State v. Garcia

Decision Date02 December 2021
Docket Number2019-398-C.A.
PartiesState v. Malik Garcia.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Providence County Superior Court (P3/17-1605ADV) Sarah Taft-Carter Associate Justice

For State: Virginia M. McGinn Department of Attorney General

For Defendant: Robert F. Weber, Esq.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

SUTTELL, CHIEF JUSTICE

The defendant, Malik Garcia, appeals from a judgment of conviction following a bench trial in Superior Court for simple domestic assault or battery, in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-5-3 and 12-29-2(a)(1); and domestic refusal to relinquish or to damage or to obstruct telephone, in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-35-14(a) and 12-29-2(a)(12).[1] On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial justice erroneously prevented and restricted the defendant's cross-examination of the complaining witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel

The defendant was charged by criminal complaint in Sixth Division District Court with one count of domestic simple assault and one count of refusal to relinquish a telephone resulting from a domestic incident that took place on October 10, 2016. At a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court following transfer from the District Court, the complaining witness, Lucely Garcia Vargas, testified that she and defendant were in a "sentimental" relationship and had lived together in Providence, along with Lucely's daughter, Tatiana Garcia, and a roommate for approximately one year when the alleged incident took place.[2]

According to Lucely, on October 10, 2016, she "asked [defendant] for permission" to "leave the house and go visit a friend" who lived in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Lucely testified that she had "permission to be out until three in the afternoon" but she did not arrive home until 5 or 5:30 p.m. because it was a holiday and the buses were late. Lucely testified that defendant was upset with the timing of her return home and, additionally, he was upset with the fact that Lucely "smelled like [cigarette] smoke" from a coat that her friend had given her. Lucely further testified that, when she offered to call her friend to verify her whereabouts, defendant pulled her to him, struck her, and pushed her onto the bed. According to Lucely, defendant then grabbed her by the hair and she "fell to the ground and went between his legs so that [she] could escape." Lucely testified that she attempted to grab her keys, identification card, and cell phone, but was able to take only her keys.

Lucely tesified that, upon securing her keys, she ran out of the apartment. Subsequently, Lucely spotted a police cruiser and tried to communicate with a police officer, who was later identified at trial as Patrolman Matthew Goddard. Lucely testified that her efforts were unsuccessful because, at the time, she spoke very little English, and Officer Goddard spoke only English. Shortly thereafter, a second police officer, Patrolman John Benros, arrived at the scene, and Lucely was able to speak with him. Lucely explained that she did not initially tell the officers about the events that had just taken place with defendant because she knew that defendant did not possess "any documents" and could face "legal problems." Ultimately, however, Lucely told the officers what had occurred.

Both officers also testified at trial, stating that they each observed a "red mark" on the left side of Lucely's face. Lucely testified that the officers did not take any pictures of her and that she was not taken to the hospital because her "injuries" were not "severe[.]" She further testified that she was driven back to defendant's apartment in a police cruiser. The officers arrested defendant and retrieved Lucely's cell phone.

At trial, defendant presented a different version of events. The defendant testified that, on the date of the incident, he had finished his work shift at 8 a.m. and returned to the apartment. The defendant contended that, after he arrived home, Lucely informed him that "she was going to go out with a female friend[.]" The defendant testified that he called Lucely between 1 and 1:30 p.m. to tell her that he had finished a work job and he "ask[ed] if she would like [him] to or if she was ready for [him] to come and pick her up at her friend's house[, ]" to which Lucely responded, according to defendant, that "she wasn't finished doing what she was doing." The defendant testified that, from the period of 1:30 p.m. until approximately 5:30 p.m., he was asleep in the room he shared with Lucely with his cell phone turned off.

The defendant testified that, around 5:30 p.m., Lucely arrived home "hysterical" and woke him up. According to defendant, Lucely was angry with him for having his cell phone turned off and for not picking her up from her friend's house. The defendant testified that, when he told Lucely to leave the room because he wanted to continue resting before he had to leave for work, she became "aggressive and tried to hit [him] in the face" with her right hand. The defendant recalled that Lucely did not make physical contact with him because he moved "backwards" and he "pushed her." The defendant testified that, after telling Lucely that both she and her daughter were to leave the apartment and that defendant could no longer "support" them, Lucely responded, according to defendant, "Now you'll pay, and you'll find out who I am, who we Colombians are."

The defendant testified that, at some point after Lucely and defendant's interaction, police officers entered his apartment with a key. The defendant testified that the police officers informed him that an incident had occurred and asked if defendant had struck Lucely, which defendant denied. The police officers then arrested defendant.

Relevant to the issue raised by defendant on appeal, the trial justice sustained approximately fourteen objections to defense counsel's questions to Lucely on cross-examination and six objections to defense counsel's direct examination of defendant. After the trial, the trial justice found defendant guilty on both charges. For count one, the simple domestic assault charge, defendant was sentenced to one year of incarceration, suspended, with probation, as well as domestic abuse counseling; and for count two, the refusal to relinquish telephone charge, defendant was sentenced to a consecutive ninety-day suspended term of incarceration, with probation. The trial justice further required that a no-contact order be entered.

The defendant filed a premature notice of appeal on November 19, 2018. The judgment of conviction was ultimately entered on November 27, 2018, placing defendant's appeal properly before us. See Butler v. Gavek, 245 A.3d 750, 753 n.1 (R.I. 2021) (noting that a notice of appeal filed prematurely will be treated "as if it had been timely filed after judgment was entered" (quoting Sullivan v. Coventry Municipal Employees' Retirement Plan, 203 A.3d 483, 486 n.4 (R.I. 2019))).

II Standard of Review

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "affords a criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses offered against him or her." State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 58 (R.I. 1995). "The ability of a defendant to meaningfully cross-examine the state's witnesses is an essential element of the due process guarantees of the United States and Rhode Island constitutions." State v. Storey, 102 A.3d 641, 648-49 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v. Lomba, 37 A.3d 615, 621 (R.I. 2012)).

"To satisfy the constitutional right of cross-examination, 'the trial justice is required to afford the accused reasonable latitude to establish or reveal bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried.'" State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 575 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 765 (R.I. 2000)). "[T]he trial justice has the discretion to sustain objections to lines of inquiry that are 'potentially misleading or irrelevant, that offer little or no probative value, or that exceed the scope of direct examination[.]'" Storey, 102 A.3d at 649 (quoting State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 610 (R.I. 2003)). "[O]nce sufficient cross-examination has been permitted to satisfy the constitutional safeguards, the trial justice is vested with discretion to limit the scope of additional cross-examination and that decision will not be disturbed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion." Clark, 974 A.2d at 575.

III Discussion

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error by impermissibly restricting defendant's cross-examination of Lucely at trial. As noted supra, the trial justice sustained approximately fourteen objections to defense counsel's questions-the majority of which defendant argues were indispensable to the determination of the complaining witness's credibility and bias. Moreover, defendant highlights that the trial justice further sustained five objections to defense counsel's direct examination of defendant.[3] In particular defendant highlights three instances of the trial justice's purported improper restriction of...

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