State v. Garcia, 1-385
Decision Date | 01 August 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 1-385,1-385 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray A. GARCIA, Defendant-Appellee. A 65. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lee Cloyd, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ken A. Elmendorf, Elmendorf & Meyer, Brownsburg, for defendant-appellee.
The State of Indiana appeals the decision of the Hendricks Superior Court No. 2, granting defendant-appellee's motion to suppress evidence of driving while intoxicated obtained at a roadblock in Hendricks County. The sole issue is the constitutionality of the roadblock.
We reverse.
The Indiana State Police, pursuant to a state-wide program in cooperation with the Hendricks County Sheriff's Department, conducted a roadblock on U.S. 40, two and one-half miles east of Plainfield in Hendricks County. The purpose of the roadblock was to check for improperly licensed operators, improperly registered automobiles, under-age drinking, and persons driving while intoxicated. The State Police released prior publicity in various newspapers concerning the general plan to conduct roadblocks, but not of roadblocks in any specific location. The particular spot at issue was selected by Officer James B. Cramer, Supervisor of the Indiana State Police in Hendricks County, and Lt. Daniel Williams of the Hendricks County Sheriff's Department. Their decision was based upon information obtained from State Police records which reflected that this location in the road generated numerous fatal and nonfatal accidents involving alcohol, including an incident where a deputy sheriff was struck by a drunk driver while supervising a wreck. The roadblock was implemented in accordance with a pre-arranged plan generated by Marion County Pursuant to the plan, the westbound traffic on U.S. 40 was stopped by approximately 11 uniformed officers who were visible on the highway. They blocked off the left westbound lane whereby all traffic was funneled into the right westbound lane, using flares and the lights from police cars to identify the roadblock. Non-selectively, cars were stopped in consecutive groups of five. Absent the detection of drinking or other violations, drivers were detained for no more than two or three minutes, during which time other traffic was permitted to pass. After a group of five was inspected and released, the next group of five cars traveling west was brought in, and the procedure was repeated. The drivers of the stopped cars were asked to produce operators licenses and registration certificates. If a violation was suspected, or alcohol consumption was detected, such operator was pulled over into a restaurant and motel parking lot. As relevant here, a driver suspected of alcohol consumption was given a field blood alcohol test. Any driver found to be over the presumptive limit of .10 blood alcohol content was then taken to the Hendricks County Jail where a breathalyzer test was administered. Upon failure of this second test, the operator was arrested. The berm near the roadblock was adequate for safety purposes, the area was lighted, and the roadblock was visible for a considerable distance. Additionally, the officers at the roadblock had absolutely no latitude or discretion to depart from the procedure set out in the plan. Numerous motorists, upon sighting the roadblock, turned their vehicles around and fled.
and Morgan County, which was adopted by the Indiana State Police Department. The plan was developed in accordance with recent Supreme Court decisions.
Garcia, who exhibited no erratic or suspicious driving, was in the first group of five cars stopped. He could produce no operator's license, whereupon an officer who was present recognized him and stated Garcia's operator's license had been suspended. After detecting alcohol on Garcia's breath, the officer read him an implied consent statement. Garcia agreed to take a field test, which he failed. Upon his subsequent failure of a breathalyzer test, Garcia was arrested. He was charged with his second offense of driving while intoxicated.
The roadblock was maintained for two hours. During this time, the officers stopped approximately 100 cars, issued 20 citations, and arrested seven persons for driving while intoxicated.
In Delaware v. Prouse, (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660; Brown v. Texas, (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116; and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, the Supreme Court of the United States has authorized, and specified parameters for, the right of police to maintain roadblocks under the Fourth Amendment. Essentially, the court has held that police officers in roving patrols are proscribed from stopping motorists. Exceptions include situations where there is at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist was unlicensed, the automobile was unregistered, or that an occupant was subject to seizure for violation of a law. However, in Prouse, supra, the court said:
(Our emphasis), (Footnotes omitted).
Id. 440 U.S. at 664, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
In Brown v. Texas, supra, the court stated that the reasonableness of seizures, which are less intrusive than traditional arrests, depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security from arbitrary interference by officers. The emphasis of these decisions is clearly a proscription against arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. Brown v. Texas, supra, states:
"To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."
(Emphasis added).
Id. 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641.
Subsequent to these Supreme Court decisions, the following cases have also expressed approval of roadblocks under Prouse: United States v. Prichard, (10th Cir.1981) 645 F.2d 854; United States v. Miller, (5th Cir.1979) 608 F.2d 1089; State v. Goines, (1984) 16 Ohio App.3d 168, 474 N.E.2d 1219; People v. Peil, (1984) 122 Misc.2d 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532; People v. Scott, (1984) 63 N.Y.2d 518, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 473 N.E.2d 1; Little v. State, (1984) 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903; Kinslow v. Commonwealth, (1983) Ky.Ct.App., 660 S.W.2d 677; State v. Deskins, (1983) 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174; State v. Coccomo, (1980) 177 N.J.Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131; State v. Hilleshiem, (1980) Iowa, 291 N.W.2d 314; Miller v. State, (1979) Miss., 373 So.2d 1004. Additional cases supporting roadblocks are catalogued in 37 A.L.R. 4th 10 (1984) including: State v. Shankle, (1982) 58 Or.App. 134, 647 P.2d 959; State v. Frisby, (1978) 161 W.Va. 734, 245 S.E.2d 622; State v. Bloom, (1977) 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465; Brantley v. State, (1976) Okla.Crim., 548 P.2d 675; People v. Andrews, (1971) 173 Colo. 510, 484 P.2d 1207; People v. De La Torre, (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 162, 64 Cal.Rptr. 804; State v. Smolen, (1967) 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 385, 232 A.2d 339; Miami v. Aronovitz, (1959) Fla., 114 So.2d 784. Our research indicates the above to be an overwhelming majority, though a minority position does exist. Moreover, a recent law review note, 17 Ind.L.Rev. 1065, discussed the controlling cases and concluded that pre-arranged roadblocks in Indiana are constitutional when no discretion of the field operator is allowed.
Prior to Prouse, our supreme court stated in Williams v. State, (1974) 261 Ind. 547, 307 N.E.2d 457:
In Irwin v. State, (1978) 178 Ind.App. 676, 383 N.E.2d 1086, a case turning on other matters, the court, citing Williams, supra, stated:
"Consequently, no one questions the right of law enforcement officers to establish a roadblock to conduct a routine traffic check of all vehicles and drivers passing through that point during a given period of time."
In Prichard, supra, where a roadblock was set up to conduct a routine license and registration check, the field officers made arrests upon observing other offenses. That roadblock, which stopped all westbound traffic except trucks was conducted in a manner similar to the plan used here. When automobiles accumulated to an amount of ten, the officers waived all other drivers through in order to prevent the situation from becoming unduly hazardous. After the cars cleared, they commenced to stop cars again. The court said:
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