State v. Floyd

Decision Date04 April 1996
Docket NumberNo. 390A94,390A94
Citation468 S.E.2d 46,343 N.C. 101
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Deano Donday FLOYD.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, and Gordon Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A. by Anita S. Hodgkiss, Charlotte, for NAACP, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, ACLU of North Carolina Legal Foundation, and North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amici curiae.

WEBB, Justice.

The defendant in this case challenges the selection of the jury for what he contends was a violation of his right to the equal protection of the laws. He says this is so because the prosecuting attorney discriminated against him, a black person, in the exercise of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors.

The question raised by the defendant's assignment of error is treated in Purkett v. Elem, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). These cases establish that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a party from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race. When a defendant objects to a peremptory challenge on the ground that it is racially discriminatory, the court must make a three-step analysis. First, it must determine if the defendant has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. One way of establishing a prima facie case is by reviewing the pattern of strikes against members of a race in the case to be tried.

If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the second step of the analysis requires the prosecutor to articulate some racially neutral reason for exercising the strike. The reason does not have to be plausible. Purkett v. Elem, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed racially neutral.

If the prosecutor articulates a racially neutral reason for a peremptory strike, the court must then take the third step in the analysis, which is to determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Whether the prosecutor intended to discriminate against the members of a race is a question of fact, the trial court's ruling on which must be accorded great deference by a reviewing court. This is so because often there will be little evidence except the statement of the prosecutor, and the demeanor of the prosecutor can be the determining factor. The presiding judge is best able to determine the credibility of the prosecutor. Disparate treatment of potential jurors should be considered, but it is not determinative.

The State exercised five of its six peremptory challenges to excuse four potential black jurors and one potential juror who identified himself as an Hispanic. The jury was composed of eleven white persons and one American Indian. The court held that the defendant had made a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

The prosecutor articulated his reasons for excusing the potential jurors. He said that a Ms. Kinlaw was excused because when he asked her, "Should the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, do you understand what your duty would be as a juror?" she said, "Yes, just to be fair about the hearing." The other jurors, when asked this question, said their duty would be to find the defendant guilty. The prosecutor said he did not think Ms. Kinlaw understood her duty as a juror. Ms. Kinlaw also had a son who had been convicted of breaking or entering, and the prosecutor said this might keep her from being a good juror.

The prosecutor then stated that he excused a Mr. Dixon because he had been charged with three separate assaults and with communicating a threat. In addition, he had a relative involved in an armed robbery similar to the robberies in this case.

The prosecutor said he excused a Ms. Hawkins because she appeared very headstrong. He based this on her description of her job, which made him think she enjoyed telling people "where to go and where not to go." He also relied, for this conclusion, on her statement that she told her daughter to quit her job because she was not being paid enough. He also said Ms. Hawkins wore tinted glasses, and he had trouble making eye contact with her.

As to a Ms. Spencer, the prosecutor said that he challenged her because she had been in an incident that involved drugs and that on at least eight occasions, she had been charged with writing bad checks.

A potential juror, Mr. Pomare, who identified himself as an...

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16 cases
  • State v. Lemons
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 9 Julio 1998
    ...juror solely on the basis of his or her race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 106, 468 S.E.2d 46, 50,cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 241, 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996). A three-step process has been established for evaluati......
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 2002
    ...a prospective juror solely on the basis of his or her race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 106, 468 S.E.2d 46, 50, cert. denied, [519] U.S. [896, 519 U.S. 896, 117 S.Ct. 241,] 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996). A three-step process has been establi......
  • State v. Locklear
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 9 Octubre 1998
    ...the challenges. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 409 (1991); see also State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 105, 468 S.E.2d 46, 48, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 241, 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996). Given the prosecutor's articulation of racially neut......
  • Berry v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 11 Octubre 2001
    ...to be considered by the trial court; it is not necessarily dispositive of discriminatory treatment. Id. (citing State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 468 S.E.2d 46, 48-49 (1996)). Where the State is able to articulate additional race-neutral reasons for striking the juror in question and uses perem......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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