State v. Gadsden

• Decision Date: 11 February 1905
• Citation: 50 S.E. 16,70 S.C. 430
• Parties: STATE v. GADSDEN et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

50 S.E. 16

70 S.C. 430

STATE v. GADSDEN et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 11, 1905

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Oconee County; Klugh Judge.

Limerick Gadsden and John Trip were convicted of arson, and appeal. Affirmed.

J. R Earle, for appellants. J. E. Boggs, Sol., for the State.

WOODS J.

The defendants, Limerick Gadsden and John Trip were convicted of arson, with recommendation to mercy.

The first ground of appeal is that the circuit court erred in allowing the witness W. J. Stribling to give his impression formed from a conversation he held with the defendant Gadsden a day or two before the fire, instead of confining him to a statement of the substance of the conversation. When this witness had given the conversation in substance, undertaking in some degree to use Gadsden's precise words, which indicated ill will on the part of Gadsden towards the prosecutor, and expression of an intention to "fix him," the defendants' counsel moved to strike out all the witness had said on the subject "as being irrelevant and tending to show reputation." This motion was, of course, refused. The witness then said: "The impression that Limerick made on me was that he intended to indict Craig." The solicitor thereupon objected on the ground that "impressions are not testimony." His objection was overruled, and the witness said: "I had an impression. It was produced in part of my knowledge of Limerick. That impression was that Limerick was up to some devilment." The defendants' counsel then asked, "Wasn't what he said what impressed you that he intended to indict him?" and the witness answered, "If I had not known him before, I might have thought he intended to indict; but from my previous knowledge of him, my impression was very different from that." At this point it is said in the record, "Mr. Earle [defendants' counsel] renews motion to strike out." It will be seen from this statement of what occurred at the trial, taken from the printed "case," that it does not appear that defendants' counsel objected at any time to the witness giving his impressions, but, on the contrary, that the objection was made by the solicitor. Defendants' first motion to strike out was made when the conversation itself--not impressions or conclusions--had been given. When the motion to strike out was renewed, no intimation was given the court as to the portion of the evidence it was intended to embrace. ...