State v. Gary Rossiter
Decision Date | 03 June 1993 |
Docket Number | 1892,93-LW-2434 |
Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GARY ROSSITER, Defendant-Appellee Case |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Scott W. Nusbaum, 20 South Paint Street Chillicothe, Ohio 45601.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel L. Silcott, 15 North Paint Street Chillicothe, Ohio 45601.
DECISION
On March 13, 1992, the grand jury indicted appellee on two counts of arson in violation of R.C. 2909.03.
On June 11, 1992, appellee filed a motion to suppress anystatements he made to law enforcement officers. Appellee argued he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights prior to the time the law enforcement officers elicited a statement from him.
On July 2, 1992, appellant filed a memorandum contra appellee's motion to suppress. Appellant argued that although the detective who questioned appellee thought he was "slow," the detective had no indication that appellee could not understand his constitutional rights. Appellant further argued that appellee remained free to leave the police cruiser at any time during the questioning.
On July 8, 1992, the court sustained appellee's motion to suppress. The court wrote in its decision:
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with the required Crim.R 12(J) certification.
In its first assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by finding that the detective questioned appellee in a custodial setting.
During proceedings on a motion to suppress evidence, the trialcourt generally assumes the role of trier of facts. See, State v. Simmons (Aug. 25, 1992), Pike App. No. 473, unreported; State v. Kingery (Mar. 18, 1992), Ross App. No. 1792, unreported at 5; State v. Cramblit (Mar. 4, 1992), Hocking App. No. 91CA7, unreported at 5. The trial court must determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence presented at hearings on motions to suppress evidence. State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 574 N.E.2d 510, 515; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584. As a reviewing court, we should defer to the trier of fact who had an opportunity to view the witnesses and observe their demeanors, gestures, and voice inflections. A reviewing court should not disturb the trial court's findings on the issue of credibility. Id. Accordingly, in our review we are bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. DePalma (Jan. 18, 1991), Ross App. No 1633, unreported. Accepting these facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the appropriate legal standard. See State v. Shelpman (May 23, 1991), Ross App. No. 1632, unreported; State v. Simmons (Aug. 30, 1990), Washington App. No. 89CA18, unreported.
In the case sub judice, we find the record contains sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a custodial interrogation occurred. We note that the only relevant inquiry in determining whether an interrogation is custodial is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood the situation. Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. A suspect is considered to be "in custody" when the suspect's freedom of action is limited to a "degree associated with formal arrest." Id. See, also, In re Smalley (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 435, 575 N.E.2d 1198; State v. Warrell (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 286, 534 N.E.2d 1237; California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 112; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768.
A review of the record reveals that Detective Ron Nichols asked appellee to enter a police cruiser for questioning. Detective Nichols called a second officer into the cruiser for assistance with the questioning. Detective Nichols testified he advised appellee of his Miranda rights "since he was sitting in my car." Detective Nichols asked appellee many questions implicating his guilt. We find sufficient credible evidence in the record to support a determination that a reasonable person being questioned under the circumstances of this case would have understood that his or her freedom of action was limited to a "degree associated with formal arrest."
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error.
In its second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trialcourt erred by failing to apply the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether appellant voluntarily confessed to the commission of the crimes. See State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 549 N.E.2d 491. In Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d at 58, 549 N.E.2d at 499, the court wrote:
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error.
In its third assignment of error, appellant asserts the evidence proves appellee voluntarily and freely waived his constitutional rights prior to making his statement. Appellee disagrees.
In State v. Simmons (Aug. 25, 1992), Pike App. No. 473 unreported, we commented:
* * *"
In Colorado v. Spring (1987), 479 U.S. 564, 573, the court wrote:
"Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. (Emphasis added.)
See, also, Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 421.
In the case sub judice, the trial court suppressed appellee's confession based upon its finding that appellant did not have an awareness both of the nature of his rights and of the consequences of waiving those rights. The court wrote that appellee "in all likelihood did not understand his constitutional rights and clearly did not waive those rights." Our review of the record uncovers sufficient...
To continue reading
Request your trial