State v. Garland

• Decision Date: 31 December 1846
• Citation: 7 Ired. 48,29 N.C. 48
• Parties: THE STATE v. J. W. GARLAND et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

7 Ired. 48

29 N.C. 48

THE STATE

v.J. W. GARLAND et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1846.

The State can bring an action in the Superior Court on a bond payable to herself for a sum less than one hundred dollars.

General statutes do not bind the sovoreign, unless expressly mentioned in them.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Macon County, at the Fall Term, 1846, his Honor Judge CALDWELL presiding.

This is an action of debt on a bond for $24 50, which was given to the State, it is said for the purchase money of a tract of what is called the Cherokee land. It was instituted in the Superior Court; and, considering that the action is by writ at the common law, and looking to the statutes relative to the debts for Cherokee lands, the presiding Judge was of opinion, that the Court had not jurisdiction of the case, and, on motion of the defendants, dismissed the suit. From that decision the attorney for the State appealed.

Attorney General, for the State .

Henry W. Miller, for the defendant .

RUFFIN, C. J.

The only question is, whether the State can bring an action in a Superior Court on a bond for a less sum than $100; and, as we think, she undoubtedly may. This results plainly from a few undeniable elementary principles. In the first place, the Superior Court is one of general jurisdiction, being the highest Court of original jurisdiction in the State, and it may take cognizance of all suits, which are not taken from it by statute. Besides, the act of 1777, ch. 115, sec. 2, expressly enacts, that it shall have legal jurisdiction of “““ all pleas of the State,” and criminal matters of what nature, degree or denomination soever, whether brought before the Court by original or mesne process, certiorari, writ of error, appeal, or any other way or means, except where it is or may be otherwise directed by act of the Legislature. To oust the jurisdiction, then, it is requisite to shew a statute, that pleas of the State for sums under $60, or $100, shall not be within the cognizance of the Superior Court, but shall be brought before some other tribunal. There is no such statute. No doubt, the motion in this case was founded on the 40th and 42nd sections of the Revised Statutes, chap. 31; which provide, that, if a suit be commeuced in the Superior Court for a sum less than $100 due by bond, it shall be dismissed. But it is a known and firmly established maxim, that general statutes do not bind the sovereign, unless expressly mentioned in them. Laws are prima facie made for the government of the citizen and not of the State herself. The very section under consideration has a provision which furnishes an example of the rule, that the sovereign is not to be brought within the purview of a statute by general words, but only by being expressly named. The provision is, that, when a suit is dismissed, or the plaintiff non suited upon the ground that the case is not within the jurisdiction of the Court, the plaintiff shall pay all costs. Now, no one will say, that there can be judgment against the State for costs in any case. But it is unnecessary to exemplify the rule, as it is well established as applying generally to the rights of the public....