State v. Gaiovnik

Decision Date09 March 2011
Docket NumberNo. A09–190.,A09–190.
Citation794 N.W.2d 643
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.Christopher George GAIOVNIK, a/k/a Christopher George Gaiounik, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. Because the procedures set forth in Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2010), do not apply when a defendant challenges a district court's legal authority to award restitution in the absence of a request from the victim, appellant did not waive his right to challenge the district court's restitution order on appeal by failing to request a hearing within 30 days of sentencing.

2. Because the district court's authority to order restitution is not limited to those situations where a victim submits a request for restitution, the court did not err when it ordered appellant to pay restitution when no victim requested restitution.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Mitchell L. Rothman, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy Spurbeck, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether the district court violated Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2010), when it ordered appellant Christopher Gaiovnik (Gaiovnik) to pay restitution to a victim when the victim did not request restitution. Because we conclude that the district court's authority to order restitution is not limited to those situations where a victim submits a request for restitution, we affirm.

On December 10, 2007, Gaiovnik and his accomplice, Christopher Landvik, robbed two employees of Hollister, a clothing store located in the Rosedale Mall. The robbery occurred in the mall parking ramp as two employees were on their way to the bank to deposit the store's cash receipts.

Shortly after the robbery, the employees returned to the Hollister store inside the mall. Their manager called 911 and police subsequently arrested Gaiovnik. The State charged Gaiovnik with simple robbery in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.24 (2010), theft in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subds. 2(1) and 3(2) (2010), and aiding and abetting both crimes in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2010).

The evidence at trial established that the amount stolen from Hollister during the robbery was at least $19,200. One employee testified that she told police that the amount stolen was “19,200.00.” The jury also heard the tape of the 911 call, in which this employee told the 911 operator that the stolen purse contained two cash bags containing $7,821 and $11,400, respectively. Finally, the second employee testified that on the day of the robbery, the stolen purse contained over $19,000 but less than $20,000. Gaiovnik did not dispute the amount stolen at trial, and he does not dispute on appeal that the amount stolen was at least $19,200.

The jury found Gaiovnik guilty of both simple robbery and theft. The district court convicted him of simple robbery and imposed sentence. During the sentencing hearing the parties and the court discussed restitution. Gaiovnik's counsel argued that the district court could not impose restitution because there was no restitution request from a victim. The presentence investigation report notes that Hollister and the two employees received victims' rights letters and information regarding restitution. But the record does not contain a restitution request from either Hollister or the individual victims.1

In response to Gaiovnik's argument, the court asked the State whether it was able to recover the money. The State responded that it never recovered the stolen money. The court then asked the State, “Do you have a specific amount that you could remind me of that was taken.” The State responded that [j]ust over $19,000” was stolen. The court stated, “Because if I remember correctly the allegation was that Mr. Gaiovnik took a trip to Vegas right after the robbery. Isn't that right?” The State answered affirmatively. The court then asked Gaiovnik and his counsel if they had anything else to say, and they responded that they did not have anything else to add.

The district court subsequently sentenced Gaiovnik to 48 months imprisonment and imposed a $300 fine. The court also ordered Gaiovnik to pay to Hollister the difference between $19,200 and any money paid by Gaiovnik's accomplice.

Gaiovnik appealed and argued that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction, he was prejudiced by evidentiary rulings, and the district court erred in awarding restitution. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Gaiovnik, No. A09–190, 2010 WL 1439156, at *9 (Minn.App. Apr. 13, 2010). With respect to restitution, the court held that Gaiovnik waived his right to challenge the restitution award because Gaiovnik did not challenge the restitution award within 30 days of sentencing, as required by Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2010). Gaiovnik, 2010 WL 1439156, at *8–9. The court of appeals did not address Gaiovnik's argument that the district court lacked authority to order restitution in the absence of a victim's request. Id. We granted Gaiovnik's petition for review on the restitution question.

Gaiovnik argues that the district court lacked authority to order him to pay restitution to Hollister because Hollister did not submit a request for restitution. Specifically, he argues that restitution can be awarded under Minn.Stat. § 611A.04 (2010) and Minn.Stat. § 611A.045 only when a victim submits a request for restitution. The State contends that the court had the authority under Minn.Stat. § 609.10 (2010) to order restitution even in the absence of a victim's request. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Roby v. State, 787 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.2010).

I.

Before turning to the statutory interpretation question that the parties raise, we must first examine the court of appeals' holding that Gaiovnik waived the right to challenge the restitution award. As noted above, the court of appeals did not reach the legal question Gaiovnik raises regarding the district court's authority to award restitution because the court of appeals held that Minn.Stat. § 611A.045 barred him from challenging restitution on appeal. Gaiovnik, 2010 WL 1439156, at *8–9.

The court of appeals grounded its holding that Gaiovnik waived his right to challenge the restitution award on appeal in Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b). Gaiovnik, 2010 WL 1439156, at *9. This provision sets out procedures the offender must follow to contest restitution. See Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b). The offender may challenge a restitution award, but under subdivision 3(b), he “must do so by requesting a hearing [in writing and] within 30 days of receiving written notification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b). Once “the 30–day time period has passed,” the statute does not permit the offender to challenge a restitution award. Id.

Gaiovnik did not submit a written request for a hearing on the restitution issue. Rather, his counsel orally challenged the district court's authority to order restitution during the sentencing hearing. The court rejected this challenge and awarded restitution to Hollister. Because Gaiovnik did not “challenge[ ] the restitution award in the district court after the award was made,” the court of appeals concluded that section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), foreclosed Gaiovnik from pursuing the restitution award on appeal. Gaiovnik, 2010 WL 1439156, at *9.

Gaiovnik does not argue that he complied with the statute. He contends that he did not need to follow the requirements of section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), because he was challenging the legal authority of the district court to award restitution, not the amount of restitution. He argues that section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), requires an offender to object to the victim's request but not to the court's order of restitution. Gaiovnik concludes that because no victim made a request for restitution, he did not waive the right to appeal the issue of the district court's legal authority to award restitution in the absence of a request. The State disagrees and contends that Gaiovnik was obligated to follow the procedures in section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), regardless of whether a victim made a request for restitution. Because Gaiovnik did not submit a hearing request within 30 days after the restitution award was made, the State argues that Gaiovnik has waived the right to contest the restitution award on appeal.

We conclude that the procedures set forth in section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), do not apply when, as in this case, an offender challenges the district court's legal authority to award restitution. The object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010); see also Weiler v. Ritchie, 788 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn.2010). When interpreting statutes, we do not examine different provisions in isolation. Instead, we construe a statute “as a whole,” and [w]ords and sentences are understood ... in the light of their context.” Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., Inc., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943). In reviewing whether subdivision 3(b) of the statute applies, therefore, we do not look at this provision in isolation. Rather, we look at the provision in context.

Paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 provides this context. Subdivision 3(a) establishes procedures that apply when an “offender intends to challenge the amount of restitution or specific items of restitution or their dollar amounts.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). In that instance, the offender has the burden to produce evidence, which “must include a detailed sworn affidavit of the offender ... justifying dollar amounts of restitution...

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