State v. Fredericks, Cr. N
Decision Date | 26 October 1993 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 507 N.W.2d 61 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kenneth FREDERICKS, Defendant and Appellant. o. 920338. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Thomas A. Dickson of Nodland & Dickson, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant.
Joseph H. Kubik, State's Atty., Dickinson, for plaintiff and appellee.
On appeal, Kenneth Fredericks asks us to reverse his conviction for actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, NDCC Sec. 39-08-01, because, he claims, the jury panel from which his jury was selected was not a fair cross section of the community and thus violated NDCC Secs. 27-09.1-01 and 27-09.1-03, infra, the United States Constitution, and the North Dakota Constitution. We find that Fredericks' claim of violation of NDCC Secs. 27-09.1-01 and 27-09.1-03 is procedurally deficient, and that Fredericks has failed to make a prima facie case under either the federal constitution or state constitution. Accordingly, we affirm.
Fredericks, a Native American, was tried in Dunn County. A few days before trial, the trial court distributed to the parties a list of the names of the twenty-nine people on the jury panel. Before voir dire on the day of trial, Fredericks filed a handwritten motion, purportedly under NDCC Sec. 29-17-20, 1 challenging the jury panel and alleging that the "panel's composition [did] not accurately or fairly reflect the ethnic diversity of Dunn County," therefore depriving Fredericks of his right "to be tried by a jury of his peers." Arguing to the trial court, Fredericks asserted that none of the jury panel was Native American and that Native Americans accounted for approximately nine percent of Dunn County's population. Fredericks further asserted that "the [master] list they draw these names from is not properly representative of the Native American population" and that "the process is maybe flawed and not the people working in the process." In support of the motion, Fredericks cited the United States Constitution, the North Dakota Constitution, and NDCC Sec. 27-09.1-01. He asked the court to stay the proceedings "until an adequate jury list is prepared." 2 The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Fredericks offers additional evidence; 3 however, we must limit our review to the evidence contained in the record. City of Minot v. Freelander, 368 N.W.2d 514 (N.D.1985).
Chapter 27-09.1, the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, establishes the procedure for the state to create a jury selection plan and the clerk of each county to compile a master list. 4 The master lists use voters from the last general election as their primary source. NDCC Sec. 27-09.1-05(1). This court periodically designates supplementary sources for the master lists. Id. Currently, county clerks compile the master lists from voters in the last general election and licensed drivers. North Dakota Jury Selection Plan (1992). Jury panels, from which juries for particular cases are chosen, are randomly selected from the master lists. Id.
Fredericks asserts that Dunn County's jury selection process violates NDCC Secs. 27-09.1-01 and 27-09.1-03(3). Section 27-09.1-01 highlights the legislature's intent in adopting the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act:
"[I]t is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered for jury service in this state...." NDCC Sec. 27-09.1-01.
Section 27-09.1-03(3) defines "master list" as "the list of actual voters for the county which shall be supplemented with names from other sources prescribed pursuant to this chapter in order to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by this chapter." Apparently, Fredericks argues that the master list from which his jury panel was drawn violated these statutes because it did not represent a fair cross section of Dunn County, nor was it supplemented adequately to meet that end. However, Fredericks' motion did not comply with section 27-09.1-12, which sets out the exclusive procedure for challenging compliance with jury selection procedures under chapter 27-09.1:
Fredericks' motion did not contain a sworn statement of facts showing noncompliance with chapter 27-09.1. Because Fredericks challenges the statutory procedure under which Dunn County compiles its master list, which is governed by chapter 27-09.1, his motion must comply with section 27-09.1-12. He may not evade the requirements of section 27-09.1-12 by resort to another chapter, because section 27-09.1-12 is the exclusive means by which one may challenge compliance with chapter 27-09.1. Having failed to follow the statute, Fredericks may not obtain reversal of his conviction for any alleged violation of chapter 27-09.1. See People v. Green, 759 P.2d 814 (Colo.Ct.App.1988) [ ].
A criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury trial under the Sixth Amendment requires the selection of the jury from a representative cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). The Fourteenth Amendment makes the provisions of the Sixth Amendment binding upon the states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). Although the North Dakota Constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not explicitly require an impartial jury, see N.D.Const. art. I, Sec. 13, we would read the Sixth Amendment's impartiality and fair-cross-section requirements into our state constitution. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Supreme Court set out the elements of a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement:
"[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Id. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668.
Once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the state to show a significant interest manifestly and primarily advanced by the aspects of the jury selection process that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinct group. Id. at 367-68, 99 S.Ct. at 670-71.
Fredericks did not present any evidence to the trial court to satisfy either the second or third prong of the Duren test. Fredericks offered only the unsubstantiated assertions that Dunn County's population was nine percent Native American and that none of the jury panel was Native American. 5 These bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to show an underrepresentation of a distinct group. Even were we to read the State's Attorney's conflicting statements in the record as admissions that Native Americans were underrepresented on this particular jury panel, Fredericks fails to satisfy Duren's third prong. A mere observation that there are no Native Americans on a jury panel that was drawn from a population containing Native Americans "simply is not sufficient to demonstrate any systematic exclusion." United States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 706 (7th Cir.1991). Fredericks' constitutional claims must fail for lack of...
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