State v. Gantt

Decision Date31 December 1973
Docket NumberNo. KCD,KCD
Citation504 S.W.2d 295
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Chester GANTT, Appellant. 26330.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Robert A. Simons, Asst. Public Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Daniel P. Card, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before SHANGLER, P.J., SWOFFORD and WASSERSTROM, JJ.

SWOFFORD, Judge.

The appellant (herein called defendant) was convicted of feloniously uttering a forged check, a violation of Section 561.011, subd. 1(3) RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. A jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at ten (10) years. Thereafter, the trial court reduced this punishment to four (4) years and judgment and sentence were entered accordingly. This appeal followed in due time and in proper form.

The points as asserted by the defendant and upon which he seeks reversal may be stated as follows: First, the court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the weight and effect of circumstantial evidence; Second, it was error to give Instructions No. 3 and No. 5 because they did not correctly state the law of the case; Third, the court should have directed a verdict of acquittal or sustained defendant's motion for a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; Fourth, it was plain error to permit the defendant to be called by the state as a rebuttal witness in order to show his prior felony convictions; and Fifth, it was plain error to permit the state to call rebuttal witnesses for the purpose of offering cumulative evidence.

The points in appellant's brief do not comply with the requirements of Rules 28.18 and 84.04(d), V.A.M.R. It continues to be a source of wonder and complete frustration to this Court, that counsel do not comply with the simple and specific provisions of these Rules when preparing briefs on appeal. Once again, however, we will overlook this default because a person's liberty is at stake, and we will consider each of these 'points'. In order to do so, a review of the evidence is necessary.

It is not disputed that in the evening of either February 25 or 26, 1972 (the importance of these dates will hereafter appear) that defendant entered a package liquor store known as 'The Party Place' in Liberty, Clay County, Missouri and purchased some liquor and cigarettes. In payment therefore he tendered a check drawn on a Liberty bank by one Hammond, dated February 25, 1972, payable to 'Cash' in the amount of $20.00. The clerk accepted the check without requesting identification in accordance with the store policy of accepting checks drawn on local banks. The defendant did not sign the check nor endorse it in the presence of the store clerk nor was he requested to do so. He left the store with the merchandise and some change representing the difference between the check and the cost of the purchases.

The state's evidence further established that later that evening the clerks in 'The Party Place' found that the name of Hammond was on a list of 'problem checks' in the store and Harold Achauer, the store owner, was contacted for instructions. Achauer was suspicious because he had sold Mr. Hammond some liquor at another of his stores that same day so he called Mrs. Hammond in an attempt to ascertain if her husband had in fact written the check here involved. She told him that her husband had not written the check. She and Achauer then immediately went to the police station and she signed a complaint against the defendant. Patrolman James Houston, that same evening, arrested the defendant and he remained in custody thereafter.

Mr. Hammond did not testify because he died on March 1, 1972, some four days after the check was cashed.

Mrs. Hammond testified for the state that she was familiar with her husband's signature and that the signature on the check was not that of Mr. Hammond. The check was introduced into evidence and identified as a 'counter-check', one without a personalized name and address imprinted on it. Mrs. Hammond testified that her husband had discontinued using such 'counter-checks' when he received a supply of personalized checks from the bank sometime prior to February 26, 1972. She further noted that the first name signed on the check was incorrectly spelled NORVELLE, when, in fact, her husband's name was NORVAL.

On cross-examination it was brought out that Mr. Hammond 'was drinking quite a bit' shortly before his death. She further testified that when he was under the influence of alcohol his handwriting became quite poor and bore no resemblance to his normal handwriting which she described as 'beautiful'. She testified that when drinking, Mr. Hammond's signature could not be recognized and that 'I couldn't read it'.

The last witness for the state was James Houston, the police officer who investigated the complaint filed by Mrs. Hammond. Officer Houston testified that he arrested the defendant, administered the 'Miranda Warning' and questioned Gantt about the check. Houston said Gantt admitted cashing the check; that he (Gantt) felt it was a good check, and that the check was given to him by a third party. However, Gantt refused to disclose who gave him the check because 'he didn't want to get anybody else involved'. Officer Houston testified on cross-examination that he did not question Mr. Hammond to determine the genuineness of the signature on the check and to the best of his knowledge no other officer contacted or questioned Norval Hammond. The sole basis for the arrest was Mrs. Hammond's complaint.

