State v. Lomba

• Decision Date: 13 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–96–C.A.,2010–96–C.A.
• Citation: 37 A.3d 615
• Parties: STATE v. John LOMBA.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

37 A.3d 615

STATE

v.John LOMBA.

No. 2010–96–C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 13, 2012.

Virginia M. McGinn, Department of Attorney General, for State.

Catherine Gibran, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

A gray Chrysler Pacifica stands at the center of an encounter between the defendant, John Lomba, and Joseph and Susan Rocheleau, the son and daughter-in-law of his friend, Leonard Rocheleau.¹ The circumstances of this case constitute but one chapter in what appears to have been an ongoing feud between the defendant and Joseph and Susan. The increasing enmity between the parties escalated into a brawl that occurred on July 11, 2008, after the defendant discovered Joseph and Susan tampering with the license plate affixed to the Pacifica while the vehicle was parked in the dirt parking lot of the Little Rhody Beagle Club in Warwick, Rhode Island. During the melee that ensued, the defendant struck Susan in the shoulder, and slashed Joseph's arm with a utility knife.

The state charged defendant with three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault. After a jury trial in the Kent County Superior Court, he was acquitted of the three felony counts, but convicted of simple assault. The trial justice sentenced defendant to one year at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with ninety-days to serve and nine months suspended, with probation. In addition, the trial justice issued no-contact orders with respect to both Joseph and Susan Rocheleau and Leonard Rocheleau. The defendant's timely appeal followed. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

IFacts & Travel

Leonard Rocheleau, a seventy-two-year-old widower, lived at Sparrow's Point, a Warwick housing development for senior citizens and some disabled persons. John Lomba, then forty-seven years old, also lived at Sparrow's Point. The defendant and Leonard became friends; they would talk often and visit each other's apartments. Leonard's son Joseph and his daughter-in-law Susan, who regularly visited Leonard, met John for the first time when Leonard brought him to church. Joseph and Susan testified that they became somewhat estranged from Leonard in February 2008. That estrangement, which apparently was tied to Leonard's relationship with defendant, lasted until June 2008, when Leonard reached out to Joseph and Susan. During that time, the Superior Court issued mutual restraining orders against defendant and Joseph and Susan Rocheleau, without a finding of liability against any party.

On July 11, 2008, the simmering tensions between the parties burst into a conflagration. Susan and Joseph testified that around 5:30 p.m. that day, they were on their way to a family dinner at Applebee's restaurant in Warwick when they spotted defendant in the parking lot of the same plaza where the restaurant is located. They observed him standing outside of a gray Chrysler Pacifica, which Susan and Joseph recognized as Leonard's vehicle. They believed that the Pacifica was unregistered, prompting them to call the police. Susan testified that she told the police that the Pacifica “was an unregistered vehicle, that it was [her] father-in-law's vehicle and [that] he did not have a license to drive it.” ² Susan and Joseph waited about thirty minutes, but left when the police did not respond.

After dinner, Susan and Joseph testified that they drove to the nearby Little Rhody Beagle Club because Leonard had told them that “John was hiding the car at the Beagle Club because it was unregistered and that Sparrow's Point would have the car towed off the property.” The Beagle Club has a long driveway that ends in a dirt parking lot adjacent to the Sparrow's Point community. While on the Beagle Club property, Susan and Joseph spoke to Carl Swanson, a member of the club. Joseph told Swanson that he was looking for a “stolen car,” and that the police “had been looking for two months and they hadn't come up with anything, so we're taking this thing on our own.” At trial, Swanson testified that Joseph and Susan were “kind of aggressive,” and that he told them that they were on private property, that they did not belong there, and that they had to leave. As they started toward the exit, Susan and Joseph saw defendant driving the Pacifica in the driveway. There was a heated exchange, during which Susan told defendant, “Good luck parking, because they're aware that you're parking up there.” John responded by saying that he had permission to park at the club.³

Sometime after 10 p.m., Joseph and Susan returned to the Beagle Club to see whether defendant had left the Pacifica in its parking lot. They spotted the car at the end of the driveway, and Joseph pulled their vehicle alongside it. Susan tried to look into the Pacifica's windows, but could not see anything inside the vehicle. What they could see, however, was the Pacifica's license plate; they believed that it was actually a plate that had been assigned to a demolished Ford Taurus previously owned by Leonard. Susan testified that they decided to try to pry the plate from the car because they feared Leonard might be held responsible if the Pacifica was involved in an accident.

