State v. Fritz
| Decision Date | 25 September 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 5549-I,5549-I |
| Citation | 585 P.2d 173,21 Wn.App. 354,98 A.L.R.3d 1 |
| Parties | , 98 A.L.R.3d 1 STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Lewis Donald FRITZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Lee Yates, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
An all night poker game at a residence in the town of Clyde Hill was abruptly terminated at 4 a. m. on April 19, 1975, when two men kicked in the front door and lined the card players up against a wall at gunpoint.
Officers of the Clyde Hill and Bellevue police departments promptly responded to a call from one of the participants in the game who had managed to escape. The officers captured the defendant and a companion at the scene, located a sawed-off shotgun and automatic pistol nearby and recovered the approximately $3,000 taken from the players.
Three separate trial dates had to be set for the defendant's case. The first date was stricken because the defendant skipped bail and had to be extradited from Florida. The second was reset due to a last minute substitution of new defense counsel at the defendant's request. A month The defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery and two counts of attempted robbery. Special verdicts were returned finding that he was armed with a deadly weapon and firearm at the time.
before the third trial date which had been set, the defendant moved to dismiss his new counsel and represent himself, but withdrew that motion after he and his attorney appeared to have settled their differences as to how to proceed. Then, on the morning of the third trial date, the defendant moved to represent himself and sought another continuance, requests which were denied. The case was tried before a jury.
One issue is determinative of the defendant's appeal.
Does a defendant in a criminal case have such an unqualified right of self-representation that it is always error for a trial court to deny that right regardless of when and under what circumstances it is claimed?
CONCLUSION. A defendant in a criminal case does have a constitutional right to defend himself or herself, but the judicious and orderly administration of justice requires that certain procedural requirements be observed in order to assert such right.
The right of a defendant charged with the commission of a crime to act as his or her own lawyer has previously been before the courts of this state, notably in State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wash.2d 92, 436 P.2d 774 (1968) and State v. Woodall, 5 Wash.App. 901, 491 P.2d 680 (1971). Those cases well illustrate the inherent problems confronting a trial judge when faced with a defendant's request to act pro se. In Woodall, the defendant asked for the right, was granted it and then claimed that the trial court erred in giving him the right to represent himself. In Kolocotronis, the defendant, who frequently had been confined to mental institutions, also asked for the right, was granted it in part and then assigned error to the trial court's permitting appointed counsel to assist him with portions of the trial. The convictions in both Woodall and Kolocotronis were affirmed, and certain guidelines were laid down for the handling of such cases.
Subsequent to Kolocotronis and Woodall, however, the United States Supreme Court reassessed all of its previous decisions on the subject. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Faretta added new dimensions to the task already confronting the trial courts in such cases.
The right of defendants in criminal prosecutions to appear and defend in person or by counsel has long been conferred by statute in federal cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) 1, and it has been conferred by state constitutional provisions in Washington and most other states. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 813-14, 95 S.Ct. 2525; Const. art. 1, § 22.
Faretta involved the defendant in a state criminal prosecution. There the United States Supreme Court, in a sharply divided decision, held that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed the defendant the right to represent himself without counsel. 1 The court ruled that the courts of the State of California erred when they forced Mr. Faretta to accept an appointed public defender and refused his request to conduct his own defense.
While Faretta declared a constitutional right, it did, as noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, leave open a host of procedural questions. See Faretta v. California dissent of Blackmun, J., 422 U.S. at 846, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Many cases have since considered those open procedural questions, particularly the courts in the State of California from whence Faretta arose. In the process, certain rules have evolved relative to a defendant's exercise of his or her right of self-representation in a criminal case. That right, and the generally accepted procedures for implementing and asserting that right, can be stated in eight basic principles.
1. Every defendant in a criminal case has an independent constitutional right to represent himself or herself without the assistance of legal counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
The rationale of this principle is explained by the majority opinion in Faretta :
It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Illinois v. Allen (397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)), 397 U.S. 337, 350-351, 90 S.Ct. 1057 (Brennan, J., concurring).
(Footnote omitted.) Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.
2. In order to exercise this right, it is incumbent on the defendant to request it, and the court is not initially required to advise a defendant of that right. People v. Salazar, 74 Cal.App.3d 875, 141 Cal.Rptr. 753, 761 (1977); People v. Enciso, 25 Cal.App.3d 49, 101 Cal.Rptr. 590, 594 (1972).
The reason for this has been bluntly put:
Unlike the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to dispense with such assistance and to represent oneself is guaranteed not because it is essential to a fair trial but because the defendant has a personal right to be a fool. This right is afforded the defendant Despite the fact that its exercise will almost surely result in detriment to both the defendant and the administration of justice. (People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal.3d 156, 164-166, 127 Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843.) It would be fundamentally unwise to impose a requirement that the court advise or suggest to a defendant this procedure which is likely to be to no one's benefit.
People v. Salazar, 141 Cal.Rptr. at 761.
3. The right must be exercised knowingly and intelligently. As expressed in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541:
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst (304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)), 304 U.S., at 464-465. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies (332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948)), 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann (317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)), 317 U.S., at 279.
In assessing the knowledgeable exercise of a defendant's right of self-representation, a showing of technical legal knowledge is not required, People v. Freeman, 76 Cal.App.3d 302, 142 Cal.Rptr. 806, 809 (1977), although mental competency to waive counsel and act as one's own counsel is obviously required. State v. Kolocotronis, supra, 73 Wash.App. at 98-102, 436 P.2d 774; Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233, 1235 (1961). In this connection, it should be observed that to the extent that State v. Kolocotronis, supra, may suggest that lack of technical competence can justify denying a motion for self-representation, it has been overruled by Faretta v. California, supra.
A basic constitutional right, which the defendant who elects pro se representation waives, is the right to be represented by counsel, a right which is cherished by most. Furthermore, the pro se defendant will bear the consequences of his or her own representation and cannot on appeal complain of the quality of his or her...
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