State v. Fultz
Decision Date | 03 July 1940 |
Docket Number | No. 37011.,37011. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. FULTZ. |
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court, Division No. 12; Robert L. Aronson, Judge.
John Fultz was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Roy McKittrick, Atty. Gen., and Ernest Hubbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
No appearance for defendant.
COOLEY, Commissioner.
Appellant, defendant below, was convicted of murder in the second degree for the killing of one Milton Gordon. The jury assessed his punishment at twenty-five years imprisonment in the penitentiary. The trial court overruled defendant's motion for new trial but of its own motion reduced the punishment to fifteen years imprisonment and after allocution sentenced defendant accordingly. He appealed. He has filed no brief in this court but after having filed his motion for new trial in the circuit court he filed there a "memorandum," or it might be called suggestions, in support of said motion, which was considered by the court in passing on the motion for new trial and which will be referred to hereinafter. It was not, however, part of the motion for new trial and is not to be so considered.
Gordon was killed by defendant about 6:15 A. M. on November 25, 1937, at the Golden Lily Tavern in St. Louis, a place frequented by cab drivers, of whom Gordon was one. Defendant was a shrimp peddler, who also frequented the place, selling his shrimps. He was often referred to as the "shrimp man." He and the deceased had known each other for several years. There was no particular hostility or bad feeling between them but Gordon would sometimes "tease" defendant and snatch shrimps out of his basket, to defendant's annoyance because the shrimps cost him money, of which he had very little. However, there is no evidence of quarrels or serious bad feeling between the parties prior to the fatal encounter above mentioned. On that morning they met in the Golden Lily Tavern. The state's evidence tended to show that defendant entered the tavern and set down his basket of shrimps on a table or window ledge. Gordon, who had been in the tavern and had momentarily stepped out, reentered, picked up the basket of shrimps and walked up and down the room saying "Shrimps, shrimps, who wants to buy some shrimps?" It appears from the state's evidence he was meaning to tease or torment defendant. Defendant drew an ice pick from a scabbard at his belt and stabbed Gordon twice in the chest and once in the forehead, inflicting mortal wounds from which Gordon very soon died. Defendant was soon thereafter arrested and at the police station made (voluntarily) a written statement, as follows:
We omit further details of the state's evidence because on the record before us there can be no doubt but that the evidence justified submission of the crime of murder in the second degree. We need not consider whether or not there was evidence of deliberation sufficient to justify submission of murder in the first degree, since defendant was not convicted of that degree of crime.
Defendant did not testify. As well as we can gather from the record, the defense he relied upon was self defense. There was evidence tending to show that in his business of preparing for sale and selling shrimps he customarily carried an ice pick—the lethal weapon he used in the homicide—in a scabbard attached to his belt. That was for the purpose of chipping ice at various places and from time to time in order to preserve the shrimps in salable condition. There was no evidence tending to show that he carried it as a weapon or for unlawful purpose. The evidence relied upon to show self defense was the testimony of a Mrs. Effie Taylor (colored). In brief, she testified that she entered the Golden Lily and sat down at a table by defendant, whom she knew; that defendant went over to the counter to get a bottle of soda water and while he was so doing the deceased took some shrimps out of defendant's basket; that she said to him "You're not counting them" and he said "They don't have to be counted." Testifying further and speaking of defendant as the "shrimp boy" and of deceased as the "cab boy" she said: She then described how, much excited, she left and shortly later came back to learn if, as she had been informed, it was the shrimp boy who had been killed. In answer to further questions she said the shrimp boy "defended himself" by "striking at the (cab) boy with the ice pick." She further testified that as defendant backed away from deceased and said "I bought $3.00 worth of shrimps, I'll give you a break" the "cab boy" said, Further on in her testimony, on cross examination, this occurred:
Defendant offered to prove by a witness, Liberman, a pawnbroker, that defendant had been in the habit of pawning clothes with the witness and later redeeming them and that a day or so before the homicide defendant had thus pawned some of his clothes with the witness. The court sustained the state's objection to such offered proof on the ground of irrelevancy.
As we have said defendant has filed no brief here, but did file in the trial court a "memorandum" in support of his motion for new trial, which has been transmitted to us with the record herein In that "memorandum" defendant urged...
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