State v. Fulkerson

• Decision Date: 31 January 1867
• Parties: STATE v. JOHN FULKERSON and SQUIRE BUTNER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

61 N.C. 233

STATE

v.JOHN FULKERSON and SQUIRE BUTNER.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January Term, 1867.

If one lay poison for another, and he or a third person take it and death result, it is murder, both in the principal and accessories before the fact.

Where the Judge charged the jury, that they must “render a fair and honest verdict. If they had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the prisoners, it was their duty, under the obligations which they had taken, to render a verdict accordingly; but if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the law and evidence, that the prisoners were guilty, and from any false sympathy rendered a verdict of not guilty, that the law said they were perjured men:” Held that it was not error.

It is not error for the Judge, after he has once charged the jury, and they have retired and failed to agree, in proceeding to give further instructions, to refuse to permit more to be said in behalf of the prisoners or the State; though it may be restrictive of our indulgent practice in capital trials.

MURDER, tried before Fowle, J., at Fall Term, 1866, of the Superior Court of FORSYTH.

The points in the case sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Attorney General, for the State .

Gilmer and T. J. Wilson, for the prisoners .

READE, J.

It was admitted that the deceased, Annie Grunet, came to her death by poison prepared by Jane Grunet, for the purpose of killing Mrs. Grunet, the step-mother of Annie; and that the poisoned soup which Jane made for Mrs. Grunet was taken by Annie; and there was evidence tending to show that the prisoners were accessories before the fact. His Honor charged the jury that they must be satisfied that the prisoners knew of Jane's purpose to poison Mrs. Grunet, and that they aided, abetted, counselled or encouraged Jane in her purpose.

There can be no doubt, that if A lay poison for B, and he or another take it, and death result, it is murder, both in the principal and accessories before the fact. Arch. Cr. Pl., 216.

There were two objections mainly relied on in this court for the prisoners.

1. That the Judge intimated his opinion upon the facts against the prisoners in this:

“The court then said, that every trial which involved the life of a human being was a matter in which every man, woman and child in the county and State had a direct interest. That our whole people were interested in the proper administration of justice, and that it was their duty to try this case by the law and the evidence, and render a fair and honest verdict. That if they had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the prisoners, or either of them, it was their duty, under the obligations which they had taken, to render a verdict accordingly; but if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt upon the law and evidence, that the prisoners, or either of them, were guilty, and from any false sympathy rendered a verdict of not guilty, that the law said they were perjured men.”

It is not stated that there was anything in the manner or emphasis of the charge against the prisoners; and the language itself does not indicate any leaning or bias. We must therefore take it that there was nothing in the manner of the Judge to give any peculiar character to his charge. Indeed, it is so grave an error in a Judge to invade the province of the jury, that we do not feel at liberty to strain his language, in order to find a fault. Yet, when the error is apparent, the consequence may be fatal to the prisoner, and we do not hesitate to correct it. It is true his Honor did not charge, in so many words, that if they convicted from prejudice it would be perjury, as much as if ...