State v. Forrest
| Decision Date | 07 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 13688,13688 |
| Citation | 578 A.2d 1066,216 Conn. 139 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Scott William FORREST. |
Bruce A. Sturman, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., with whom was Marcia A. Pillsbury, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO and BORDEN, JJ.
The defendant, Scott Forrest, has appealed from his judgment of conviction by a jury of the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, 1 for which the trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant raises the sole issue of whether the trial court should not have overruled his objections to the so-called "policeman at the elbow" questions that the state asked his expert witness on cross-examination. He claims that these questions elicited opinions from the expert regarding ultimate issues of fact reserved for the jury, in violation of General Statutes § 54-86i, 2 as well as in contravention of the trial court's prior ruling on the state's motion in limine. 3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The murder charge against the defendant arose from his admitted shooting of Sheila Ann Kelly, his former girlfriend. In November, 1987, Kelly purportedly attempted to terminate her relationship with the defendant, who had a history of psychological problems, including a suicide attempt. Kelly nonetheless attended a Christmas party with the defendant on December 4, 1987. After the party, the defendant and Kelly went to his grandparents' house, where the defendant then lived, and engaged in sexual intercourse in the defendant's room. Kelly thereafter told the defendant not to believe that they would get back together just because they had sexual relations that night. When the defendant was driving Kelly home, he became angry, stopped his car in a secluded area, and removed a rifle from the trunk of the car, allegedly intending to commit suicide. He then went to the front of the car and shot Kelly in the head three times.
The principal issue at trial was whether the defendant specifically intended to kill Kelly as alleged by the state, or rather killed Kelly while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance as the defendant claimed in an affirmative defense pursuant to § 53a-54a. Prior to the presentation of the defendant's case, the state filed a motion in limine requesting a ruling that the defense experts be prohibited, under § 54-86i, from expressing "an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the acts alleged in the information." After defense counsel agreed with the trial court's statement that § 54-86i prevented the parties from seeking an "opinion or inference as to whether the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the alleged act," the trial court granted the state's motion in limine.
Subsequently, the defendant called an expert witness, Kenneth Selig, a psychiatrist, to testify as to his diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition. Without objection by the state, defense counsel asked Selig if he had an opinion whether at the time of the shooting the defendant suffered "from a mental disease or defect that would rise to the level of insanity under our [p]enal [c]ode," to which Selig answered that in his opinion the defendant did not. The state then requested that the jury be excused, and expressed its concern to the trial court that the defense would next ask Selig, in violation of § 54-86i, whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect that rose to the level of extreme emotional disturbance. The state argued that Selig might The trial court, rather than expressing agreement with the state's interpretation of § 54-86i, noted that "the ultimate question here, the element is whether it is extreme emotional [disturbance]," and permitted the state to voir dire Selig in order to resolve the state's doubts.
After a voir dire of Selig, in the jury's absence, satisfied the state that his testimony would fall within the permissible bounds of § 54-86i, Selig testified further on direct examination that as a result of the defendant's break-up with Kelly, Upon cross-examination of Selig, the following colloquy then took place:
It is this exchange that the defendant claims violated the proscriptions of § 54-86i, as well as the trial court's ruling on the state's motion in limine. Furthermore, the defendant contends that the harm resulting from the exchange is apparent from the state's reduction of its case down to Selig's answers by referring the jury to Selig's answers in closing argument and stating "[t]hat's the whole case."
We note first that the defendant, by objecting to the state's questions on relevancy grounds, failed to preserve properly the issue he has raised on appeal. Practice Book § 4185 requires that appealable claims of error be distinctly raised at trial. See also Practice Book § 288; State v. Weidenhof, 205 Conn. 262, 273, 533 A.2d 545 (1987). Nor is the defendant entitled to Evans review of this issue, for the admissibility of expert opinion testimony is a matter of state evidentiary law, rather than a matter of constitutional significance. See State v. Smith, 209 Conn. 423, 426, 551 A.2d 742 (1988); State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 46-47, 540 A.2d 42 (1988); State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). Since the defendant's claim is not "of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right"; State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239, 567 A.2d 823 (1989); one of the four preconditions to Evans review, his claim to Evans review is without merit. See id., at 239-40, 567 A.2d 823. Because the parties have raised and briefed a single issue on appeal, and the record in this case provides an adequate basis for appellate review, we nonetheless exercise our discretion and review the defendant's claim. 4
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State v. Campbell
...disturbance; and (2) there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for [his] extreme emotional disturbance." State v. Forrest , 216 Conn. 139, 148, 578 A.2d 1066 (1990). The language requested by the defendant is a correct statement of the law. In State v. Elliott , 177 Conn. 1, 7, 411 A.2d ......
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