State v. Bray
| Decision Date | 04 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 18982,18982 |
| Citation | 834 P.2d 892,122 Idaho 375 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Timothy BRAY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Thomas P. Watkins, Deputy Atty. Gen., (argued) for plaintiff-respondent.
Timothy Bray conditionally pled guilty under I.C.R. 11 to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, reserving his right to appeal from a district court order denying his motion to suppress. The issue he presents in this appeal is whether his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated when a police officer, responding to a motorcycle accident, conducted an inventory search of two saddlebags belonging to Bray and found illegal drugs. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the inventory search was the reasonable exercise of a police caretaking function, not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and we affirm.
On August 24, 1988, Bray was riding a motorcycle on state Highway 55 near the top of Horseshoe Bend Hill when he lost control of the motorcycle. Idaho State Police Officer George Stokesberry was the first officer to arrive at the scene of the accident. When Stokesberry arrived, a number of people were gathered around the accident scene, and Bray was sitting on a guardrail receiving medical attention from an EMT who had happened to pass by. The motorcycle which Bray had been riding had been picked up and parked on its kickstand by the side of the road and a number of items which had fallen off of the motorcycle during the crash had also been picked up and placed on top of the motorcycle. Stokesberry observed that Bray was covered with dirt and blood and had sustained various lacerations and abrasions about his head, face, and hands. Stokesberry also observed that Bray had a severe injury to his foot where the motorcycle's footpeg had gone through his boot. As a result of the foot injury, Bray was unable to walk. Stokesberry learned that an ambulance In conversing with Bray, Stokesberry noted that Bray was very concerned about the motorcycle and that Bray repeatedly expressed the desire to be left alone and to ride away from the scene on his own. Having determined, however, that Bray would pose a risk to himself and others if allowed to operate the motorcycle in his present condition, Stokesberry informed Bray that he would not be allowed to operate the motorcycle and that a wrecker had been called to retrieve it. Ultimately, Bray consented to being transported by ambulance to a hospital for treatment of his injuries.
[122 Idaho 377] had already been called to the scene.
Before Bray was placed in the ambulance, one of the ambulance attendants advised Stokesberry that Bray was carrying a gun in his belt, and requested that Stokesberry confiscate the gun. Stokesberry did so, and asked Bray if he had any other weapons in his possession. Bray replied that he had a .357 magnum in one of the motorcycle's saddlebags.
At the time of this incident, the official policy regarding inventory searches of impounded vehicles set forth in the Idaho State Police Operations Manual provided that "[i]n every case, all impounded vehicles must be inventoried by the impounding officer on ISP Form 112 prior to the time the wrecker operator takes control of the vehicle." Pursuant to this policy, Stokesberry performed an inventory of the items contained within and on the motorcycle. Stokesberry commenced by inventorying the contents of the motorcycle's two leather saddlebags. The lids of these saddlebags were unlocked but fastened by leather straps and buckles. Upon inventorying the saddlebags, Stokesberry found, among other things, a .357 magnum revolver; six bottles containing sodium chloride (a chemical used to manufacture methamphetamine); and several plastic bags, containing substances which appeared to be methamphetamine, marijuana, and LSD. One of the plastic bags containing the methamphetamine also contained three bundles of cash, each bundle containing $1,000. Upon finding what he believed to be controlled substances, Stokesberry, pursuant to department policy, stopped the inventory and radioed the Bureau of Narcotics for assistance in investigating the matter. Stokesberry waited to resume the inventory until after the narcotics investigator had arrived and had completed his investigation at the scene.
The Bureau of Narcotics dispatched investigator David Kynoch, who conducted a number of field tests at the scene to make a preliminary determination as to the nature of the substances found in Bray's saddlebags. Kynoch's tests indicated that the plastic bags contained methamphetamine, LSD, and marijuana. Kynoch took the items containing the contraband back to the laboratory for further testing.
After Kynoch removed the items containing the contraband, Stokesberry finished inventorying the property on the motorcycle, noting such items as a pair of binoculars, a scanner that was evidently broken during the accident, thirty-four rounds of .38 ammunition, some .22 magnum ammunition, a red leather coat, chaps, a yellow rain coat and pants, miscellaneous clothing, three fishing poles and reels which apparently had also been broken during the accident, a 35mm camera, and tools. Stokesberry took these items to a state police warehouse. The motorcycle was initially transported to the storage facilities of the wrecker, and was later transported to the state police warehouse.
Bray was subsequently charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, one count of concealing a deadly weapon, and one count of basic rule infraction. A preliminary hearing was held, after which Bray was bound over for trial in the district court. Bray then filed a motion to suppress in the district court, alleging that the evidence seized from the saddlebags and admitted at the preliminary hearing should have been suppressed because the inventory of the saddlebags violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. After a hearing on the motion, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order denying Bray's motion.
Later, pursuant to a plea agreement, Bray entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The state dismissed the remaining counts against Bray. Bray received a unified sentence of five years with a one-year fixed term of confinement. The district court retained jurisdiction over Bray for the first 120 days pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601, and stayed execution of the sentence during the pendency of this appeal.
The question we are asked to decide is whether the district court erred in denying Bray's motion to suppress. The standard for reviewing orders denying motions to suppress evidence is well established; we will not disturb the district court's determinations of fact which are based upon substantial evidence, but we exercise free review of the lower court's decision as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 666 P.2d 1139 (1983); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct.App.1986).
In its memorandum decision, the district court determined that because Bray was transported to Boise in an ambulance and the motorcycle was left standing upright near the edge of Highway 55, Stokesberry "had the authority and in fact even the responsibility of removing the motorcycle to a place of safe keeping." This determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Stokesberry testified that he refused to allow Bray to operate the motorcycle after the accident because, in his judgment, Bray's injuries left him physically unable to safely do so. The evidence also shows that after the accident, the motorcycle was parked upright near the edge of Highway 55. Various items which had fallen off during the accident were stacked on top of the motorcycle. Bray did not attempt to entrust the motorcycle to anyone at the accident scene. He testified, rather, that he told Stokesberry to leave the motorcycle where it was; that he had friends who were coming to pick it up. The record shows, however, that during the approximately two and one-half hours that Stokesberry was at the scene of the accident before the motorcycle was taken away, no one associated with Bray came to pick up either the motorcycle or the property found thereon.
Once a decision is made to impound a vehicle, an inventory search of the vehicle is permissible. State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80, 813 P.2d 888, 891 (1991). Under I.C. § 49-662(2) and (3)(b),
(2) Any peace officer is authorized to remove or cause to be removed to a place of safety any unattended vehicle illegally left standing upon any highway in a position or under circumstances as to obstruct the normal movement of traffic.
(3) Any peace officer is authorized to remove or cause to be removed to the nearest garage or other place of safety any vehicle found upon a highway when:
(b) The person or persons in charge of the vehicle are unable to provide for its custody or removal[.]
We conclude that the evidence adduced in this case and the law of Idaho both support the district court's conclusion that Stokesberry's impounding of the motorcycle was legal and proper. This conclusion is also consistent with constitutional law. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). See also State v....
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