State v. Floyd Y.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2015
• Citation: 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08102,135 A.D.3d 70,19 N.Y.S.3d 52
• Parties: In re STATE of New York, Petitioner–Appellant, v. FLOYD Y. (Anonymous), Respondent–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

135 A.D.3d 70
19 N.Y.S.3d 52
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 08102

In re STATE of New York, Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
FLOYD Y. (Anonymous), Respondent–Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Nov. 10, 2015.

19 N.Y.S.3d 53

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (Matthew W. Griecoand Steven C. Wuof counsel), for appellant.

Marvin Bernstein, Mental Hygiene Legal Services, New York (Sadie Zea Ishee and Maura Martin Klugmanof counsel), for respondent.

Opinion

RICHTER, J.

In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support a jury's conclusion that respondent suffers from a mental abnormality under article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law. The jury found that respondent has a mental disorder that predisposes him to commit sexual offenses, and that results in his having serious difficulty controlling that conduct. The trial court set aside the verdict, concluding that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that respondent had the requisite serious difficulty. In overturning the verdict, the trial court relied upon the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of State of New York v. Donald DD. (Kenneth T.),24 N.Y.3d 174, 996 N.Y.S.2d 610, 21 N.E.3d 239 (2014)and this Court's decision in Matter of State of New York v. Frank P.,126 A.D.3d 150, 2 N.Y.S.3d 483 (1st Dept.2015). We now reverse and conclude that the jury's verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence. Nothing in Kenneth T.or Frank P.warrants a different result.

Respondent Floyd Y. is a recidivist sex offender who was most recently convicted of sexually abusing his prepubescent stepson and stepdaughter. The conviction stemmed from four separate incidents which took place over an almost two-year period, when the children were 8 to 10 years old. After a trial, respondent was found guilty of four counts each of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child. Respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from 4 to 8 years, and upon his release from prison, he was transferred to a psychiatric facility.

Petitioner State of New York subsequently brought this petition seeking sex offender civil management pursuant to article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Under article 10, a detained sex offender is subject to civil management if the State establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the offender has a “mental abnormality,” that is, “a congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [i], [q]). Thus, it must be shown that the offender's disorder “results in both a predisposition to commit sex offenses and a serious difficulty controlling that behavior” (Matter of State of New York v. John S.,23 N.Y.3d 326, 348, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532, 15 N.E.3d 287 [2014]).

After a hearing, Supreme Court determined that there was probable cause to believe that respondent suffers from pedophilia, polysubstance dependenceand antisocial personality disorder, and that he was a sex offender requiring civil management. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict finding that respondent suffers from a disorder that: (1) predisposes him to commit conduct constituting a sex offense; and (2) results in his having serious difficulty controlling that conduct. The trial court granted respondent's motion to set aside the verdict, finding that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the second prong.¹The State now appeals.

19 N.Y.S.3d 55

A trial court may set aside a jury verdict as legally insufficient when “there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could possibly lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury” (Cahill v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.,31 A.D.3d 347, 349, 819 N.Y.S.2d 732 [1st Dept.2006]). In deciding the motion, the trial court was required to afford the State every inference that may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the evidence should have been considered in the light most favorable to the State (John S.,23 N.Y.3d at 348, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532, 15 N.E.3d 287; KBL, LLP v. Community Counseling & Mediation Servs.,123 A.D.3d 488, 489, 999 N.Y.S.2d 18 [1st Dept.2014]). Moreover, in article 10 proceedings, issues concerning the viability and reliability of the respondent's diagnosis are properly reserved for resolution by the jury (Matter of State of New York v. Robert V.,111 A.D.3d 541, 542, 975 N.Y.S.2d 390 [1st Dept.2013], lv. denied23 N.Y.3d 901, 987 N.Y.S.2d 1, 10 N.E.3d 189 [2014]).

Judged by these standards, we conclude that the State presented legally sufficient evidence that respondent's mental condition results in his having serious difficulty controlling his sexual conduct. At trial, the State offered the testimony of Stuart Kirschner, an expert psychologist who evaluated respondent. Dr. Kirschner testified about respondent's repeated sexual abuse of his two prepubescent stepchildren over a nearly two-year period. On several occasions, respondent entered his stepdaughter's room and fondled her vagina, sometimes removing her clothes and licking her genitals. Respondent also molested his stepson two times, reaching into the boy's underwear while he was sleeping, and squeezing his penis.²Dr. Kirschner also reviewed records containing an admission by respondent that he had sexual urges toward his stepdaughter, and that he tried to resist them for a significant period of time, but ultimately gave in to them. This was confirmed by the trial testimony of respondent's own expert, who interviewed respondent. Respondent told the expert that after abusing his stepdaughter, he recognized the wrongfulness of his conduct, said, “I am going to stop,” but had an urge and did it again nine months later. Respondent also admitted to his expert that he had “deviant needs.”

Dr. Kirschner explained that a person has pedophilia if he has sexual urges, fantasies or behaviors involving prepubescent children, and acts upon, or experiences significant distress at, those urges for more than six months. He concluded that respondent's repeated offenses against his stepchildren over a two-year period, and his admitted sexual urges, supported a pedophilia diagnosis.³Dr. Kirschner testified that pedophilia is a chronic condition, and that respondent still suffers from it because he failed to fully engage in the necessary treatment to control his urges (seeAmerican Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at 699 [5th ed. 2013] [DSM–5] [describing pedophilia as a “lifelong condition”] ).

Dr. Kirschner reviewed respondent's sex offender treatment records and concluded that he has not developed the cognitive skills necessary to control his pedophilia. According to Dr. Kirschner, respondent neither understands nor accepts the fact

19 N.Y.S.3d 56

that he is sexually attracted to children. Respondent fails to take full responsibility for his actions, and instead offers “numerous explanations” and “different stories” about his misconduct in an attempt to minimize his offending behavior. In addition, Dr. Kirschner testified that respondent does not have a viable relapse prevention plan that would prevent him from reoffending in the future. Dr. Kirschner described respondent's progress in treatment as “minimal,” explaining that he...