State v. Foster

• Decision Date: 30 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 21415,21415
• Citation: 127 Idaho 723,905 P.2d 1032
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Brenton Craig FOSTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1032

905 P.2d 1032

127 Idaho 723

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Brenton Craig FOSTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21415.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Oct. 30, 1995.

Lynn, Scott, Hackney & Jackson, Boise, for appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

In this case we are called upon to determine the validity of a vehicular search. After the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle, Brenton Craig Foster entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c), and misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer, I.C. §§ 18-903(a), 18-915. Foster now appeals, contending that the warrantless search of his automobile violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Because we find that the search was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. FACTS

On April 26, 1993, Brenton Foster drove to a duplex where an acquaintance resided. Foster parked his automobile on the driveway of the duplex and walked to the front entry of the residence. When Foster knocked, the door was opened by Special Agent Pieper of the Idaho Bureau of Narcotics. Pieper and several other law enforcement officers were in the duplex to arrest the resident on drug charges. Immediately after admitting Foster into the residence, Pieper questioned Foster as to why he was there and asked him for identification. Foster replied that he had identification in his vehicle. Agent Pieper and Officer Ross then accompanied Foster to his vehicle where he retrieved from the passenger compartment an identification card that was not a driver's license. Foster also opened the trunk of his vehicle to get a business card from a brief case as further identification. When Foster could not produce a driver's license, Officer Ross radioed a request for a driver's license check. Agent Pieper then asked Foster if Pieper could search the vehicle. Foster refused to consent. Pieper informed Foster that he was not under arrest but that he would not be allowed to drive his car away until the officers determined whether Foster was licensed to drive. At that point, Foster began to walk away, but Pieper told him he was not free to leave at all until the driver's license check was completed. Shortly thereafter, Officer Ross was informed by radio that Foster's driver's license had been suspended. Foster was then told he was under arrest for driving while his license was suspended. A scuffle ensued, and Foster was taken to the ground and handcuffed. When Foster was informed that he was under arrest, he was standing to the rear of the automobile. Agent Pieper estimated that Foster was about fourteen feet away from the vehicle when he was wrestled to the ground and handcuffed. After the arrest, the officers conducted a thorough search of Foster's vehicle and found marijuana, cocaine Foster was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), I.C. § 37-2732(c), and three misdemeanors: possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), I.C. § 37-2732(c); battery on a law enforcement officer, I.C. § 18-903(a); and resisting an officer. I.C. § 18-705. Foster filed a motion to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia seized from his vehicle, asserting that the warrantless search of the car did not constitute a valid inventory search or search incident to arrest and, therefore, the search violated the Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court denied Foster's motion, holding that the officers had a legal right to impound Foster's automobile and conduct an inventory search. The district court did not address whether the search was a lawful search incident to Foster's arrest.

[127 Idaho 726] and miscellaneous items of drug paraphernalia.

Foster thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges of possession of cocaine and battery on a law enforcement officer, reserving his right to appeal the court's order denying his motion to suppress. The remaining charges were dismissed. Foster now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying the suppression motion. Foster maintains that the search cannot be justified as an inventory search because there was no reasonable justification for impoundment of his automobile and that the search was not a valid search incident to arrest because he was not an occupant of the vehicle when he was arrested. ¹

II. ANALYSIS

When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, we accept the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Aitken, 121 Idaho 783, 784, 828 P.2d 346, 347 (Ct.App.1992); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 662, 809 P.2d 522, 523 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 122, 795 P.2d 15, 16 (Ct.App.1990). The lawfulness of a search is to be determined by the court, based upon an objective assessment of the circumstances which confronted the officer at the time of the search. Id. at 124, 795 P.2d 15.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995); State v. McIntee, 124 Idaho 803, 864 P.2d 641 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Wight, 117 Idaho 604, 790 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.1990). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198; McIntee, 124 Idaho at 804, 864 P.2d at 642.

A. Inventory exception

We consider first the district court's holding that the police lawfully impounded and conducted an inventory search of Foster's vehicle. Warrantless inventory searches following impoundment, when conducted in compliance with standard and established police procedures, and not as a pretext for criminal investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable searches and seizures. Colorado Although inventory searches of impounded vehicles' contents constitute an exception to the warrant requirement, an inventory search is not valid unless the police first obtain lawful possession of the vehicle. Our Supreme Court recently stated in Weaver, 127 Idaho at 291, 900 P.2d at 199:

[127 Idaho 727] v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 742, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099-3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Weaver, 127 Idaho at 291, 900 P.2d at 199; State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80-81, 813 P.2d 888, 891-92 (1991). Inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles serve three purposes: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property and the protection of the police and others from dangerous instrumentalities that may be found in the vehicle. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373, 107 S.Ct. at 741; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097.

An impoundment of a vehicle constitutes a seizure and is thus subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment. If the impoundment violates the Fourth Amendment, the accompanying inventory is also tainted, and evidence found in the search must be suppressed.

An impoundment will be found to comply with Fourth Amendment standards only if it was "reasonable under all the circumstances known to the police when the decision to impound was made." Id.

The standard against which we evaluate the reasonableness of police conduct in a seizure context was articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and reiterated by our Supreme Court in State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 523 P.2d 523 (1974):

[T]he officer's conduct must be judged against an

"Objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? [Citations omitted]. Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.... [Citations omitted]. And simple 'good faith on the part of the ... officer is not enough'.... If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."

95 Idaho at 925, 523 P.2d at 528, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. See also Weaver, supra.

Compliance with this standard has been found, and the impoundment deemed reasonable, where impoundment of an automobile following the driver's arrest was reasonably necessary to prevent a traffic hazard or to protect the vehicle from risk of damage or theft. Smith, 120 Idaho at 80-81, 813 P.2d at 891-92; State v. Bray, 122 Idaho 375, 834 P.2d 892 (Ct.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 916, 113 S.Ct. 1272, 122 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); Dept. of Law Enforcement v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 121 Idaho 211, 214-16, 824 P.2d 142, 145-47 (Ct.App.1991). Our Supreme Court found impoundment unreasonable, however, where the police impounded an automobile after arresting the driver without first making an inquiry which would have revealed that a passenger, who was not arrested, was the owner of the vehicle, had a valid driver's license and was able to drive and take responsibility for the automobile. Weaver, supra.

In Foster's case, the State has presented no justification for the officers' decision to...