State v. Gardner
Decision Date | 07 May 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-1879.,01-1879. |
Citation | 661 N.W.2d 116 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Reese Edward GARDNER, Jr., Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kim Griffith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
The judge who presided at the defendant's criminal trial was subsequently listed as a witness in the minutes of testimony filed by the State in support of a habitual violator allegation. The defendant, Reese Gardner, claims the judge's dual roles violated Gardner's due process right to a fair trial and contravened Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.605. Although we discourage the course employed by the prosecution in this case, we conclude the defendant's rights were not compromised. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
In August 2001 a jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree robbery in a trial over which Judge George Stigler presided. After the verdict, the State filed amended minutes of testimony in support of a habitual violator allegation made in the trial information. See Iowa Code §§ 902.8, .9 (2001) ( ). These minutes included Judge Stigler as a witness, stating the judge would testify he presided over a 1989 case in which the defendant pled guilty to second-degree robbery.
The habitual violator allegation proceeded to trial. District Judge Jon Fister presided. After testimony from an employee of the clerk of court's office, the defendant elected to forego a jury trial and the case then proceeded on the minutes of testimony. Based on the minutes, including the summary of Judge Stigler's anticipated testimony, Judge Fister found that the defendant was the same person who was convicted of second-degree robbery in 1989. The court made similar findings with respect to two other felony convictions alleged in the amended trial information. Judge Fister then adjudged the defendant to be a habitual violator.
A few weeks later, the defendant appeared before Judge Stigler for sentencing. Judge Stigler sentenced the defendant to the term of incarceration required by the applicable sentencing laws. See id. §§ 902.9, .12.
The defendant appeals, claiming he was denied a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Iowa constitutions because Judge Stigler presided over his criminal trial while also being used by the State as a witness on the habitual violator allegation. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. The defendant also relies on Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.605, which precludes a presiding judge from being a witness. We review the claimed constitutional violation de novo and the alleged rule violation for correction of errors of law. See State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Iowa 2003)
.
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of constitutional due process." State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Iowa 1976); accord In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 (1955)
; see also State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002) ( ). A judge cannot be fair and impartial, however, when he or she is called upon to assess his or her own credibility in determining a matter. See Keith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 262 N.W.2d 249, 260-61 (Iowa 1978).
The basis for this conclusion is apparent: how can a judge presiding in a case in which the judge is also a witness be expected to do otherwise than find himself or herself to be credible? We agree with the following observations of the Eighth Circuit on this point:
Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir.1970) (citations omitted).
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.605 addresses similar concerns by prohibiting a presiding judge from testifying as a witness. The underlying justification for this rule, like its constitutional counterpart, is the idea that a presiding judge's assumption of the role of witness is inconsistent with the impartiality expected of the court. State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245, 609 N.W.2d 349, 353 (2000); O'Quinn v. Hall, 77 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex.App.2002); 3 Joseph M. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 605.02[2], at 605-5 (2d ed.2002) [hereinafter Weinstein's Federal Evidence]. This rule is violated whenever the judge functions as a witness, even though the judge may not actually take the stand to testify. See Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1992)
; Tyler, 427 F.2d at 416; O'Quinn, 77 S.W.3d at 448; Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 605.07[1], at 605-21.
When the procedural posture of the matter before us is examined in light of the rationale underlying the prohibition against a presiding judge serving as a witness, we conclude the defendant was not denied his...
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