State v. Garrett, 16829
| Decision Date | 06 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 16829,17607,16829 |
| Citation | 829 S.W.2d 622 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael W. GARRETT, Appellant. Michael W. GARRETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
William J. Swift, Columbia, for appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
A jury found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, § 565.024.1(2), 1 and he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, and that appeal is No. 16829. After the trial, defendant filed a motion for relief under Rule 29.15, and the trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals from that motion, and that appeal is No. 17607. The appeals are consolidated and will be dealt with separately.
The information, in addition to its formal portions, charged that the defendant "on or about August 1, 1989, while in an intoxicated condition, operated a motor vehicle in Ozark County, Missouri, and while operating said motor vehicle acted through criminal negligence to cause the death of Vestal Junior Hobbs."
Section 562.016.5 reads:
A person "acts with criminal negligence" or is criminally negligent when he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
Defendant's first point is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise, because: (a) "The corpus delicti that defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated was not demonstrated"; and (b) "The evidence failed to establish as a matter of law that defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in this situation, since the evidence indicates defendant was driving at a maximum speed of 35 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone under unfavorable weather conditions."
In reviewing defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court considers the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, and disregards those portions contrary to a finding of guilt. This court does not weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of the witnesses. The test is whether the evidence, so viewed, was sufficient to make a submissible case from which rational jurors could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty. State v. Whittle, 813 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Mo.App.1991).
The state's witnesses were Rodney Hensley, Mike Yaeger, Deputy Sheriff Billy Ingle, Trooper Brian Thompson, Coroner Charles Fish, and chemist David Nanneman.
Hensley testified that he knew defendant and Vestal Hobbs and was with them on the evening of August 1, 1989, at a campground located less than 100 yards from Patrick's Bridge. Several people were at the campground. Hensley saw defendant and Hobbs leave the campground in defendant's 1973 Buick Century. Defendant was the driver, and he drove toward Patrick's Bridge. About 15 minutes later, Hensley "heard of" a vehicle being in the water at the bridge. Hensley and Mike Yaeger went to the bridge. Defendant's vehicle was in the river, upside down. Yaeger pulled Hobbs out of the vehicle and then pulled defendant out. Hensley did "CPR" on Hobbs and also tried mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, "but it didn't work." Hobbs died at the scene.
Yaeger testified that he was with some friends at the camp area near the bridge and became aware of the vehicle being upside down in the river. He heard someone holler "help." He said he pulled Hobbs out of the vehicle and then pulled defendant out of it.
Deputy Ingle and Trooper Thompson were summoned, and they arrived at Patrick's Bridge, which is on H Highway in Ozark County and crosses North Fork River. Ingle arrested defendant and gave him the Miranda warnings. Defendant told Ingle that he had been driving the vehicle and had been drinking. Defendant had only minor injuries. Defendant told Ingle he had had nothing to drink since the accident.
Ingle testified that defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, wobbled and swayed when he stood up, and was intoxicated. Defendant was taken to a hospital in West Plains for examination and a blood alcohol test. Defendant told Ingle he wasn't sure how he should be feeling because he had never killed anybody before. On cross-examination, Ingle said that defendant told him he was starting across the bridge and wasn't sure why, but the car went to the right and was in the water before he knew it.
When Trooper Thompson arrived at the scene, the vehicle was upside down in the water. Defendant's eyes were bloodshot and he had a strong odor of intoxicants on his breath. Defendant told Thompson he was driving and that he didn't know what happened to cause the vehicle to drive off the roadway and that he had had two beers. Thompson stated that defendant was intoxicated and that Ingle had previously arrested him. Thompson informed defendant he had a right to refuse to undergo the blood alcohol test, but if he did refuse he could lose his driver's license. Such a test was later administered to defendant.
Thompson testified that the roadway on the bridge is about 13 feet wide and there is a curb, about seven inches square, on either side of the bridge. The curb had been broken away at the very end of the bridge at the north end. A caution sign, located 4 1/2 feet north of the north end of the bridge, was "knocked ajar." It was still standing and had fresh scrape marks on it. The vehicle was in the water about 66 feet from the north end of the bridge. There were scrape marks along the curb on the right side of the bridge and marks on the bottom of the vehicle showing scrape marks.
Thompson further testified that if a person had approached the bridge and slammed on the brakes, the vehicle would leave scuff marks or skid marks. There were no skid marks or scuff marks on the roadway at the north end of the bridge. Thompson estimated the speed of the vehicle at 35 miles an hour but said that was an educated guess because there were no skid marks or scuff marks to measure. He said that there was nothing at the scene which would prevent someone operating a motor vehicle from going from one end of the bridge to the other while using ordinary caution. The roadway was clear and dry, and there were no obstructions. He said it would not be dangerous for a sober person exercising standard care to approach the bridge and cross it. Photographs introduced into evidence by both sides supported that opinion.
On cross-examination, Thompson said that he could tell from the north end of the bridge that the vehicle had started off the roadway right at the end of the bridge and before it reached the bridge. He said that prior to the accident the vehicle was traveling south and left the roadway to the right side. The sign which was damaged was located 4 1/2 feet north of the bridge. He said that he would not describe the bridge as a dangerous situation and that it was a "traversable roadway." He said there was some fog or mist that evening at the bridge. The speed limit at the scene of the accident was 55.
Coroner Fish testified that he went to the scene, took photographs of Hobbs' body, and later examined it. The cause of death was "accidental drowning." He said the blood alcohol content of Hobbs was .01 percent.
The parties stipulated to the following: "The vehicle of Mr. Garrett was examined and there was nothing to indicate, based on those examinations, that there were any mechanical defects with respect to the steering, 'the tie rods or things that would affect the steerability mechanically'; the inspection took place in December 1989 by inspector Joe Johnson of the Missouri Highway Patrol; the nurse who drew defendant's blood for alcohol testing 'used all the approved methods for drawing blood,' and the 'chain of custody' of the blood was proper."
Chemist Nanneman testified that he had analyzed a sample of defendant's blood obtained during the night of the accident and the blood alcohol content was .24, "over twice the legal limit."
In order for there to be a conviction of a crime, the fact that a crime was committed must be proven. State v. Howard, 738 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Mo.App.1987). Corpus delicti is "the body of the offense charged." State v. Willoby, 34 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo.1930). Extrajudicial statements, admissions or confessions, are both inadmissible and insufficient to sustain a conviction unless there is independent proof, direct or circumstantial, of the essential elements of the corpus delicti. State v. Charity, 587 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo.App.1979). The corpus delicti cannot be presumed and must be proved by legal evidence sufficient to show that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone. State v. Summers, 362 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Mo.1962).
Full proof of the corpus delicti independent of defendant's extrajudicial confession is not required. State v. Reed, 759 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Mo.App.1988). "On the contrary, what seemed to be only slight corroborating facts have been held sufficient." State v. McQuinn, 361 Mo. 631, 235 S.W.2d 396, 397 (1951). If there is evidence of corroborating circumstances which tends to prove the crime and corresponds with circumstances related in defendant's confession, both the circumstances and the confession may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved. Id. If a confession is made, which enables the state to discover...
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