State v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 02 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 15303,15303 |
| Citation | 235 Conn. 671,669 A.2d 573 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Jose GARCIA. |
Monte P. Radler, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, with whom were Judith M. Rossi, Assistant State's Attorney, and, on the brief, Eugene J. Callahan, State's Attorney, and David Cohen, Senior Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.
This appeal 1 raises two issues: (1) whether this court had the authority to stay the running of the statutory eighteen month period for commitment for the restoration of the defendant's competency during the pendency of his prior interlocutory appeal; and (2) whether the trial court properly concluded that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, involuntary medication of the defendant will restore his competency to stand trial and that the drug regimen prescribed for him will not cause an unreasonable risk to his health.
This is the second appeal by this defendant that we have considered. In State v. Garcia, 233 Conn. 44, 84-86, 658 A.2d 947 (1995) (Garcia I ), we held that "[i]n order for a court to authorize the involuntary medication of an incompetent defendant to render him competent to stand trial ... the state must demonstrate [by clear and convincing evidence] that: (1) to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, involuntary medication of the defendant will render him competent to stand trial; (2) an adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be had using less intrusive means; (3) the proposed treatment plan is narrowly tailored to minimize intrusion on the defendant's liberty and privacy interest; (4) the proposed drug regimen will not cause an unreasonable risk to the defendant's health; and (5) the seriousness of the alleged crime is such that the state's criminal law enforcement interest in fairly and accurately determining the defendant's guilt or innocence overrides the defendant's interest in self-determination." In addition, sua sponte, we addressed the issue of what effect an appeal by the defendant from an involuntary medication order may have on the running of the time limit imposed on involuntary commitment for restoration of competency pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d. We remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the state had met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence each of the requisite factors for the involuntary medication of an incompetent defendant and held that Id., at 93, 658 A.2d 947.
After a further evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the state had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence each of the requisite factors. Accordingly, the trial court issued an order authorizing the state to medicate the defendant involuntarily. Additionally, the trial court rejected the defendant's argument that this court lacked the authority to stay the running of the statutory eighteen month period of commitment during the defendant's initial appeal. This appeal followed.
We first address the defendant's challenge to our authority to toll the running of the statutory period during which the state may attempt to restore the defendant's competency to stand trial. Pursuant to § 54-56d(i)(1), if there is a substantial probability that competency can be restored, a defendant who is deemed incompetent to stand trial may be committed for a period "of the maximum sentence which the defendant could receive on conviction of the charges against him or eighteen months, whichever is less." This statutory provision was enacted in response to Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), so as to ensure that defendants are not committed for indefinite periods. In this case the defendant is charged with murder. Thus, the state has a maximum period of eighteen months in which it may attempt to restore the defendant's competency to stand trial.
As we noted in Garcia I, § 54-56d offers no guidance as to the effect that an interlocutory appeal taken by a defendant to challenge a trial court's medication order has upon the running of this time period. Garcia I, supra, 233 Conn. at 92, 658 A.2d 947. Therefore, in order to prevent a defendant from effectively escaping a trial court's medication order by taking an appeal, which could consume the eighteen month period, we held that the filing of an interlocutory appeal by a defendant automatically stays or tolls the running of the time period. Id.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 4183, this court may "on its own motion or upon motion of any party ... order a stay of any proceedings ancillary to a case on appeal." Moreover, this court has statutory authority, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265(a)(2), to "fashion a remand that is reasonably necessary or appropriate to facilitate its judgment." National Elevator Industry Pension, Welfare & Educational Funds v. Scrivani, 229 Conn. 817, 822, 644 A.2d 327 (1994). Without such a stay, the defendant could escape the practical effect of this court's judgment by simply taking an appeal from an order requiring medication. Such a stay, therefore, is reasonably necessary and appropriate to facilitate our judgment. Consequently, we hold that this court is authorized to toll the statutory period during the time of appeal so as to effectuate the purpose of § 54-56d.
In this case, the defendant was initially committed on September 23, 1993, after having been found to be incompetent to stand trial. On this date, the eighteen month statutory period began to run. On January 11, 1994, the trial court heard evidence regarding whether the defendant should be involuntarily medicated, after which it entered an order to medicate the defendant, but stayed the order, thereby allowing the defendant the opportunity to present argument contesting the order. On January 20, 1994, the court again stayed the medication order pending further argument regarding the defendant's due process rights. On August 10, 1994, the court reissued its order authorizing the medication of the defendant, but stayed that order for twenty days. On August 26, 1994, the defendant filed an appeal in the Appellate Court challenging the medication order. The appeal was subsequently transferred to this court, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). On May 9, 1995, we rendered our decision and held that the eighteen month time period would recommence at the expiration of the ten day period in which a party may file a motion to reargue before this court. Garcia I, supra, 233 at Conn. 92, 658 A.2d 947. Thereafter, on July 24, 1995, the trial court reheard evidence and issued an order to medicate. On August 2, 1995, the defendant filed the present interlocutory appeal.
Section 54-56d was designed to provide the state with a certain period of time in which to restore a defendant's competency. To implement the statutory policy in the circumstances of this case, the running of the statutory period shall be tolled (1) from August 26, 1994, to May 20, 1995, and (2) from August 2, 1995, to ten days after this decision is released.
Regarding the merits of the forced medication order, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence with respect to only the first and fourth factors enumerated in Garcia I--that is: (1) "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, involuntary medication of the defendant will render him competent to stand trial"; and (2) "the proposed drug regimen will not cause an unreasonable risk to the defendant's health." Garcia I, supra, 233 Conn. at 84-85, 658 A.2d 947.
As a result of the rehearing, the trial court had the benefit of testimony from four medical...
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