State v. Foster.
| Decision Date | 04 August 1919 |
| Docket Number | No. 2299.,2299. |
| Citation | 183 P. 397,25 N.M. 361 |
| Parties | STATEv.FOSTER. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
The evidence in this case reviewed, and held, that the confession made by appellant was involuntary
A cattle inspector and the owner of the cattle appellant was accused of stealing held to be “persons in authority,” within the rule excluding a confession of a defendant in a criminal case, where the confession is induced by promises of immunity made by persons in authority.
Appeal from District Court, Chaves County; McClure, Judge.
Otis Foster was convicted of larceny of cattle, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded, with instructions to grant a new trial.
Where defendant, knowing that he was under suspicion of stealing cattle, procured cattle inspector's statement to defendant's neighbor that inspector would see how owner felt, and, if he would not push case, would bring him to meet defendant, and that, if they came, defendant might understand that owner would not prosecute, a confession to the inspector and owner was involuntary.
L. O. Fullen, of Roswell, for appellant.
Carl H. Gilbert, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant appeals from a conviction of larceny of cattle. His confession of the crime to Lee J. Richards, a cattle and hide inspector, and to W. A. Hamilton, the owner of the stolen cattle, was introduced by the state over appellant's objection, that the same was involuntary, having been induced by promises of immunity made by both Richards and Hamilton. The court was of the opinion that there was a conflict in the evidence whether the confession was voluntary or involuntary, and let it go to the jury, under an instruction that if they believed that the confession was voluntary they could consider it in arriving at their verdict, but if they believed that it was involuntary they should not so consider it. This action of the court is assigned as error.
[1]The undisputed facts in the case are: That the appellant, learning that he was under suspicion, went into hiding. That his mother went to a neighbor, H. C. Hammond, and asked him to see what could be done in appellant's behalf. Hammond called on Richards and asked him to see Hamilton, and see if Hamilton would be inclined to deal leniently with the appellant, if the appellant would come in and tell all he knew about the case. Richards told Hammond that he (Richards) would see Hamilton, and if Hamilton would help the appellant, Richards would bring Hamilton to Hammond's house at a named hour, and that if they came Hammond could inform appellant that Hamilton would help the appellant, if he would come to Hammond's house and meet them, and tell them all he knew about the case. Hammond so informed the appellant, and when, according to the arrangement, Richards and Hamilton came to his house, Hammond sent for the appellant, who came in, met Richards and Hamilton, and confessed. There is a conflict in the testimony whether or not, at the time appellant confessed and immediately prior thereto, Richards and Hamilton promised him immunity. Richards denies that they did. The appellant testified that they made him the promises immediately before he confessed. Hamilton did not appear as a witness in the case.
But we believe the court misapprehended the conclusive effect of the facts leading up to the making of the confession, for it was established by the testimony of all the witnesses, including Hammond, that the confession was brought about by Richards telling Hammond that he (Richards) would see how Hamilton felt about the matter, and, if Hamilton would not push the case, Richards would bring Hamilton to Hammond's house for a meeting with appellant, and that Hammond could tell appellant that, if they came, appellant could understand that Hamilton would not prosecute him. Richards, just before leaving the stand, testified as follows:
“Q. And do you know you arranged a meeting? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you conveyed the impression, by what you said and what you did, to Hammond, that if the boy did come up there with Hammond that he could know that it was all right and that Hamilton...
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State v. Lord
...in evidence because not voluntary. District attorneys are “persons in authority” within the meaning of the rule. State v. Foster, 25 N.M. 361, 183 P. 397, 7 A.L.R. 417; and annotation in 7 A.L.R. beginning at page 419. We stated in the Foster Case, 183 P. 398: “There is no more convincing e......
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State v. Turnbow
...of the jury, as to the voluntariness of his purported confession. We there quoted the following language from State v. Foster, 1919, 25 N.M. 361, 183 P. 397, 398, 7 A.L.R. 417: 'There is no more convincing evidence to the ordinary man than a confession of guilt, and where a confession is ad......
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State v. Sanders
...person can constitute sufficient state coercion to render the resulting confession involuntary. {12} Sanders relies on State v. Foster, 25 N.M. 361, 183 P. 397 (1919), and State v. Benavidez, 87 N.M. 223, 531 P.2d 957 (Ct. App.1975), for the proposition that the threat need not originate wi......
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Killough v. United States
...on a representation by the examiner that statements could not be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Cf. State v. Foster, 25 N.M. 361, 183 P. 397, 7 A.L.R. 417 (1919); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 419 at 7 In Tyler v. United States, 90 U.S.App. D.C. 2, 193 F.2d 24 (1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. ......