State v. Garcia-Martinez

• Decision Date: 13 October 1997
• Docket Number: D,GARCIA-MARTINE,No. 36922-9-I,36922-9-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Carlosefendant, Jesus Abitia Enriquez, Appellant, and Lana Antonette Cortez, Defendant.

Page 322

88 Wn.App. 322

944 P.2d 1104

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Carlos GARCIA-MARTINEZ, Defendant, Jesus Abitia Enriquez, Appellant, and Lana Antonette Cortez, Defendant.

No. 36922-9-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 1.

Oct. 13, 1997.

Kimberly N. Gordon, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, for Appellant.

Erin Riley, Deputy King County Pros., Seattle, for Respondent.

AGID, Judge.

Jesus Enriquez appeals his conviction and standard range sentence for delivery of cocaine. He argues that the sentencing court erred when it failed to impose a sentence below the standard range and that the prohibition against appeal of standard range sentences in RCW 9.94A.210(1) violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. We hold that the prohibition is necessary to effectuate a compelling governmental interest, i.e., the proportionality, equality and justice of sentences for all similarly situated defendants. We also conclude that the trial court properly denied Enriquez's request for an exceptional sentence, and affirm.

FACTS

Early on the morning of February 26, 1995, Seattle Police Officer Michelle Hackett was working as an undercover buyer in a buy-bust operation near First and Union. Officer Hackett testified at trial that Enriquez was standing nearby with Carlos Garcia-Martinez (Garcia) and Lana Cortez. Hackett approached them and asked if they knew where she could get a "teener." ¹ Enriquez asked Hackett what she needed and she answered "a sixty of coca." Enriquez replied, "yeah, I got it, wait here." He turned to Garcia, who did not speak English, and spoke to him in Spanish. Cortez then directed Hackett to follow them down a stairwell to Western Avenue. At the foot of the stairwell, Enriquez asked Hackett if she had her money. Garcia pulled a plastic bag containing white powder from the crotch area of his pants. At that point, a large group of people approached, forcing them to move to a nearby park. At the park, Garcia again retrieved the plastic bag and poured some of the powder onto a plastic wrapper Enriquez pulled from his pocket. Enriquez closed the wrapper and gave it to Cortez in exchange for cash.

Garcia then ripped a piece from a plastic trash bag and poured powder into it. Hackett testified that Enriquez picked it up, twisted it closed, tied it and carried it over to her. She gave him the $45 he asked for in exchange for the packet, which contained .27 gram of white powder containing cocaine. As Enriquez and Garcia walked away, Hackett gave the "good buy" signal to let other officers know she had completed a narcotics transaction. The officers moved in to make the arrests, and Enriquez ran. Officer Martin Welte chased Enriquez and saw him throwing money away as he ran. Welte retrieved $68. One of the bills was a marked bill Hackett had used to purchase the cocaine.

Enriquez testified that he and Cortez had pooled their money to buy some cocaine. When they ran into Garcia, from whom Enriquez had bought heroin in the past, Garcia and Enriquez agreed to a cocaine and heroin deal. According to Enriquez, when Hackett approached and asked if he knew where she could buy a "teener," he told her "no." Enriquez denied that he helped Garcia package the drugs for Cortez. He testified that when Garcia offered him the second packet, he refused it and Garcia told him to give it to Hackett. He did so, and she gave him $45. He accepted the cash and began walking after Garcia, who had already started to leave, to give it to him. When he saw Garcia being arrested, he ran and was arrested himself.

Enriquez was charged by amended information with delivery of cocaine. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Enriquez requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range, ² arguing that a sentence of 48 months with 12-18 months of inpatient drug treatment would save the public the unnecessary expense of incarcerating him for a longer period of time. He also argued that because his involvement in the transaction was minimal and the amount of cocaine was unusually small, he was entitled to an exceptional sentence downward based on State v. Alexander, 125 Wash.2d 717, 888 P.2d 1169 (1995). The trial court rejected Enriquez's arguments, stating that while it preferred not to incarcerate anyone for a period as long as that dictated by the standard range, it believed that an exceptional sentence below the standard range was simply insupportable under the facts of this case. The court observed that the amount of drugs involved was "pretty standard for a street deal" and that the nature of Enriquez's involvement was "pretty typical." It imposed a standard range sentence of 87 months, the bottom of the standard range.

