State v. Floyd
| Decision Date | 02 May 2000 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. S.D. 2000) State of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Richard Dean Floyd, Defendant/Appellant. 22598 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Greene County, Hon. Don Bonacker
Counsel for Appellant: Amy M. Bartholow
Counsel for Respondent: Linda Lemke
Opinion Summary: None
Defendant was arrested the morning of October 3, 1997, for the murder of his wife. He was originally charged by complaint, which was dismissed when the grand jury issued an indictment on October 28, 1997, charging murder in the first degree, pursuant to section 565.020.1, RSMo 1994. Following jury trial on August 24-28, 1998, Defendant was found guilty and thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
The evidence presented established the following: At approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 3, 1997, Defendant awoke before his wife, Sherri Floyd, and turned off the alarm clock so that she would not be awakened by it. Defendant retrieved a butcher knife from the kitchen and returned to bed, where he laid down next to his wife for an hour and thought about killing her. When Sherri began to wake, Defendant attempted to plunge the knife into her stomach. The knife did not penetrate her stomach, so Defendant straddled his wife and began slashing at her throat and legs with the knife. Sherri struggled and screamed, and Defendant continued to attack her. Finally, Defendant put his hands around Sherri's neck and squeezed until she stopped struggling. When Defendant relaxed, Sherri gasped and began moving, and Defendant again strangled her, this time fatally. Defendant then checked her for a pulse, and found none. After that, Defendant washed his hands in the bathroom, and went into the kitchen to eat a bowl of cereal. When he finished eating, Defendant went back into the bedroom and checked again for a pulse. Defendant then called his father-in-law, Charles Mears, and told him that he had just killed Charles' daughter. Defendant also called 911 and said, "I've just killed my wife."
When police officers arrived at Defendant's home, Defendant walked outside with his hands raised. When the officers instructed him to lie down on the ground, he complied. Defendant was handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car, and read his Miranda rights. Detective James Arnott arrived at the scene, and again read Appellant his Miranda rights and transported him to the Sheriff's station.1
For several years prior to his wife's death, Defendant had been suffering with depression. On January 6, 1995, Appellant's co-workers found him dazed and disoriented, and wandering in the parking lot. A co-worker brought him inside, and attempted to talk to him. Defendant's eyes were glazed; he was hallucinating and hearing voices. He seemed confused, lethargic, and his speech was slow. He was taken to the emergency room at Cox North Hospital, and admitted to the psychiatric unit under the care of psychiatrist Dr. Kenneth Fattmann. The psychiatrist diagnosed Defendant as suffering from a major depressive disorder with psychotic features. Defendant remained hospitalized for 17 days and was prescribed medication to aid a recovery. According to Defendant's religious beliefs, however, he felt that taking medication was a moral and spiritual failure, and that he should trust in God for his healing.
In October of 1996, Defendant was again hospitalized for eleven days in the psychiatric unit following a suicide attempt by cutting his wrists with a filet knife. He was again diagnosed as suffering from major depression recurrent with psychotic features. The psychiatrist treating him, Dr. Edgar Galinanes, prescribed an antidepressant and a prescription to treat auditory hallucinations. After his release, Defendant received no follow-up care, and did not take his medication on a regular basis.
Defendant made four more attempts to commit suicide by slitting his wrists, taking pills, and by drinking lamp oil. Defendant believed that God would not let him die because no one would be left to care for his wife. Defendant was convinced that he needed to take his wife with him in order to leave -- he had to take her life to take his own.
At the time of the killing, Defendant had not been taking anti-psychotic medications for more than a month.Point I
Defendant claims the trial court erred by not granting his motion to strike venireperson Carey Stubblefield. The defense filed a motion to strike Stubblefield for cause based upon the assertion that Stubblefield did not believe that a defense of mental disease or defect could ever justify a verdict of not guilty. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on its determination of whether to strike a venireperson for cause unless the record reflects both a clear abuse of discretion, and a real probability of injury to the complaining party. State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 512 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 757 (1995).
Venirepersons may be excluded only where their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions and their oath. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2387 (1998). If it appears that a venireperson cannot apply the proper burden of proof or otherwise follow the court's instructions in a first-degree-murder case, then the juror can be stricken for cause. Id. The qualifications of a prospective juror are not determined conclusively by a single response, but are determined on the basis of the voir dire as a whole. Id.
Defendant singles out one answer Venireperson Stubblefield gave during voir dire. In his brief, Defendant recites Stubblefield's answer that a person's mental disease or defect would not be strong enough in order to find him not guilty. When read in context, however, it is apparent that the prosecutor's question presented to Venireperson Stubblefield was not clearly worded. Additionally, there were many other instances when Stubblefield did not respond to questioning along the same line. The pertinent parts of voir dire follow:
MR. CARRIER: . . . But the bottom line under Missouri law is that it is the determination and responsibility and the decision of the jury to decide whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense which excluded responsibility. Is there anybody who feels that they could not make that type of decision? Okay. I see no response. . . .
Now, another thing that I want to talk about in Missouri law is that under Missouri law a person can have a mental disease or defect and still be responsible for their actions. There's two different parts to the analysis.
The issues are, number one, is -- did the defendant have a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. And then number two, did that mental disease or defect exclude him from responsibility in this case? Is there anybody who would have difficulty in -- about distinguishing between those two issues?
Ms. Stubblefield, in this situation, if you have a -- in this case that there's evidence that the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, would you automatically then find him not guilty if that's what the evidence showed that he had no mental disease or defect at the time of the offense?
Voir dire by defense attorney, Dee Wampler:
MR. WAMPLER: . . . Do any of you, from what you've heard about this case so far, do you have any assumptions or feelings or opinions about the case or about Richard Dean Floyd being guilty already from what you've heard about the case? In other words, are you leaning at this time towards guilt or leaning towards not guilty, based on anything either that's been said today or anything that you've heard or read about the case? Anything at all?
Is it a clean slate? . . .
. . .
Defense counsel further questioned the venire panel members concerning the State's burden of proof on the issue of mental disease or defect, whether they felt the defense of mental disease or defect was just a loophole, and whether they felt that depression could never count as a mental disease or defect. None of the venire panel members, including Ms. Stubblefield, responded affirmatively to these questions.
Considering voir dire as a whole, not isolating a single response, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to strike Venireperson Stubblefield. Because we do not find an abuse of discretion, it is not necessary to determine if there was a real probability of injury to Defendant. See Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 512. Point I is denied.Point II
Defendant alleges the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress statements in that...
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