justices, "acting and sitting together, " as charged in the indictment, had as full jurisdiction as one justice sitting alone.

To quash the indictment for the harmless and really advisable addition of the names of the justices would contravene the explicit prohibition contained in Code, § 1183, that no criminal proceeding, whether "by warrant, indictment, information, or im-peachment, " shall be "quashed, or judgment stayed, by reason of any informality or refinement, if in the bill or proceeding sufficient matter appears to enable the court to proceed to judgment." State v. Burke, 108 N. C. 750, 12 S. E. Rep. 1000; State v. Haddock, (at this term,) 13 S. E. Rep. 714. The form of indictment provided by the act in question has been sustained by this court in State v. dates, 107 N. C. 832, 12 S. E. Rep. 319, and State v. Peters, 107 N. C. 876, 12 S. E. Rep. 74. The effect of the act is not to change in any respect the constituent elements of perjury, nor the nature or mode of proof. It only relieves the state from charging in the indictment the details, or rather the definition, of the offense, and makes it sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully committed perjury, charging the name of the action and of the court in which committed, setting out the...