State v. Friberg

• Decision Date: 31 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. C5-87-1703,C5-87-1703
• Citation: 435 N.W.2d 509
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mary FRIBERG, Bernard Boyle, Jr., Paul Bernabei, Georgia Springer and Paul O'Donnell, Petitioners.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 509

435 N.W.2d 509

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mary FRIBERG, Bernard Boyle, Jr., Paul Bernabei, Georgia Springer and Paul O'Donnell, Petitioners.

No. C5-87-1703.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 31, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

Defendants were not denied their constitutional right to a speedy trial where the delay resulted from an overcrowded court calendar and defendants suffered no significant prejudice.

Condition of probation requiring defendants convicted of trespassing to stay 500 feet away from the premises on which they trespassed did not unduly restrict their first amendment rights.

Barry William McKee, Stillwater, for petitioners.

Patricia A. Rogin, Asst. City Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

AMDAHL, Chief Justice.

Defendants petitioned this court to review a court of appeals decision which affirmed their conviction for trespassing and upheld a condition of probation which required them to stay 500 feet away from the premises on which they trespassed, 421 N.W.2d 376. Defendants argued their constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because trial was delayed for more than 60 days after their demand pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06 and that the limited geographical exclusion made a condition of their probation unreasonably restricted their first amendment rights. We disagree.

Defendants were arrested for trespassing after they staged a "sit-in" in a St. Paul Planned Parenthood clinic on December 23, 1986. A formal complaint was issued and defendants made their first appearance on January 13, 1987. At that time, a pre-trial hearing was scheduled for February 24, 1987. Petitioners appeared pro se at the scheduled hearing and requested a continuance so they could retain counsel. The court granted the continuance and scheduled a second pre-trial hearing for March 18, 1987.

At the March hearing, trial was scheduled for May 26, 1987; however, sometime prior to that date, the court assignment clerk contacted defendants' counsel to inform him the trial had to be postponed because no judges would be available during that week. On May 26, 1987, defendants filed a demand for speedy trial and the following day were notified by the court that the trial had been rescheduled for June 22, 1987. On the day the trial was scheduled to begin, defendants filed a notice to remove the judge who was assigned to hear their case. The removal of the judge caused a second delay.

Defendants' counsel was contacted the following day by the assignment clerk and informed that the trial could not be held that same week and that a notice of the new trial date would be sent by mail. The next trial date assigned was August 17, 1987. On August 13, 1987, defendants served upon the prosecutor a motion to dismiss the charges claiming their right to speedy trial had been violated.

Immediately preceding trial on August 17, 1987, the court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss and defendants presented testimony about how they had been inconvenienced by having to reschedule work and appointments, rearrange vacation plans, arrange to be absent from work, deal with pressure from employers to get the case concluded and cope with the stress and anxiety of waiting for trial.

During the motion hearing, the trial judge commented on the calendar problems which existed at the time, stating in the record:

I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I'm on the calendar committee for this district and I'm sure it's to the chagrin of the state that they can't move the cases faster because it is a problem with the number of judges and a lot of the illness on the bench as long as we have sat with two judges' positions that have been vacant for a long time.

The trial court also explained that defendants' case had come into the system at the time the district and municipal courts were being consolidated and there were many scheduling problems. Although the court did not specifically state it would take judicial notice of the calendar congestion, neither the prosecutor nor defendants' attorney disputed its existence. When questioned by the trial judge at the motion hearing, defendants' attorney did not remember whether he had informed the assignment clerk that his clients had filed a demand for speedy trial. The prosecutor explained at the hearing that the assignment clerk customarily contacts the defendant's attorney to arrange trial dates and simply notifies the prosecutor since prosecutors are generally readily available.

The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss from the bench stating that defendants' counsel had been aware of the scheduling problems when the notice of removal was filed and that the anxiety, stress and time lost from work and families was not sufficient prejudice to justify dismissal.

The trial was conducted as scheduled and defendants were convicted of trespassing. The court sentenced each of the defendants to 60 days in the Ramsey County Workhouse but suspended the sentences in lieu of probation subject to the following conditions: payment of a $330 fine; that defendants remain law-abiding for one year; that defendants not go within 500 feet of the clinic in which they had trespassed; and that defendants each complete 40 hours of community service. Defendants Friberg, Boyle and Springer agreed to the conditions. O'Donnell and Bernabei refused to abide by them and were ordered to serve their workhouse sentences.

On August 28, 1987 defendants' attorney filed a notice of appeal with the court of appeals indicating defendants were appealing the judgment of conviction and the condition of probation which prohibited them from going within 500 feet of the clinic. Sometime after the trial, defendants retained a new attorney who on September 2, 1987 filed a post-trial motion with the trial court to vacate the judgment or in the alternative to modify the conditions of probation. ¹ The motion was filed unaccompanied by any supporting affidavits and at the motion hearing conducted September 3, 1987, defendant's counsel presented no evidence. He simply argued the motion and submitted a memorandum to the court and gave no indication that he intended to submit more information to the court at a later time. Nearly two weeks later, on September 14, 1987, defendants' attorney filed an affidavit of the court assignment clerk which stated that if he had been informed that defendants had requested a speedy trial, he would have scheduled the case for trial within the 60-day period. The record contains no information as to whether the trial judge actually received the affidavit before issuing the order denying the motion on September 23, 1987. The findings and conclusions in the trial court's order refer only to the information which was discussed at the hearing. ²

After the trial court ruled on the post-trial motion, defendants' new attorney filed an amended statement of the case with the court of appeals so as to include in the appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court after which defendants petitioned this court for review.

Speedy Trial

The first issue we must consider is whether defendants' right to speedy trial was violated. We hold that Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06 does not set an arbitrary time limit for speedy trials, violation of which requires dismissal of a case. Rather, the rule provides that delays greater than 60 days after a demand for speedy trial has been made are presumptively prejudicial and require further inquiry to determine whether there was good cause for the delay.

Both the United States and the Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a defendant's right to speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV; Minn. Const. article 1, § 6. In evaluating this right, the United States Supreme Court has said:

The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (citing Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 576, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)). In Barker the Court refused to establish an arbitrary and rigid time period for determining whether the right to speedy trial has been violated and instead adopted a balancing test for reviewing such claims. Id. 407 U.S. at 529-530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. The Court directed trial judges to balance the following factors: 1) length of delay; 2) reason for delay; 3) whether the defendant asserted the right; and 4) whether there was any prejudice. Id. at 530-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93.

The length of delay, the court explained, is a "triggering mechanism" which determines whether further review is necessary. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. Where the length of delay is "presumptively prejudicial" there is a necessity for inquiry into the remaining factors of the test. Id. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. The court made clear that states are "free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards", but also indicated that trial courts should exercise judicial discretion based on the circumstances in each case. Id. at 523, 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2188, 2192.

Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06 and 11.10 are the procedural rules which define what this court considers a reasonable time for bringing defendants to trial. Both rules provide that defendants "shall be tried within sixty (60) days from the date of the demand unless good cause is shown by the prosecutor or the defendant why he should not be brought to trial within that period." Neither rule defines what constitutes "good cause" nor does either rule mandate any consequence for failure to bring a defendant to trial within sixty days.

Both the "Overview of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure" and the comments to Rules 6.06 and 11.10 indicate that the rules do not attempt to...