State v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 04 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0286 |
| Citation | 501 P.3d 925 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Logan Ray GARDNER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Lauren Amongero, Law Student Intern, Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana, Pete Wood, Attorney at Law, Boise, Idaho
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Ellen Donohue, Mineral County Attorney, Debra A. Jackson, Deputy County Attorney, Superior, Montana
¶1 Logan Ray Gardner appeals from the Order and Opinion Affirming Denial of Motion to Suppress entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Mineral County, on March 24, 2020, affirming the Mineral County Justice Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Gardner entered a conditional guilty plea before the Justice Court to Aggravated Driving Under the Influence (DUI), third offense, in violation of § 61-9-465, MCA, reserving the right to appeal the Justice Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Gardner appealed to the District Court, arguing the Justice Court erred in not suppressing evidence gathered from the traffic stop, as the officers lacked particularized suspicion to initiate the stop based solely on Gardner "flicking" his high beams on and off once. The District Court affirmed the Justice Court and Gardner appeals to this Court. We restate the dispositive issue on appeal:
Whether the officers had particularized suspicion to justify their investigatory stop of Gardner.
¶2 We reverse and remand with instructions to grant Gardner's motion to suppress, as the officers lacked particularized suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Gardner's vehicle.
¶3 The Mineral County Justice Court is not a court of record. Rather than trying the case anew on appeal before the District Court, the parties stipulated to the following facts:
¶4 At approximately 1:16 a.m. on April 29, 2019, Mineral County Sherriff's Deputies Alex Hughes and Ryan Funke stopped Gardner and his girlfriend Angela Scovell on Interstate 90 near mile marker 36 in Mineral County. Gardner was driving the vehicle. The deputies were traveling westbound, and Gardner was travelling eastbound. At the time of this stop, the portion of the interstate where the vehicles passed was under construction, rendering Interstate 90 more akin to a two-lane highway with one lane designated for each direction of travel, rather than a four-lane interstate with a median. The section of highway where the stop occurred is straight and flat, and not curved or on a grade.
¶5 The officers stopped Gardner for "flicking" or flashing his high beams or "brights" at the officers, who were less than 1000 feet from Gardner at the time. At the suppression hearing, Officer Hughes testified Gardner's flashing his brights caused Officer Hughes to experience momentary blindness. Officer Hughes also testified he did not recall whether the patrol vehicle he was travelling in at the time had its brights activated or not. The officers' dashcam video was not working at the time of the stop. Officer Funke did not testify.
¶6 Gardner and Scovell also testified at the suppression hearing. Both Gardner and Scovell confirmed Gardner had flashed the officers with his brights. However, both Gardner and Scovell testified the brights on the officers' vehicle were on. Gardner further testified he flashed the officers in an attempt to get the driver of the oncoming vehicle to dim the vehicle's brights. All parties agreed Gardner only momentarily flicked his high beams, but he did so when the officers were within 1000 feet of his vehicle. Officer Hughes testified Gardner's flicking his brights was the sole basis for the stop.
¶7 Following the stop and making contact with Gardner, the officers smelled alcohol and a DUI investigation ensued. Gardner was eventually cited for Aggravated DUI, contempt, and a seat-belt violation. Gardner challenged the stop in a motion to suppress, which the Justice Court denied, ruling the stop was valid. Gardner pleaded guilty to Aggravated DUI, third offense, on October 30, 2019, but reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue. The contempt and seat-belt charges were dropped.
¶8 A case originating in a justice court and first appealed to a district court is reviewed by this Court as if it had been appealed directly to this Court. City of Helena v. Brown , 2017 MT 248, ¶ 7, 389 Mont. 63, 403 P.3d 341. We review a justice court's ruling on a motion to suppress to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court's interpretation and application of law are correct. Brown , ¶ 7.
¶9 Whether the deputies had particularized suspicion to justify their investigatory stop of Gardner.
¶10 On appeal, Gardner maintains the deputies' seizure of him was unconstitutional and any evidence gathered from the investigatory stop must be suppressed because § 61-9-221(1), MCA, does not prohibit momentary flashing of one's high beams to warn other drivers. As § 61-9-221(1), MCA, did not prohibit Gardner from flashing his brights to warn the oncoming driver the vehicle's high beams were on and this was the sole stated basis for the stop, he contends the officers lacked any particularized suspicion an occupant of the vehicle had committed a traffic violation to justify conducting the investigatory stop of his vehicle. The State counters the deputies did not misapprehend or misunderstand the law and the District Court correctly interpreted and applied § 61-9-221(1), MCA, to prohibit even momentary flashing of high beams within 1000 feet of an oncoming vehicle.
¶11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Massey , 2016 MT 316, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 460, 385 P.3d 544 ; State v. Flynn , 2011 MT 48, ¶ 7, 359 Mont. 376, 251 P.3d 143. In addition, the Montana Constitution contains an explicit right to privacy under Article II, Section 10. When a search or seizure "specifically implicate[s] the right of privacy," we analyze and apply Article II, Sections 10 and 11 together. State v. Staker , 2021 MT 151, ¶ 9, 404 Mont. 307, 489 P.3d 489 (quoting State v. Hardaway , 2001 MT 252, ¶ 32, 307 Mont. 139, 36 P.3d 900 ). Sections 10 and 11 together are "broader where applicable than the privacy protection provided under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Staker , ¶ 9.
¶12 A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a "seizure" of the occupants of the vehicle and thus must accord with the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Flynn , ¶ 7. An officer "may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Section 46-5-401(1), MCA. "To establish particularized suspicion, the State must show (1) objective data from which an officer can make certain inferences, and (2) a resulting particularized suspicion that the occupant of the motor vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing." Flynn , ¶ 7. Particularized suspicion is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Flynn , ¶ 7.
¶13 Citing State v. Lacasella , 2002 MT 326, ¶ 30, 313 Mont. 185, 60 P.3d 975, Gardner contends an officer's mistake of law cannot establish particularized suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. In other words, if the deputies are wrong § 61-9-221(1), MCA, prohibits a momentary flashing of high beams, they lacked particularized suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and our analysis ends there. The State does not dispute this, but rather contends the officers did not make a mistake of law. Our decision in Lacasella did not cite the Montana Constitution but rather relied on caselaw applying the Fourth Amendment from the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 Since our decision in Lacasella , however, the United States Supreme Court has decided Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), and established an officer's mistake of law can establish particularized suspicion to justify an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment. Under Heien , reasonable suspicion or particularized suspicion "can rest on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition," if the mistake is reasonable under the circumstances. Heien , 574 U.S. at 60, 135 S. Ct. at 536. "The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable." Heien , 574 U.S. at 66, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (emphasis in original). For a mistake of law to be reasonable, a "statute must pose a really difficult or very hard question of statutory interpretation" and "such cases will be exceedingly rare." Heien , 574 U.S. at 70, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
¶14 Thus, we must first determine whether the plain language of § 61-9-221, MCA, prohibits momentary flashing of high beams to warn oncoming drivers. If it does not, we must then determine whether the officer's mistake of law was reasonable or, alternatively, whether the act of flashing one's high beams could have given rise to a particularized suspicion the occupant of the vehicle was engaged in wrongdoing on its own under the circumstances.
¶15 When interpreting statutes, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the language used in the statute. See State v. Rossbach , 2016 MT 189, ¶ 8, 384 Mont. 269, 378 P.3d 1160 ; see also § 1-2-101, MCA. "[O]ur objective is to...
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