State v. Fontenot
| Decision Date | 18 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. K87-826,K87-826 |
| Citation | 535 So.2d 433 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Leo FONTENOT, Defendant-Relator. 535 So.2d 433 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Michael F. Kelly, Asst. Dist. Atty., Marksville, for defendant-relator.
J. Edward Knoll, Dist. Atty., Marksville, for plaintiff-respondent.
Before STOKER, DOUCET and KING, JJ.
In this case we consider a res nova question involving the nature of mayor's courts in Louisiana and their relationship to the judicial system in general. We are particularly confronted with the question of what appellate rights may be afforded a defendant in a mayor's court who pleads guilty to an offense cognizable by such a court. The defendant in this case pleaded guilty to a charge brought in a mayor's court and sought an appeal after being sentenced. The question we must answer is whether the statutory trial de novo on appeal to district courts granted to persons convicted and sentenced in a mayor's court operates to allow the defendant to start afresh in the district court. Stated another way: Is an accused who pleads guilty to a charge in a mayor's court precluded from appealing to a district court? The pertinent Louisiana statute law provides that in criminal cases where a person is subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of property an accused may appeal from a mayor's court to the district court and such appeal "shall be tried de novo." In the case sub judice the appellant was denied an appeal on a de novo basis, both by the mayor's court and the district court.
We granted a writ in this case for the purpose of considering the question noted above.
This case originated in the Mayor's Court for the Town of Cottonport, Louisiana.
On May 20, 1987 relator pleaded guilty to a charge of criminal mischief 1 pursuant to a plea bargain in which another charge was dropped. The magistrate of the Cottonport Mayor's Court sentenced relator to a fine of $246, $42 court costs and restitution to the victim of $1,500, in default of which he would serve 30 days in jail. On May 28, 1987 relator moved for an appeal by trial de novo to the Twelfth Judicial District Court urging application of LSA-R.S. 13:1896 A. The magistrate refused to sign the appeal order for a trial de novo and issued a warrant for defendant's arrest for failure to pay his fines.
Relator filed a writ of mandamus with the Twelfth Judicial District Court asking that the Cottonport magistrate be ordered to grant the appeal for a trial de novo. On July 10, 1987 the district court heard arguments and ruled against defendant recalling the writ of mandamus and dismissing the appeal. Relator has sought review of the district court's denial in this court, assigning as his sole assignment of error the following:
The trial court erred in refusing to order the Cottonport Mayor's Court Magistrate to recognize an appeal of Leo Fontenot's conviction in the Mayor's Court and in failing to grant Leo Fontenot a trial de novo as required by LSA-R.S. 13:1896.
The statutory language we must construe, i.e., LSA-R.S. 13:1896, provides:
No problems arise from this statute with reference to mayor's court cases actually tried which result in subjecting a defendant "to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property." Subparagraph (1) puts appeals with the district courts and grants the de novo trial without distinction between cases tried and those disposed of through guilty pleas. Only in subparagraph (2), relating to the time within which appeals may be taken, are the words "cases tried" used. "Trial" obviously implies that a plea of not guilty was entered. Here, however, we are apparently faced with a res nova situation: defendant-relator's claim that he is entitled to a de novo trial despite his entry of a plea of guilty in the mayor's court. Were it not for the fact that the guilty plea was made and accepted in a mayor's court of this State, we could readily conclude that defendant-relator was not entitled to an appeal. We would construe the plea as a waiver of rights which might be asserted on appeal.
Guilty pleas normally act as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional pre-plea defects that are not reserved, including insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Champagne, 461 So.2d 1059 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand for resentencing, 506 So.2d 1377 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987); State v. Coats, 260 La. 64, 255 So.2d 75 (1971). A great measure of finality should be afforded to guilty pleas. State v. Bosworth, 451 So.2d 1070 (La.1984); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Moreover, the testing of a sentence followed by an attempt to withdraw the guilty plea upon dissatisfaction with the sentence received has been long regarded as an impermissible ground to withdraw the plea. State v. Willis, 457 So.2d 861 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984); State v. Boatright, 406 So.2d 163 (La.1981); State v. Deakle, 372 So.2d 1221 (La.1979); State v. Robinson, 311 So.2d 893 (La.1975); State v. Johnson, 260 La. 902, 257 So.2d 654 (1972).
