State v. Galloway

• Citation: 45 Tenn. 326
• Parties: The State v. M. C. Galloway & W. H. Rhea.
• Decision Date: 30 April 1868
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

45 Tenn. 326

The State

v.M. C. Galloway & W. H. Rhea.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April Term, 1868.

FROM MEMPHIS.

At the January Term, 1868, of the Criminal Court for Memphis, Judge WILLIAM HUNTER, presiding, a judgment was rendered against Galloway & Rhea, for an alleged contempt of the Court, which is brought to this Court by writ in error; and also by writ of error from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Memphis, Judge GEORGE W. WALDEN, presiding, dismissing for want of jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus sued out in that Court by the defendant to be discharged from imprisonment, on the ground that the original judgment was void, and the imprisonment under it illegal.GRIFFIN, for the State.

E. M. YERGER, LANDON C. HAYNES and EDWARD A. BEECHER, for Galloway & Rhea.

HENRY G. SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Criminal Court of Memphis, pronounced judgment of fine and imprisonment, upon the charge of contempt, against M. C. Galloway & W. H. Rhea, the editors and publishers of the newspaper published at Memphis, called the Memphis Avalanche. The alleged contempt, upon which the judgment was rendered, was an editorial article published in the newspaper, purporting to give the particulars, and denouncing the Judge of the Court as guilty of official corruption, in discharging upon bail, a prisoner under indictment in that Court, for a felony. The publication was made a day or two after the discharge of the prisoner on bail.

Application is made to this Court by Galloway & Rhea, to revise and reverse the judgment of the Criminal Court, and discharge them from the sentence pronounced by that Court.

The clauses of the Code of Tennessee, in regard to contempt, dealt with in the opinion following, are these:

Sec. 4106. The power of the several Courts of this State, to issue attachments and inflict punishments for contempt of Court, shall not be construed to extend to any except the following cases:

1st. The willful misbehavior of any person in the presence of the Court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. 2d. The willful misbehavior of any of the officers of said Court, in their official transactions.

3d. The willful disobedience or resistance, of any officer of said Court, party, juror, witness, or any other person, to the lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command, of said Court.

4th. Abuse of, or unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of said Court.

5th. Willfully conversing with jurors in relation to the merits of the cause in the trial of which they are engaged, or otherwise tampering with them.

6th. Any other act, or omission, declared a contempt by law.

The inferior Courts of Tennessee have no power to punish as contempts, the acts or omissions of parties and persons, other than such acts and omissions as are prescribed by the Code, or other statuary enactments.

Contempts at common law, which do not fall within the five clauses prescribed by the Code, or by other statutory enactments, are not punishable by the inferior Courts of Tennessee. The 6th sub-section of sec. 4106 of the Code, was not intended to embrace, and does not embrace, the vast and undefined scope of contempts at common law, outside of the classes prescribed by statutory enactments.

Such is the obvious and necessary construction of the Code, and such has been the universal opinion and practice of the Courts and the profession in Tennessee, since the passage of the Act of 1831, ch. 19, which is substantially transferred to the Code.

The power to punish contempts, where limitations have been put on the power by statute, came under review in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, wherein Mr. Justice Baldwin of the Supreme Court of the United States, held in the case of Exparte Poulson, that the Act of Congress of March 2d, 1831, ch. 99, which is similar to the provisions of the Code of Tennessee on this subject, (excepting as to sub section 6,) withdrew from the Courts of the United States the common law power, to protect their suitors, witnesses, officers, and themselves, against the libels of the press, though published and circulated pending the very trial of a cause. It is altogether probable, that the breadth of expression employed by Judge Baldwin, to declare the immunity of the press, may require limitation, in case the matter published be of a character, and vicinity to the Court, so as fairly to bring it within the class prescribed by the Code, which consists in “the willful misbehavior of a person so near to a Court as to obstruct the administration of justice.” See Poulson's case, cited and commented upon, in 1 Kent's Commentaries, 301.

This disposes of the main question in the case. The argument submitted on behalf of the State, concedes that the first five sub-sections of the Code, which designate the special causes of contempt, furnish no sanction to the judgment rendered against the defendants; and that the judgment is without sanction of law, unless the 6th subsection bestows upon the Criminal Court, the power to punish contempts at common law, other than such as are made punishable by the Code or statute.

There being manifest error in the construction given by the Criminal Court to the 6th sub-section of section 4106, the question is, whether this Court can revise and annul the judgment founded on such error.

The case is brought here in two modes. 1st, By writ of error to the original judgment: and 2d, By writ of error to the judgment of the Municipal Court of Memphis, dismissing for alleged want of jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus sued out in that Court by the defendants, to be discharged from imprisonment under the original judgment, on the alleged ground that the original judgment was void and the imprisonment under it illegal.

The power to punish for contempts is absolutely essential to the protection and existence of Courts. To be effectual, the power must be instant and inevitable. Hence, in England and America, the whole current of judicial authority is, with very rare exceptions in the American Courts, that a judgment of a conviction for contempt, is not subject to the revision, by appeal, writ of error, or otherwise, of any other Court, co-ordinate or superior. Using the language of Ruffin, Chief Justice, pronouncing the opinion of the Court in exparte Summers, 5 Iredell Rep., 152: “From the very nature of contempts, and in order that the punishment may be efficacious, the punishment must be immediate and peremptory, and not subject to suspension by appeal at the mere will of the offender, nor by any proceeding in the nature of an appeal. Suppose one to come into Court and curse and abuse the Judge on the bench? Or, suppose the sheriff, with a writ in his hand, in the presence of the Court, positively refuses to return it, so that the party's action will be discontinued? What would sentence for these contempts be worth, if the culprit could supersede them by appeal, certiorari or writ of error? Manifestly nothing; and the authority of the Court would be really contemptible, if it could be thus eluded and prostrated.”

And to the same effect, it is said in 2 Bishop Crim. Law. sec. 254, (221,) “that the very nature of a contempt is such as compels the Court, against whom it is committed, to proceed against it, and precludes any other or superior tribunal from taking cognizance of it, whether directly or on appeal, or otherwise.”

The like ruling has been heretofore made in this Court, in the case of P. H. Darby, reported in 3 Wheeler's Crim. Cases, 7; and in the case of Shumate, at Nashville, in the year 1824, and in Martin's Case, 5 Yer., 456; See, also, Hist. Lawsuit, sec. 720.

It must, therefore, be held here, that a judgment for contempt can not be brought from an inferior Court into this Court for revision, by writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error.

And it can make no difference that the judgment is alleged to be void upon its face. To hold otherwise, would precipitate into this Court, the whole flood of judgments for contempts, upon the ground of being void; and would greatly paralyze the power of the inferior Courts, indispensable to their efficiency and existence. No doubt is entertained of the jurisdiction of this Court to reverse and annul ordinary judgments which are void, and because they are void. But it is quite another thing, to hold that this Court ought to exercise, or has appellate jurisdiction in regard to judgments for contempt, because, and for the reason only, that they are void. The rule, we think, proper and in harmony with the practice of the Courts everywhere, is, that the judgment of a Court for contempt, is not subject to appellate revision. If such judgment be void, the law has provided other modes of redress sufficiently prompt and effectual and entirely compatible with the power of the Courts, to...