The defendant, Chester Gantt, testified in his own behalf. His story differed in major detail from that of the State's witnesses. Gantt testified that he had gone to Hammond's home on a social visit and while there he and Hammond drank alcoholic beverages together. As the defendant prepared to leave, Hammond requested that he (Gantt) purchase additional liquor and cigarettes and bring such items to the Hammond home the next morning. The defendant said that Hammond produced a check and attempted to fill in the blanks, but was unsuccessful because his condition imparied his ability to write. Hammond then produced a second check and filled in the blanks and signed it while the defendant watched.

The defendant testified that he took the check to the liquor store, purchased the items for Hammond, and took them to Hammond the following morning. However, defendant could not explain why Hammond would misspell his own first name.

At the conclusion of Gantt's testimony, the defense rested. The prosecutor then stated:

'MR. BURNETT: I am trying to find Mr. Smithart (another police officer) Your Honor. May I have a five-minute recess to see whether or not I can locate him?

Now, I am going to put on rebuttal, Mrs. Hammond.' (Emphasis supplied)

Thereupon, there was a colloquy at the bench and in chambers out of the hearing of the jury apparently as to whether or not Mrs. Hammond could be recalled, since she had been present in the courtroom after the completion of her testimony in violation of the rule as to the exclusion of witnesses, which had been invoked at the trial.

Thereafter, the following appears in the transcript:

'THE COURT: Call your next witness.

MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, I have a little further cross examination of the defendant.' (Emphasis added)

Thereupon, Mr. Gantt resumed the witness stand and it was developed that he had been in jail since his arrest; that he thought he was arrested on Saturday night, February 27, 1972, and that he delivered the wine and cigarettes to Mr. Hammond the preceding morning (Friday, February 26, 1972). This examination also revealed previous felony convictions.

Witnesses Houston, Hammond and Achauer were then recalled to the stand by the state for rebuttal. Officer Houston testified that he arrested the defendant on Saturday, February 26, 1972 and that defendant has remained in custody since that time. Achauer testified that the check was cashed on Saturday, February 26, 1972 and that the police were contacted a short time later. Mrs. Hammond's testimony was, in substance, merely a reaffirmation of her earlier direct testimony that the signature on the check was not that of her husband and was therefore cumulative.

Thereafter, the defendant resumed the stand in his own behalf in 'surrebuttal' and testified that the date Mr. Hammond wrote the check was Friday, February 25, 1972; that he cashed the check that same evening; that he delivered the purchases to Mr. Hammond the next morning, Saturday, February 26, 1972, and was placed under arrest that day. We take judicial notice of days of week and of calendar data. State v. Bubenyak, 331 Mo. 549, 56 S.W.2d 43, 44 (1932); City of Gladstone v. Knapp, 458 S.W.2d 885 (Mo.App.1970). By reference to a 1972 calendar, we note that February 25, 1972 was a Friday and February 26, 1972 was a Saturday.

The state had the burden of proof to establish the essential elements of the felony charged against the defendant under Section 561.011, subd. 1(3). In pertinent part, that statute reads:

'1. It shall be unlawful:

(3) For any person with intent to defraud to use as true, or to utter as true, * * * any writing * * * which said person knows has been made (forged) or altered in the manner described in either of subdivisions (1) or (2);'

In the case before us, the state could meet this burden by showing (1) that the defendant used or 'uttered' the check in question; (2) that the check was false and not issued by the purported maker, Hammond; (3) that the defendant had knowledge of its falsity; and (4) defendant had intent to defraud. These elements could be established by the state by either direct or circumstantial evidence. In this case, the first element is not in dispute, the defendant did use and utter the check as above noted. The second element is in violent dispute. The defendant asserts the Hammond executed the check in his presence and the state...

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24 cases
  • State v. Scurlock
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 10, 1999
    ...In holding as it did in Chambers, with respect to the issue in question, the Southern District relied on Taylor and State v. Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App.1973). In Taylor, this court stated [t]he principle as referenced in Gantt, that the possession of and attempt to pass a forged ins......
  • State v. Scurlock, Jr.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 10, 1999
    ...In holding as it did in Chambers, with respect to the issue in question, the Southern District relied on Taylor and State v. Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo. App. 1973). In Taylor, this court stated [t]he principle as referenced in Gantt, that the possession of and attempt to pass a forged i......
  • State v. Chambers, 19511
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 1, 1995
    ...v. Taylor, 778 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo.App.1989). To similar effect see State v. Jones, 703 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App.1973). Although the foregoing authorities involved situations where the cashing of the check was done by defendant himself rather ......
  • State v. Bollinger
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 3, 1978
    ...that fact. State v. West, 487 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Mo.1972); State v. Whitley, 512 S.W.2d 840, 842-843 (Mo.App.1974); State v. Gantt, 504 S.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Mo.App.1973). Defendant's first point has no Defendant's second point is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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