State v. Foster
| Decision Date | 07 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | AC 44043 |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FRANKLIN FOSTER |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Argued September 12, 2022
Procedural History
Petition for an order extending the acquittee's commitment to the Psychiatric Security Review Board, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk geographical area number one, where the court, Hon Richard F. Comerford, Jr., judge trial referee, denied the acquittee's motions to dismiss and to strike thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Hon Richard F. Comerford, Jr., judge trial referee; judgment granting the petition, from which the acquittee appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (acquittee).
James M. Ralls, special assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek, state's attorney, and Maureen Ornousky, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Cradle, Suarez and Seeley, Js.
The acquittee, Franklin Foster, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the state's petition seeking his continued commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (board) pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593. The acquittee claims that the court improperly (1) found that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a mental illness resulting in his being a danger to himself or others and (2) rejected his claim that § 17a-593, as applied to him, violates his right to equal protection guaranteed by the federal constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history underlie the present appeal. In 2002, following a trial before the court, Hon. William F. Hickey, Jr., judge trial referee, the acquittee was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect under General Statutes § 53a-13 with respect to the following offenses: burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-101 (a) (2); risk of injury to a minor in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1); two counts of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1); and two counts of possession of a weapon on school grounds in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217b (a) (1). The facts underlying the offenses are not in dispute. On January 16, 2001, the acquittee, then twenty-four years old, entered a Greenwich middle school while in possession of two knives. In a school hallway, the acquittee slapped, punched, and kicked a male sixth grade student, and he lifted a female sixth grade student over his head. The acquittee was on school grounds without permission and his violent conduct was unprovoked.[1] When the acquittee was asked by the police why he was at the school, he responded, On April 2, 2003, the court committed the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board for a period of time not to exceed ten years, and the acquittee was subsequently admitted to a psychiatric hospital. By agreement of the parties, the acquittee's commitment was continued by the court for one year in 2013, two years in 2014, two years in 2016, and one year in 2018. On July 24, 2018, the acquittee was granted conditional release, at which time he was discharged from the hospital and began living in the community. His release in the community was conditioned upon his compliance with several requirements pertaining to his ongoing mental health treatment.
On July 9,2019, the state filed a petition for continued commitment pursuant to § 17a-593. Therein, it alleged that "[t]he state is of the opinion that reasonable cause exists to believe that the acquittee continues to be a danger to himself or others if discharged" and that "without continued supervision by the board, [the acquittee] would quickly decompensate and become a risk." Thereafter, the acquittee filed a motion to dismiss the petition as well as an accompanying memorandum of law in which he relied on equal protection grounds. In broad terms, the acquittee argued that the recommitment procedure that applies to him as a committed acquittee pursuant to § 17a-593 differs from the recommitment procedure that applies to civilly committed inmates pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-515.[2]Although the acquittee does not define the term "civilly committed inmates" with specificity, courts in prior cases have defined such persons as "mentally ill, convicted defendants who were transferred, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17a-498 and 17a-515, to a psychiatric facility while they were serving their sentences, and whom the state seeks to commit to a similar institution after their sentences end." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299, 301, 53 A.3d 153 (2012); see also State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 514, 847A.2d862 (defining "civilly committed inmates" as "convicted prisoners who subsequently are civilly committed to a mental hospital at some point after they have been incarcerated"), cert, denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S.Ct. 424, 160 L.Ed.2d 340 (2004). The acquittee also argued that such disparate treatment of similarly situated persons cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. On August 27, 2019, the board filed with the court a report in which it recommended that the acquittee's commitment be extended for a period of time not to exceed five years. On November 12, 2019, the acquittee filed a motion to strike the portion of the board's report filed with the court that recommended that the acquittee's commitment be extended for five years, and he referred to arguments that he made in his memorandum of law he filed in support of his motion to dismiss.
In December, 2019, the court, Hon. Richard F. Comerford, Jr., judge trial referee, held a hearing related to the acquittee's motions and the state's petition. In oral rulings, the court denied the motion to dismiss the petition and the motion to strike the board's recommendation. On December 18,2019, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the state's petition to extend the acquittee's commitment, for a period of two years, until December 23, 2021.
On March 16, 2020, the acquittee filed the present appeal. On May 5, 2020, the acquittee filed a motion for rectification in which he argued that, in its memorandum of decision, the court mistakenly stated that he had been acquitted of two counts of possession of a firearm on school grounds, rather than two counts of possession of a weapon on school grounds. On September 30, 2020, the court held a rectification hearing, during which it stated that the acquittee's request for rectification was appropriate.
On March 26, 2021, the court, White, J., issued a corrected memorandum of decision in which it reiterated the findings and conclusions that had been set forth in Judge Comerford's original memorandum of decision, thereby granting the petition for a period of two years. In the corrected memorandum of decision, however, the court addressed the grounds for the acquittee's motion for rectification by stating that the acquittee had been acquitted of two counts of possession of a weapon on school grounds. The court also incorporated by reference statements made by Judge Comerford during the rectification hearing.[3] Additional facts and procedural history will be discussed as necessary.
First the acquittee claims that the court improperly found that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a mental illness resulting in his being a danger to himself or others. Specifically, he claims that the state was required, but failed, to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a risk of imminent physical injury to himself or others, meaning a risk that physical injury is "ready to take place" or is "hanging threateningly over one's head." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We are not persuaded.
In its corrected memorandum of decision, the court stated: "The court finds that the state has established by clear and convincing evidence that . . . [the acquittee] suffers from a psychiatric illness diagnosed as: schizoaffective disorder bi-polar type . . . borderline intellectual functioning . . . inappropriate and impulsive behaviors especially toward females . . . [and] frustration difficulties.
In its decision, the court also stated that it "incorporates by reference its oral remarks regarding the rationale involved in the court's ultimate decisions on the motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and the state's...
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