INTERPRETATION OF LSA-R.S. 13:1896
We granted the writ in this case and set the matter down for briefing and oral argument to consider whether the nature of proceedings in mayor's courts and their place in the State's judicial system required a different treatment of guilty pleas in such courts. Preliminarily we must determine whether LSA-R.S. 13:1896, in its own language, is restricted in application to cases "tried" in mayor's courts so that, by some literal construction, the statute should be held to be inapplicable to convictions and sentences which come as a result of pleas of guilty. We determine that the statute does not by its language indicate one way or the other that it should be restricted to cases "tried" in mayor's courts. Consequently, we pass on to the question of whether policy reasons dictate a handling of guilty pleas entered in mayor's courts differently from that accorded in other courts of our judicial system. This consideration requires that we look at the nature of mayor's courts and laws creating and empowering them.
In Sledge v. McGlathery, 324 So.2d 354 (La.1975) the Louisiana Supreme Court held that mayor's courts possessed the inherent power of courts. The question in the case, answered affirmatively, was whether a judge sitting as a mayor's court in Louisiana has the power and authority to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant charged under a municipal criminal code of the jurisdiction. The following selected quotations are from the Supreme Court's opinion in Sledge v. McGlathery:
La.R.S. 33:441 sets out the jurisdiction of the Mayor's court:
These courts remain in existence today pursuant to Article V, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 which provides in pertinent part that "Mayors' courts ... existing on the effective date of this constitution are continued, subject to change by law."
Article V, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, in pertinent part, guarantees that "[a] judge may issue ... all ... needful ... orders ... in aid of the jurisdiction of his court." One such order would necessarily be appointment of counsel for indigents because Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution, provides:
"... At each stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel ... appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment...."
[2-4] There is therefore little dispute that Mayor's courts are courts which have jurisdiction to conduct trials, determine guilt, and impose sentences including fines and imprisonment for breach of municipal ordinances. Judges of such courts may therefore issue needful writs in aid of their jurisdiction, including the appointment of counsel for an indigent charged with an infraction of an ordinance if that infraction may be punished with imprisonment.
The need to have indigent defendants who are confronted with the possibility of imprisonment represented by counsel was made constitutionally imperative by the United States Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
* * *
Mayor McGlathery's appointment of respondent Claude R. Sledge was therefore not only within his power and authority, but legally and constitutionally required, unless one or more of the arguments posed by respondent are found to have merit.
* * *
Secondly, respondent Sledge asserts that the resolution of the problem of appointed counsel in accordance with the Argersinger mandate is exclusively a problem for the Louisiana legislature. Independent of the presence of specific laws on the subject, we believe...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Joseph
... ... MR. RICHARD: Well — ... THE COURT: Okay ... The state argues that guilty pleas normally act as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional pre-plea defects that are not reserved, citing State v. Fontenot, 535 So.2d 433 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988) and State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). The state's reliance on these cases to support their argument is, however, misplaced. The Louisiana Supreme Court specifically noted as follows in Crosby, 338 So.2d at 588 (emphasis added): ... ...
-
State v. Myers
...act as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional pre-plea defects that are not reserved, including insufficiency of evidence. State v. Fontenot, 535 So.2d 433 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988); State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). "A guilty plea is more than a confession which admits that the accused did ......
-
City of Broussard v. Watkins
...and regardless of whether the conviction and sentence resulted from trial or the entry of a plea of guilty. State v. Fontenot, 535 So.2d 433, 438-39 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988). While we are cognizant that Fontenot involves a criminal case, for the same reasons espoused therein, the protection of ......
-
95-626 La.App. 3 Cir. 12/13/95, State v. Johnson
...expectation of a lesser sentence does not render a guilty plea involuntary. State v. Clark, 414 So.2d 369 (La.1982); State v. Fontenot, 535 So.2d 433 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988); State v. Fairley, 525 So.2d 588 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988). It is only when misunderstandings regarding the sentence one will......