Appeal of Standard Range Sentence

Enriquez challenges the trial court's refusal to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. He argues that the prohibition against appeal of a standard range sentence in RCW 9.94A.210(1) violates the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions by denying a particular group of defendants--those receiving standard range sentences--the right to appeal their sentences. The Fourteenth Amendment states "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Art. I, § 12 of the Washington Constitution states "[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations." Because the equal protection clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution are substantially identical, they are considered under the same analysis. State v. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d 553, 559-60, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993). Both require that persons similarly situated be treated similarly. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d at 560, 859 P.2d 1220. But see Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash.2d 58, 64-65, 922 P.2d 788 (1996) (the extent to which the constitutional guarantees in art. I, § 12, exceed those under the Fourteenth Amendment remains an open question).

The first step in any equal protection analysis is to determine the appropriate standard of review--strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or the rational basis test. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d at 560, 859 P.2d 1220. The standard applied depends on the nature of the interest affected or the characteristics of the class created by the legislation. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d at 560, 859 P.2d 1220. Strict scrutiny applies when the allegedly discriminatory classification affects a suspect class or threatens a fundamental right. We use intermediate scrutiny in the limited circumstances where the law affects important rights or semi-suspect classifications. The rational basis test applies where the statutory classification does not involve a suspect or semi-suspect class and does not threaten a fundamental right. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d at 560, 859 P.2d 1220. Enriquez argues that, because the right to appeal in all criminal cases is guaranteed in art. I, § 22 of the Washington Constitution, the prohibition against appeal of a standard range sentence in RCW 9.94A.210(1) threatens a fundamental right and strict scrutiny should apply. Cf., San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-97, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (fundamental rights are those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"). We agree. Unless the prohibition against appeal of a standard range sentence in RCW 9.94A.210(1) is necessary to effectuate a compelling governmental interest, it would violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 124 Wash.2d 368, 376, 879 P.2d 283 (1994). ³

We conclude that the governmental interest here is a compelling one. The Legislature's primary purpose in promulgating the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) was to replace the prior indeterminate, rehabilitation-oriented sentencing system with a determinate system, the focus of which was not rehabilitation but "proportionality, equality and justice." State v. Barnes, 117 Wash.2d 701, 710, 818 P.2d 1088 (1991). This was because studies had shown the indeterminate sentencing system resulted in significant disparity among sentences imposed for similar offenses depending on the decision-maker's own personal philosophy and perspective. The Legislature was particularly concerned that the punishment for a criminal offense be proportionate both to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history, thereby ensuring that the punishment imposed would be just. RCW 9.94A.010(1). To that end, the Legislature also restructured trial judges' discretion so as to more closely control--but not abolish--that discretion. See Barnes, 117 Wash.2d at 711, 818 P.2d 1088. In so doing, the Legislature sought to assure each defendant's right to equal protection; i.e., the right to a sentence in the same range as others committing similar crimes. By limiting judges' discretion to sentence a defendant outside the standard range and precluding appeals regarding the length of a standard range sentence, the Legislature sought to ensure that punishment for each criminal offense would be commensurate with that imposed on others with similar criminal histories committing a similar offense. See RCW 9.94A.010(3). To permit the appellate courts to second-guess that decision would destroy the uniformity the Legislature sought to achieve. The bar against appeal of the length of a standard range sentence also serves the additional purpose of making frugal use of judicial resources. See RCW 9.94A.010(6). The Legislature's primary purpose, assuring "proportionality, equality and justice" in sentencing, taken together with the prudent...