State v. Frey
Decision Date | 09 November 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 55173,No. 2,55173,2 |
Citation | 459 S.W.2d 359 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Eric FREY, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Dale L. Rollings, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Gerald Kiser, North Kansas City, for appellant.
Appellant, Eric Frey, was convicted by the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, of the unlawful sale of a hallucinogenic drug (V.A.M.S. 195.240) and of the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug (V.A.M.S. 195.020), and his punishment was assessed at imprisonment in the custody of the State Department of Corrections for terms of two and six years, to run consecutively. (V.A.M.S. §§ 195.270 and 195.200.) Following rendition of judgment and imposition of sentence and appeal was perfected to this Court.
Appellant testified at the trial. On cross-examination, the following occurred:
The State then introduced into evidence the following record of what occurred on July 8, 1968, in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri:
In Missouri, it is State v. McClain, Mo.Sup., 404 S.W.2d 186, 190.
V.A.M.S. § 491.050 reads as follows: 'Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is, notwithstanding, a competent witness; but the conviction may be proved to affect his credibility, either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer.'
We must conclude from the record that on July 8, 1968, after appellant entered a plea of guilty, the Circuit Court of St. Louis County suspended the imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation. This was permissible under V.A.M.S. § 549.071, which provides that a trial court 'may in its discretion, by order of record, suspend the imposition of sentence or may pronounce sentence and suspend the execution thereof and may also place the defendant on probation upon such conditions as the court sees fit to impose.' The trial court chose the first alternative authorized by the statute. We must conclude that the trial court did not impose sentence.
The determinative question then becomes: When sentence is not imposed, may there be a 'conviction' which will satisfy the meaning of § 491.050, supra? Or, to put the question differently, may the credibility of a witness be impeached, under § 491.050, by a record which shows he entered a plea of guilty but that sentence was not imposed?
The States are not in accord on the general question. See Annotation, 14 A.L.R.3rd 1272, 'Permissibility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing verdict of guilty without judgment of sentence thereon.' The question has not been decided in Missouri. However, various general pronouncements, relating indirectly to the question, appear in our case law.
In State v. Townley, 147 Mo. 205, 208, 48 S.W. 833 (1898), this Court approved the following statement: "It has generally been held that the word 'convicted' includes the final judgment, and that one who has been found guilty by the jury, but has not yet been sentenced, is not a 'convicted' person."
In Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 399, 177 S.W.2d 502, 504 (1944), this Court en banc said: "Convicted' is generally used in its broad and comprehensive sense meaning that a judgment of final condemnation has been pronounced against the accused. State v. Townley, 147 Mo. 205, 48 S.W. 833.'
In Meyer v. Missouri Real Estate Commission, 238 Mo.App. 476, 482, 183 S.W.2d 342, 345 (1944) the Court recognized the law announced in Townley and Neibling, supra, and said: 'We have been cited to no authority holding that the suspension of the imposition of the sentence, or the suspension of the sentence, itself, upon a plea or a verdict of guilty, and the placing of the defendant upon probation, is a final judgment within the meaning of the statutes giving effect to such proceedings in another proceeding.
In State v. Rumfelt, Mo.Sup., 258 S.W.2d 619, 620 (1953), this Court held that § 491.050, supra, 'must be strictly construed.'
In State v. Blevins, Mo.Sup., 425 S.W.2d 155 (1968), a case involving a jury verdict of guilty, this Court held that the judgment of conviction referred to in § 491.050, supra, is a final judgment of conviction, made so by affirmance on appeal or by lapse of time permitted for notice of appeal without an appeal having been taken.
In 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 618, p. 568, appears the following: ...
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U.S. v. Woods, 82-1683
...a prior conviction could not be used unless the witness had been sentenced in connection with the prior conviction. State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo.1970); State v. Crate, 493 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo.App., Because the general rule in Missouri is that a plea of guilty is a conviction and the e......
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Lewis v. Wahl, 74382
...is used generically and not specifically. The purpose of the amendment in 1981 was to change the result of the holding in State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo.1970). In Frey, this Court held that a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) is not a conviction and, therefore, could not be used to ......
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State v. Stearns
...credibility of a witness may not be challenged under § 491.050 where sentence has not been imposed, as in this situation. State v. Frey, 459 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo.1970). United States v. Hall, relied on by defendant involves application of federal standards which permit impeachment on a suspe......
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State v. Kirkland, 56218
...previously been attacked in a prior proceeding under rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., habeas corpus, or writ of error coram nobis. See: State v. Frey, Mo., 459 S.W.2d 359. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for new SEILER, J., ocncurs. HOLMAN, P.J., concurs in result. ...