State v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 12 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-00-319-CV,2-00-319-CV |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT v. VALENTIN GRACIA AND JOAN GRACIA, |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 236TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Before DAY, DAUPHINOT, and GARDNER, JJ.
The 236th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, dismissed a condemnation suit on motion by the State of Texas on behalf of the Texas Department of Transportation ("DOT"). The DOT complains that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees and expenses to Valentin and Joan Gracia, as condemnees, contending that only a county court at law had jurisdiction over the suit and that the district court therefore had no jurisdiction to award the fees and expenses. We affirm.
On October 5, 1999, the State of Texas on behalf of the Texas Department of Transportation filed a petition for condemnation in the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, seeking to condemn 3,919 square feet of land owned by the Gracias and title to a masonry building located thereon. As required by section 21.014 of the property code, the court appointed special commissioners. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.014 (Vernon 1984). Following a hearing that the Gracias did not attend, the special commissioners awarded $193,500.00 to the Gracias.
The DOT filed a motion for nonsuit and verified plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of the proceeding on the basis that the 236th District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Specifically, the DOT contended section 21.013(b) of the property code places jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings exclusively in the county courts at law in counties that have one or more county courts at law, such as Tarrant County.
The Gracias did not oppose the requested dismissal, but filed their own verified plea to the jurisdiction and objections to the special commissioners' award. The Gracias also sought attorney's fees and expenses upon dismissal, pursuant to section 21.0195 of the property code. Following a hearing, the trial court signed an order of dismissal without prejudice entitled "Order Granting Non-Suit and Dismissal," awarding $7,000 in attorney's fees and $2,808.83 in other expenses to the Gracias. The DOT appeals from the order to the extent that it grants attorney's fees and expenses to the Gracias.
The DOT first contends that the district court had no jurisdiction to award attorney's fees and expenses to the Gracias because section 21.013 of the property code placed exclusive jurisdiction over the eminent domain proceeding in the county courts at law of Tarrant County, and the district court therefore had no jurisdiction to take any action other than dismissal. The DOT further contends that section 21.0195(c), pursuant to which the attorney's fees and expenses were awarded to the Gracias, only applies where the condemnor voluntarily dismisses, not where the dismissal is for want of jurisdiction.
The Gracias respond that section 21.013 is merely a venue provision that, when not properly followed by the State, triggers mandatory statutory remedies provided by section 21.0195. The Gracias contend that, because the DOT failed to bring the condemnation proceeding properly in this case by filing it in the court required by section 21.013, the special statutory provisions of section 21.0195 mandated the award of attorney's fees and expenses. They contend the district court had no discretion to order otherwise.
It is undisputed that the DOT filed its petition for condemnation in the wrong court. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.013 (Vernon Supp. 2001). The issues we must determine are (1) whether the filing requirements of section 21.013 are jurisdictional so that the failure to comply with them deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, and (2) if so, whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney's fees and expenses under section 21.0195. We answer both issues in the negative.
Section 21.001 of the property code is entitled "Concurrent Jurisdiction" and provides that "[d]istrict courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases." Id. § 21.001 (Vernon 1984). Section 21.013 of the property code, as amended for cases filed on or after June 1, 1999, provides in pertinent part as follows:
§ 21.013. Venue; Fees and Processing for Suit Filed in District Court
(a) The venue of a condemnation proceeding is the county in which the owner of the property being condemned resides if the owner resides in a county in which part of the property is located. Otherwise, the venue of a condemnation proceeding is any county in which at least part of the property is located.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by law, a party initiating a condemnation proceeding in a county in which there is one or more county courts at law with jurisdiction shall file the petition with any clerk authorized to handle such filings for that court or courts.
(c) A party initiating a condemnation proceeding in a county in which there is not a county court at law must file the condemnation petition with the district clerk.
Id. § 21.013.
If a statute's wording does not indicate whether the legislature intended to make a provision jurisdictional, we must resolve the issue by applying the rules of statutory construction. Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1996); Brown v. Owens, 674 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. 1984). In determining the legislature's intent, we must consider the entire Act, its nature and object, and the consequences which follow from each construction. Brown, 674 S.W.2d at 750. We must also keep in mind that the procedures set forth in the condemnation statutes must be strictly followed and their protections liberally construed for the benefit of the landowner. John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. 1992); State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co., 30 S.W.3d 418, 420 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2000, pet. granted).
The DOT argues that, prior to being amended in 1999, section 21.013 gave parties initiating condemnation proceedings the option to file their petitions in a county court at law if such a court existed in the county where the property in question was located.1 As amended in 1999 however, the DOT argues section 21.013(b) requires parties initiating condemnation proceedings to file their petitions in a county court at law if such a court exists in the county where the property is located. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.013(b). The DOT contends that the use of the ordinarily mandatory term "shall" in section 21.013(b) indicates that it is a jurisdictional provision. Id. Along with other factors, we must take such mandatory language into consideration in construing the statute. See Wichita County, 917 S.W.2d at 783; Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084, 1087 (1926).
According to a bill analysis produced by the House Committee on Land and Resource Management:
The exclusive use of county courts at law for condemnation hearings, where these courts are available, would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the hearing process. District Courts often are overburdened with heavy caseloads covering a wide variety of subjects. County courts could be more efficient in conducting condemnation hearings because of their lighter caseloads.
Condemnation cases, which rely heavily on complex eminent-domain laws, require expertise and careful attention that district court judges often cannot give. County court judges could develop this expertise if they were required consistently to preside over condemnation hearings. This would improve the effectiveness of the condemnation process for all participants.2
The DOT filed its condemnation petition in the instant case after this amendment was in effect. Therefore, the DOT argues, jurisdiction was exclusively in a county court at law and the district court thus lacked jurisdiction.
It is true that, because the cause of action for condemnation and the remedy for its enforcement did not originate in the common law but are creatures of statute, it is within the power of the legislature to designate a particular court as the exclusive tribunal to hear and determine such a suit. Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Terrell, 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364, 368 (1933); Mingus, 285 S.W. at 1087-88; State v. Autumn Hills Centers, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Colvin v. State, 416 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1967, no writ); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cocke, 292 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1956, no writ). "[I]n special proceedings not within the common law jurisdiction, the court's statutory designation of the venue is mandatory and jurisdictional." Alpha Petroleum, 59 S.W.2d at 368 (quoting Mingus, 285 S.W. at 1088). Each of the foregoing cases, however, deals with a statutory designation of a particular county as the exclusive venue for filing suit. None deals with designation of a particular court within a county as the exclusive tribunal for suit.
Before 1981, petitions for condemnation were filed with the district judge. See Seiler v. Intrastate Gathering Corp., 730 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1987, no writ) (discussing history of predecessor statute to section 21.013(b)). As codified in 1984, section 21.013(b) allowed petitions for condemnation to be filed with the clerk authorized to accept filings for a particular court. Act of May 24, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 576, § 21.013, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3499 (current version at Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.013). Specifically, the statute, as codified in 1984, provided that, in a county with one or more county courts a law, a party "may file the petition with any clerk authorized to handle filings for that court or courts." Id. (emphasis added)....
To continue reading
Request your trial