State v. Fowler
| Decision Date | 23 December 1909 |
| Parties | STATE. v. FOWLER. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
1. Homicide (§ 152*) — "Manslaughter" — "Murder in the Second Degree" — Presumptions.
Where the killing with a deadly weapon was established, or admitted, and the plea was self-defense, the two presumptions that the killing was unlawful and that it was done with malice arose, and, where accused merely rebutted the presumption of malice, the presumption that the killing was unlawful stood, justifying a conviction of "manslaughter, " which is an unlawful killing, which becomes "murder in the second degree" when it has the added element of malice.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 279, 280; Dec. Dig. § 152.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4338-4342; vol. 8, p. 7715; vol. 5, pp. 4041, 4642; vol. 8, p. 7727.] 2 Criminal Law (§ 1175*)—Appeal and Error—Harmless Error—Verdict.
One convicted of manslaughter cannot complain that the jury, on discarding his plea of self-defense, should have convicted of murder in the second degree.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3188; Dec. Dig. § 1175.*]
3. Homicide (§ 244*) — Instructions — Self-Defense.
An instruction that, if the jury were "left in doubt" whether accused slew in self-defense, they should convict of manslaughter, was erroneous.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 509; Dec. Dig. § 244.*]
4. Criminal Law (§ 822*)—Trial—Instruction s—Construction.
A charge must be considered as a whole in the connection in which it was given, and if, when so construed, it presents the law correctly, the judgment will not be reversed because some of the expressions therein, when standing alone, are erroneous.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1990; Dec. Dig. § 822.*]
5. Homicide (§ 300*)—Instructions—Self-defen se—s ufficiency.
Where the court charged that accused was not required to rebut the presumption of malice, arising from the killing with a deadly weapon, beyond a reasonable doubt, but to the satisfaction of the jury, and that the plea of self-defense must be sustained only to the satisfaction of the jury, a charge that, if the jury were left in doubt as to whether accused slew in self-defense, they should convict him of manslaughter, was not misleading.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 619; Dec. Dig. § 300.*]
Appeal from Superior Court, Polk County; Justice, Judge.
Joe Fowler was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Shipman & Williams, for appellant.
The Attorney General and Geo. L. Jones, for the State.
This appeal presents two assignments of error:
1. Did the judge err in submitting to the jury the question of manslaughter? Under State v. Quick, 150 N. C. 820, 64 S. E. 168, such an error is without prejudice to the defendant, and he cannot complain. When, as in this case, the plea is self-defense, and the killing with a deadly weapon is established or admitted, two presumptions arise: (1) That the killing was unlawful; (2) that it was done with malice. An unlawful killing is manslaughter, and, when there is the added element of malice, it is murder in the second degree. When the defendant takes up the laboring oar, he must rebut both presumptions—the presumption that the killing' was unlawful, and the presumption that it was done with malice. If he stops when he has rebutted the presumption of malice, the presumption that the killing was unlawful still stands, and, unless rebutted, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. This is a fair deduction from the cases in this state. State v. Hagan, 131 N. C. 802, 42 S. E. 901; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 501, 502. At the request of defendant, the judge charged the jury very explicitly that, if they should find from the evidence offered by the defendant that the killing occurred under circumstances claimed by him and testified to by his witnesses, they should return a verdict of not guilty. The jury discarded defendant's plea, and if, as now argued by him, there was nothing in the evidence to warrant a verdict of manslaughter, it was the duty of the jury to convict of murder in second degree. It necessarily follows that, under such circumstances, the defendant cannot...
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...and, second, that it was done with malice--and an unlawful killing with malice is murder in the second degree." See State v. Fowler, 151 N.C. 732, 66 S.E. 567. It be seen that, in cases of homicide, it is the law that raises the presumption when the killing with a deadly weapon is admitted ......
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