As Joseph struggled with the license plate, defendant appeared out of the darkness, coming around some nearby bushes. He began to shout and curse, telling Susan and Joseph to get away from his car. Both Susan and Joseph testified that as defendant approached, they could see he was holding something in his hand, but they could not see what it was. Joseph testified that defendant tried to kick him out of his way, but failed to make contact. Susan testified that defendant then came toward her, and that when she told him she was calling the police, he “went after [her] with his object,” punched her in her left-upper chest, and pushed her out of the way in an effort to reach the car door. A violent affray ensued, during which Joseph ended up on top of defendant inside the car. As the pair wrestled, Joseph was cut on the arm with a utility knife.⁴ After about a minute, Joseph extracted himself from the car, shut the door, and retreated.⁵ Joseph testified that defendant then put the car in reverse and sped toward him, causing him to jump out of the way to avoid being struck. In his haste, however, defendant failed to turn on the Pacifica's headlights and he collided with a dump truck that was parked along the edge of the driveway.

Sergeant Andrew Tainsh of the Warwick Police Department was the first officer to respond to the scene. He testified that as soon as he arrived he saw defendant running from the driveway into the woods. Sergeant Tainsh followed him and ordered him to stop. Initially, defendant responded by crouching behind a small berm; he emerged only after Sgt. Tainsh again ordered him to reveal himself. The defendant identified himself and said that he had stabbed someone in a fight over a car. After defendant was placed under arrest, officers discovered a flashlight, an owner's manual for a Chrysler, a utility knife with the blade exposed, a license plate, and a set of keys behind the berm.

IIArguments of the Appellant

Before this Court, defendant advances two arguments. First, he contends that the trial justice erred when he denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of simple assault because the state failed to introduce evidence of malice or wantonness. Second, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the trial justice's evidentiary rulings deprived him of his constitutional right to present a full and fair defense. He contends that the trial justice erred by improperly limiting his attempts to delve into the relationship between the parties and by ruling that his out-of-court statement to a police officer about being the victim of a hate crime in 1998 was inadmissible hearsay.

IIIStandard of Review

“In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we apply the same standard as applied by the trial justice.” State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1232, 1237 (R.I.2010) (citing State v. Caba, 887 A.2d 370, 372 (R.I.2005)). Accordingly, “we ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses and draw all reasonable inferences that are consistent with guilt.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Henshaw, 557 A.2d 1204, 1206 (R.I.1989)). “If, after viewing all of the evidence, ‘the inferences drawn would justify a reasonable juror in finding a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Hornoff, 760 A.2d 927, 932 (R.I.2000)). With respect to the trial justice's evidentiary rulings, “[t]his Court consistently has held that determining the admissibility of evidence is squarely within the purview of the trial justice.” State v. Johnson, 13 A.3d 1064, 1065–66 (R.I.2011); see also State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I.2010). “We will not disturb a trial justice's evidentiary ruling without first determining that the ruling constitutes a clear abuse of his or her discretion.” Johnson, 13 A.3d at 1066 (citing McManus, 990 A.2d at 1234; State v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 614–15 (R.I.2009); Ferrell v. Wall, 889 A.2d 177, 188 (R.I.2005)).

IVAnalysis

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

The defendant asserts that his “offer of force did not constitute an assault since it was not made with a wicked or malicious intention to cause injury to Mrs. Rocheleau * * *.” Rather, he reasons that any blow that he may have directed at Susan Rocheleau was lawful because “she deliberately tried to block [him] from getting into his car after he emphatically warned her and her husband to get away from the vehicle.” In other words, he argues that because his actions were undertaken “in order to be able to do what he had...