Heien v. North Carolina

• Decision Date: 15 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–604.,13–604.
• Citation: 574 U.S. 54,190 L.Ed.2d 475,135 S.Ct. 530
• Parties: Nicholas Brady HEIEN, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

574 U.S. 54

135 S.Ct. 530

190 L.Ed.2d 475

Nicholas Brady HEIEN, Petitioner

v.NORTH CAROLINA.

No. 13–604.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 6, 2014.

Decided Dec. 15, 2014.

Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner.

Rachel P. Kovner, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

Michele Goldman, Raleigh, NC, Donald B. Ayer, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Counsel of Record, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, John F. Maddrey, Solicitor General of North Carolina, Robert C. Montgomery, Counsel of Record, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Derrick C. Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Respondent.

Chief Justice ROBERTSdelivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."Under this standard, a search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake.An officer might, for example, stop a motorist for traveling alone in a high-occupancy vehicle lane, only to discover upon approaching the car that two children are slumped over asleep in the back seat.The driver has not violated the law, but neither has the officer violated the Fourth Amendment.

But what if the police officer's reasonable mistake is not one of fact but of law?In this case, an officer stopped a vehicle because one of its two brake lights was out, but a court later determined that a single working brake light was all the law required.The question presented is whether such a mistake of law can nonetheless give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.We hold that it can.Because the officer's mistake about the brake-light law was reasonable, the stop in this case was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

I

On the morning of April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department sat in his patrol car near Dobson, North Carolina, observing northbound traffic on Interstate 77.Shortly before 8 a.m., a Ford Escort passed by.Darisse thought the driver looked "very stiff and nervous," so he pulled onto the interstate and began following the Escort.A few miles down the road, the Escort braked as it approached a slower vehicle, but only the left brake light came on.Noting the faulty right brake light, Darisse activated his vehicle's lights and pulled the Escort over.App. 4–7, 15–16.

Two men were in the car: Maynor Javier Vasquez sat behind the wheel, and petitionerNicholas Brady Heien lay across the rear seat.Sergeant Darisse explained to Vasquez that as long as his license and registration checked out, he would receive only a warning ticket for the broken brake light.A records check revealed no problems with the documents, and Darisse gave Vasquez the warning ticket.But Darisse had become suspicious during the course of the stop—Vasquez appeared nervous, Heien remained lying down the entire time, and the two gave inconsistent answers about their destination.Darisse asked Vasquez if he would be willing to answer some questions.Vasquez assented, and Darisse asked whether the men were transporting various types of contraband.Told no, Darisse asked whether he could search the Escort.Vasquez said he had no objection, but told Darisse he should ask Heien, because Heien owned the car.Heien gave his consent, and Darisse, aided by a fellow officer who had since arrived, began a thorough search of the vehicle.In the side compartment of a duffle bag, Darisse found a sandwich bag containing cocaine.The officers arrested both men.

366 N.C. 271, 272–273, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352–353(2012);App. 5–6, 25, 37.

The State charged Heien with attempted trafficking in cocaine.Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized from the car, contending that the stop and search had violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.After a hearing at which both officers testified and the State played a video recording of the stop, the trial court denied the suppression motion, concluding that the faulty brake light had given Sergeant Darisse reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, and that Heien's subsequent consent to the search was valid.Heien pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression decision.App. 1, 7–10, 12, 29, 43–44.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed.214 N.C.App. 515, 714 S.E.2d 827(2011).The initial stop was not valid, the court held, because driving with only one working brake light was not actually a violation of North Carolina law.The relevant provision of the vehicle code provides that a car must be

"equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle.The stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake.The stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps."N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 20–129(g)(2007).

Focusing on the statute's references to "a stop lamp" and "[t]he stop lamp" in the singular, the court concluded that a vehicle is required to have only one working brake light—which Heien's vehicle indisputably did.The justification for the stop was therefore "objectively unreasonable," and the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.214 N.C.App., at 518–522, 714 S.E.2d, at 829–831.

The State appealed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed.366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351.Noting that the State had chosen not to seek review of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the vehicle code, the North Carolina Supreme Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the faulty brake light was not a violation.Id., at 275, 737 S.E.2d, at 354.But the court concluded that, for several reasons, Sergeant Darisse could have reasonably, even if mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that both brake lights be in good working order.Most notably, a nearby code provision requires that "all originally equipped rear lamps" be functional.Id., at 282–283, 737 S.E.2d, at 358–359(quotingN.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 20–129(d) ).Because Sergeant Darisse's mistaken understanding of the vehicle code was reasonable, the stop was valid."An officer may make a mistake, including a mistake of law, yet still act reasonably under the circumstances....[W]hen an officer acts reasonably under the circumstances, he is not violating the Fourth Amendment."366 N.C. at 279, 737 S.E.2d, at 356.

The North Carolina Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Heien's other arguments for suppression (which are not at issue here).Id., at 283, 737 S.E.2d, at 359.The Court of Appeals rejected those arguments and affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.266/280 C.App.741 S. E. 2d 1(2013).The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in turn.367 N.C. 163, 749 S.E.2d 278(2013).We granted certiorari.572 U.S. 1059134 S.Ct. 1872, 188 L.Ed.2d 910(2014) .

II

The Fourth Amendment provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a "seizure" of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.Brendlin v. California,551 U.S. 249, 255–259, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132(2007).All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure, officers need only "reasonable suspicion"—that is, "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped" of breaking the law.Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393/396134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687–88, 188 L.Ed.2d 680(2014)(internal quotation marks omitted).The question here is whether reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition.We hold that it can.

As the text indicates and we have repeatedly affirmed, "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ "Riley v. California, 573 U.S.134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430(2014)(some internal quotation marks omitted).To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."Brinegar v. United States,338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879(1949).We have recognized that searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable.The warrantless search of a home, for instance, is reasonable if undertaken with the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a resident.SeeIllinois v. Rodriguez,497 U.S. 177, 183–186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148(1990).By the same token, if officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect's description, neither the seizure nor an accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful.SeeHill v. California,401 U.S. 797, 802–805, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484(1971).The limit is that "the mistakes must be those of reasonable men."bRinegar,supra, at 176, 69 s.CT. 1302.

But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion.Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer's understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law.The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground.Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the...