State v. Gaines

Decision Date11 October 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-323,88-323
Citation545 N.E.2d 68,46 Ohio St.3d 65
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. GAINES, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

R.C. 2923.11(B) and 2929.71(A) require that, prior to imposition of an additional term of three years' actual incarceration for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was operable or could readily have been rendered operable at the time of the offense.

On March 10, 1986, defendant-appellee, Dennis Gaines, was indicted by the Scioto County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery, with a firearm specification, pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and 2929.71(A). On May 14, 1986, trial was commenced. During trial, various testimony was given relative to appellee's possession of a gun during the commission of the offense.

The state's initial witness, Timothy Munion, testified as follows:

"Q. Did you see a gun in his hand?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. What kind of gun was it?

"A. It was a shiny gun like a revolver sort of--

"Q. Silver plated?

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Or chrome plated?

"A. It was real shiny.

"Q. Are you sure it was a gun?

"A. Most definitely.

"Q. How do you know?

"A. It * * * he didn't fire it or anything but I've seen guns before. Pistols and such. It resembled a pistol. It was a pistol in my mind at the time.

"Q. You're sure in your mind it was a gun?

"A. Yeah."

After Munion's testimony, Sandra Rader testified as follows:

"Q. What type gun was it?

"A. Well, I don't know my guns really. The end of it, the round part of if was about this long, and it was shiny silver.

"Q. Could you easily distinguish from your vantage point it was a gun?

"A. Oh, yes.

"Q. Were you convinced in your own mind it was a lethal weapon.

"A. Uh huh.

" * * *

"Q. Were you convinced in your own mind the gun was capable of firing a shot and injuring someone?

"A. Yeah, I thought any minute it was going to go off."

On rebuttal, Kevin McKnight testified on behalf of the state as follows:

"Q. Did he have his hand extended over the counter with the gun in it?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Could you see the gun?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. How far away were you from the front of that gun?

"A. Like this. Two or three feet.

"Q. You were looking down the barrel of the gun, is that correct?

"A. One time he was up there like this and I could see it.

"Q. In your mind was it a real gun?

"A. It was a real gun.

"Q. Capable of firing a bullet?

"A. Yeah."

Following trial, appellee was convicted of aggravated robbery with the firearm specification, and judgment was entered upon the verdict. On January 19, 1988, the court of appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the firearm specification.

The court of appeals, finding its decision to be in conflict with the decision of the First Appellate District in State v. Jordan (1987), 31 Ohio App.3d 187, 31 OBR 353, 509 N.E.2d 1278, and the decision of the Sixth Appellate District in State v. Vasquez (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 92, 18 OBR 455, 481 N.E.2d 640, certified the record of the cause to this court for review and final determination.

Lynn Alan Grimshaw, Pros. Atty., and R. Randolph Rumble, Portsmouth, for appellant.

Gloria Eyerly, Columbus, for appellee.

Randall M. Dana, Gregory L. Ayers and Barbara L. Farnbacher, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender Com'n.

Tataru, Wallace & Warner and Roger Warner, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

SWEENEY, Justice.

The sole issue presented for review in the instant appeal concerns the evidentiary basis necessary to require additional incarceration under the firearm specification statute. Defendant-appellee was convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01. This section provides in relevant part:

"(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall do either of the following:

"(1) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, on or about his person or under his control;

" * * *

"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated robbery, an aggravated felony of the first degree." (Emphasis added.)

"Deadly weapon" is defined in R.C. 2923.11(A) as follows:

" 'Deadly weapon' means any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon."

In addition to his conviction for aggravated robbery, the jury further concluded that appellee was in possession of a firearm during the commission of the felony. The trial court thereafter imposed an additional term of three years' actual incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2929.71. This section provides in pertinent part:

"(A) The court shall impose a term of actual incarceration of three years in addition to imposing a life sentence pursuant to section 2907.02, 2907.12, or 2929.02 of the Revised Code or an indefinite term of imprisonment pursuant to section 2929.11 of the Revised Code, if both of the following apply:

"(1) The offender is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, any felony other than a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code; "(2) The offender is also convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a specification charging him with having a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the felony. The three-year term of actual incarceration imposed pursuant to this section shall be served consecutively with, or prior to, the life sentence or the indefinite term of imprisonment.

" * * *

"(D) As used in this section:

"(1) 'Firearm' has the same meaning as in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code[.]"

R.C. 2923.11(B) defines "firearm" as follows:

" 'Firearm' means any deadly weapon capable of expelling or propeling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible propellant. 'Firearm' includes an unloaded firearm, and any firearm which is inoperable but which can readily be rendered operable." (Emphasis added.)

It is the contention of the state that the terms "deadly weapon" and "firearm" are synonymous as applied to guns, and that evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the accused was in possession of a gun that was a deadly weapon pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) is also sufficient to establish that the accused was also in possession of a firearm pursuant to R.C. 2929.71(A). This view is not supported by the statutory language.

As an initial matter, R.C. 2923.11(B) defines "firearm" as a deadly weapon capable of expelling a projectile. If the General Assembly had intended that the two terms be synonymous there would have been no need to further define "firearm" in R.C. 2923.11(B) with respect to its operability. Moreover, there would be no need to separately define "deadly weapon" and "firearm" in R.C. 2923.11(A) and (B), respectively.

Secondly, if the requirements for the firearm specification contained in R.C. 2929.71 were satisfied merely by proof sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), the firearm specification statute would be superfluous. If, indeed, the General Assembly intended to impose a three-year mandatory term of imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, it could have so provided within the framework of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). 1

The state relies upon State v. Vondenberg (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 285, 15 O.O.3d 349, 401 N.E.2d 437, to support its contention. However, Vondenberg is inapposite to the issue involved in this appeal. The syllabus to Vondenberg provides as follows:

"For purposes of establishing the crime of aggravated robbery, a jury is entitled to draw all the reasonable inferences from the evidence presented that the robbery was committed with the use of a gun, and it is not necessary that the prosecution prove that the gun was capable of firing a projectile." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, Vondenberg was concerned only with the evidence necessary to establish the crime of aggravated robbery. That issue is not before this court. In point of fact, the firearm specification statute (effective July 1, 1983) was not in existence at the time Vondenberg was decided.

Consequently, commission of a felony while in the possession of an "instrument * * * capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon" is not synonymous with the commission of a felony while in the possession of a "deadly weapon capable of expelling or propelling * * * projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible propellant." Examples of these distinctions are numerous. One may use a BB gun (State v. Ewing [Mar. 27, 1980], Cuyahoga App. No. 41080, unreported) or a pellet gun (State v. Scales [Sept. 27, 1979], Cuyahoga App. No. 39763, unreported) in the commission of a theft offense and be found guilty of aggravated robbery. Nevertheless, on identical facts one would not be subject to the three-year firearm specification since such weapons, although considered deadly weapons under R.C. 2923.11(B), do not employ an "explosive or combustible propellant" so as to come within the purview of R.C. 2929.71(A) by virtue of the definition contained in R.C. 2923.11(B). State v. Gray (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 318, 20 OBR 420, 486 N.E.2d 159. Conversely, where the weapon used is inoperable, it may nevertheless be considered a deadly weapon even though it is not a firearm. Accordingly, convictions for aggravated robbery have been upheld even where a toy gun or an inoperable gun was used in the commission of the theft offense since such devices could be used as bludgeons and were therefore "capable of inflicting death" pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and 2923.11(A). See State v. Hicks (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d...

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