State v. Fulton

• Decision Date: 03 January 1911
• Citation: 152 Mo. App. 345,133 S.W. 95
• Parties: STATE v. FULTON.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

133 S.W. 95

152 Mo. A. 345

STATE v. FULTON.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

January 3, 1911.

1. COURTS (§ 36)—INFERIOR COURTS—JURISDICTION—PRESUMPTIONS.

The county court, though a court of limited statutory jurisdiction, stands on the footing of courts of general jurisdiction, and the same presumptions will be indulged in favor of the regularity of proceedings in the county court, and the validity of its judgments in matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, as are indulged in favor of judgments of courts of general jurisdiction.

2. COURTS (§ 35)—COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION—PRESUMPTIONS.

Where the record of a court of general jurisdiction is silent about a matter necessary to confer jurisdiction, the existence of such matter will be presumed.

3. COURTS (§ 36)—JURISDICTION — PRESUMPTIONS.

In the absence of a showing to the contrary, the court must presume that the county court had jurisdiction at a special term of court to make an order for the publication of notice of the result of a local option election; jurisdiction in matters pertaining to local option elections being placed in the county court.

4. COURTS (§ 64)—COUNTY COURT—SPECIAL TERMS—STATUTES.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 4088, authorizing the president or any two judges of the county court to order a special term when the business and interests of the county may require it, the power to determine when a special term is necessary is left exclusively to the presiding judge or judges, and the discretion in ordering a special term cannot be questioned.

5. COURTS (§ 64)—SPECIAL TERMS—COUNTY COURT.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 4088, authorizing the president or any two judges of the county court to order a special term when the business and interests of the county may require it, the president may order a special term to take steps necessary in a local option election, and the court at a special term called by the president may make an order for the publication of notice of the result of a local option election.

6. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 39)—VIOLATION OF LOCAL OPTION LAW—EVIDENCE.

The state, on a trial of a violation of the local option law, need not show that notice of the result of a local option election was given, but the fact that notice was not given is a matter of defense.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Joseph J. Williams, Judge.

P. H. Fulton was convicted of violating the local option law, and he appeals. Affirmed.

John H. Raney and James Orchard, for appellant. J. F. Meador, Pros. Atty., for the State.

COX, J.

Defendant was convicted on a charge of an illegal sale of liquor, in violation of the local option law, and has appealed.

The only error urged upon our consideration in this court is one relating to the publication of notice of the result of a local option election. The order for the publication of notice was made at a special term of the county court of Wayne county, and appellant now insists that this special term of the court was not legally convened, and therefore the court had no authority to act, and the order for the publication of notice was therefore void, and hence the local option law did not go into effect in Wayne county. The record of the court shows that on March 1, 1906, the February term of the county court of Wayne county adjourned sine die. The record of the special term, at which the order complained of was made, shows the following order to have been made April 9, 1906: "Court met pursuant to call by the presiding judge, James Grisham, with the following officers present: James Grisham, presiding judge of the county court; A. Blain, associate justice of the county court, district No. 1; D. Cozart, associate justice of the county court, district No. 2; Almon Ing, prosecuting attorney, and William Woods, clerk, when the following business was transacted." No complaint is made of the form of the order for the publication, nor the proof of the fact that publication was made as directed, but the whole contention rests upon the fact that the court did not legally convene, and the position is taken...