State v. Matos, 15433

• Decision Date: 06 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15433,15433
• Citation: 694 A.2d 775,240 Conn. 743
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jaime MATOS

Page 775

694 A.2d 775

240 Conn. 743

STATE of Connecticut v. Jaime MATOS

No. 15433.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 19, 1997.

Decided May 6, 1997.

[240 Conn. 744] Lisa J. Steele, Special Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Christopher T. Godialis, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Attorney, and Edward R. Narus, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, Jaime Matos, was deprived of his rights to due process and equal protection of the law when he was prevented by General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 54-76b ¹ from applying for treatment as a youthful offender because he was charged with, although not convicted of, the class A felony of murder. Additionally, we are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the victim's gang connections. We conclude that the defendant's due process and equal protection rights were not violated by § 54-76b and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the proffered evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On June 10, 1990, the defendant, who was seventeen years of age, together with two friends, Angel Madeira and Julio Sanchez, attended a festival held at Colt Park in Hartford. The defendant carried a semiautomatic pistol with him to the festival. Also attending the festival were Roberto Sanchez and several of his friends. Apparently, there was an unsettled dispute between these two groups arising from a previous altercation. At 3:21 p.m. during the festival, which was attended by approximately 15,000 people, the two groups met. Roberto Sanchez spoke to the defendant's friend, Madeira, saying, "I didn't get you last time. I'm going to get you now." ² Roberto Sanchez then struck Madeira with his fist, and the two became involved in a fist fight, during which the defendant pulled his gun from his waistband and fired several shots. Roberto Sanchez was struck four times by the defendant's bullets and was killed. Norberto Rivera, an innocent bystander, was hit in the shoulder and wounded by a stray bullet. The defendant was arrested later that night. Additional facts will be noted where necessary.

The defendant was charged in an amended information with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, ³ first degree assault in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59, ⁴ and criminal use of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-216. ⁵ Thereafter, the defendant filed a youthful offender eligibility application, which was denied by the trial court. The defendant's subsequent motions requesting the court to reconsider his youthful offender application also were denied. After a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 54-46a, ⁶ the court found probable cause for the murder charge. A jury later acquitted the defendant of murder, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1). ⁷ The jury also found the defendant guilty of first degree assault and criminal use of a firearm. The trial court dismissed the criminal use of a firearm count ⁸ and sentenced the defendant to a term of fifteen years on the manslaughter count and to a term of five years on the first degree assault count, to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The defendant presents the following issues on appeal: (1) whether § 54-76b violates his rights to due process and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions; ⁹ and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence concerning the gang with which the victim was supposedly affiliated and its reputation for violence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The defendant challenges § 54-76b on both substantive due process and equal protection grounds. It is well settled that a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218 Conn. 580, 590, 590 A.2d 447 (1991); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 508, 542 A.2d 700 (1988). While courts may declare a statute to be unconstitutional, the power to do so should "be exercised with caution, and in no doubtful case." State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, 288 (1856). Every presumption is to be given in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 79, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991); Bottone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652, 657, 553 A.2d 576 (1989).

A

The defendant first claims that § 54-76b violates his right to due process as guaranteed to him by the federal constitution. "The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that the 'State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....' In order to prevail on his due process claim, the [defendant] must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property [or liberty] interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property [or liberty] interest has occurred without due process of law. See Double I Limited Partnership v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 218 Conn. 65, 76, 588 A.2d 624 (1991); Connecticut Education Assn. v. Tirozzi, 210 Conn. 286, 293, 554 A.2d 1065 (1989)...." Tedesco v. Stamford, 222 Conn. 233, 241-42, 610 A.2d 574 (1992).

"Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources--the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-227 [96 S.Ct. 2532, 2537-2540, 49 L.Ed.2d 451] (1976)." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The defendant does not claim that he has been deprived of a fundamental right by the youthful offender statute. He claims, rather, that the youthful offender statute itself has created a liberty interest and that he has been denied that liberty interest without due process of law. "[O]nce a state provides its citizens with certain statutory rights beyond those secured by the constitution itself, the constitution forbids the state from depriving individuals of those statutory rights without due process of law." State v. Garcia, 233 Conn. 44, 77, 658 A.2d 947 (1995), on appeal after remand, 235 Conn. 671, 669 A.2d 573 (1996). "The guarantee of substantive due process requires that a law be reasonable, rather than arbitrary or capricious, and that its operation has a real and substantial relation to the object to be obtained. All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, [213 Conn. 184, 205, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989) ]." Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn.App. 105, 118, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a fundamental right, we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. See generally Campbell v. Board of Education, 193 Conn. 93, 105, 475 A.2d 289 (1984); Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 314-15, 417 A.2d 343 (1979). The party claiming a constitutional violation "bears the heavy burden of proving that the challenged policy has no reasonable relationship to any legitimate state purpose; Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., supra, [at] 314-15 ...." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Campbell v. Board of Education, supra, at 105, 475 A.2d 289.

A brief examination of the benefits of youthful offender status and the statutory eligibility requirements for that status is in order before we consider the defendant's due process claims. The youthful offender statutes confer certain benefits on those youths eligible to be adjudged youthful offenders. For instance, all proceedings, except the motion for investigation of eligibility, are private. General Statutes § 54-76h. ¹⁰ If confined, a youth is segregated from other defendants over the age of eighteen years before and during trial and before sentencing. General Statutes § 54-76h. A youthful offender is also eligible to receive a more lenient sentence; compare General Statutes § 54-76j, ¹¹ with, e.g., General Statutes § 53a-35a; ¹² is not disqualified from later holding public office, and does not forfeit any right or privilege to receive a license granted by a public authority. General Statutes § 54-76k. ¹³ Moreover, a youthful offender is not considered a criminal, and a determination that a defendant is a youthful offender is not deemed a conviction. General Statutes § 54-76k. A youthful offender's records are kept confidential; General Statutes § 54-76l; ¹⁴ and are automatically erased "when such person attains twenty-one years of age, provided such person has not subsequent to being adjudicated a youthful offender been convicted of a felony ... prior to [having] attained such age." General Statutes § 54- 76o. ¹⁵ Certain categories of defendants, however, are statutorily ineligible for treatment as youthful offenders. These groups can be characterized as comprising three general classifications: (1) those defendants who have already had the benefit of juvenile or youthful offender treatment or who have been afforded accelerated rehabilitation; ¹⁶ (2) those defendants previously convicted of a felony; and (3) those defendants who have been charged with certain serious crimes. ¹⁷

The defendant makes two substantive due process claims: (1) that the legislature's decision to base eligibility for youthful offender status on the seriousness of the crimes charged violates his right to due process of law; and (2) that the legislature's decision to preclude a defendant from...