State v. Freeman

• Citation: 146 N.C. 615,60 S.E. 986
• Parties: STATE. v. FREEMAN et al.
• Decision Date: 25 March 1908
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

60 S.E. 986

146 N.C. 615

STATE.

v.FREEMAN et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 25, 1908.

1. Criminal Law — Appeal — Abandonment of Exceptions.

Under the express provision of rule 34 (140 N. C. 666), exceptions taken at the trial, but not set out in appellant's brief, will be taken as abandoned by him.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Criminal Law, §§ 3011-3013.]

2. Evidence—Acts of Bloodhound.

In a prosecution for breaking into a house with intent to steal, evidence of the conduct of a bloodhound is admissible, where the dog has been shown to have been trained to follow only the tracks of mankind.

3. Same.

In a prosecution for breaking into a house with intent to steal, evidence of tracks leading from the house is competent, and was properly submitted to the jury.

Appeal from Superior Court, Columbus County; Long, Judge.

George and Frank Freeman were convicted for breaking into a storehouse with intent to steal, and appeal. Affirmed.

J. B. Schulken, for appellants.

Hayden Clement, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLARK, C. J. Indictment for breaking into storehouse with intent to steal. Several exceptions were taken at the trial, but only two are relied on in defendant's brief. The others are taken to be abandoned. Rule 34, 140 N. C. 666.

The first exception is that it was error to permit the witness to state that "the dog carried us to the shoe" on the ground that it was making the act of the dog substantive testimony, and not corroborative of any particular act as the shoe was not upon any one. The same exception was taken to another witness, who said: "The dog went to the shoe referred to by the other witness. She smelt the shoe, and whined. She then turned to the defendant and scented him, and started to go on to him, and I took her away." His honor stated to the jury that the court allowed the foregoing evidence only as corroborative, and in his charge toldthem: "The evidence as to the dog is only admitted and so explained to the jury to corroborate other evidence as to tracks offered by the state and after the dog had been shown to have been trained to follow only the tracks of mankind." If there was error, it was against the state, for it is not correct to say that such evidence is admissible only in corroboration. In State v. Moore, 129 N. C. 498, 39 S. E. G26, 55 L. R. A. 96, it was held that it must be either "a circumstance which would tend to connect the defendants with the larceny, or that it in any way corroborated the testimony of the witness." As said in State v. Hunter, 143 N. C. 609, 56 S. E. 548, and cases there eited: "The conduct of the dog is competent evidence." The safeguard is that the dog was shown to be a bloodhound of pure blood, trained from a pup to run the tracks of men only; that she had been tried and proved reliable, "trained and tested." Pedigo v. Com., 103 Ky. 41, 44 S. W. 143, 42 L. R. A. 432, 82 Am. St. Rep. 566. The witness testified: "After she is put on the scent of one man she will not run after another. She has trailed the track of one man 15 miles, and through where 1, 000 had been." Where the training, character, and conduct of the dog makes his acts evidence, such acts may be either a circumstance or corroborating evidence. Their admission as evidence is not restricted to cases in which the dog's acts are corroborating only. It is sufficient, if the evidence of...