State v. Gee
| Decision Date | 28 February 1885 |
| Citation | 92 N.C. 756 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. THOMAS GEE. |
INDICTMENT FOR MURDER, tried before Shepherd, Judge, and a jury, at Fall Term, 1884, of CUMBERLAND Superior Court.
The prisoner was charged with the murder of Mary Hughes, committed at her house on Monday night, September 29th, 1884. The deceased lived alone in the suburbs of Fayetteville, some two miles distant from the house of the prisoner, with whom she had kept criminal relations for four years preceding, he spending much of his time at night with her. The deceased had been on that day with Martha Campbell, a neighbor, engaged in picking out cotton in the field, and about dark the two returned to the house of the deceased, at which they parted. After dark, about the hour of 7, the prisoner was seen about 25 yards from the house, going in that direction. He stated to a witness that he left the place a quarter of an hour before sunset on that day. He was also observed to cross the Campbellton Bridge on his way towards his home between the hours of 8 and 9.
Allen Jones, a witness for the State, passed the house or cabin occupied by deceased, about 8 o'clock that night, saw a light in it, and heard her talking. At a later hour, about 11, he again passed it and it was dark.
At 8 o'clock the next morning, Tuesday, the deceased was found by Martha Campbell on the floor, dead, with her skull fractured, as it appeared, by an axe, which with a kettle and two dresses belonging to her, were missing. The same morning the prisoner was discovered burning up the removed dresses, and on being asked what he was about, replied that he was burning nails.
About three weeks before the homicide the prisoner had been heard to say that he understood a man was trying to get between him and her, and that he intended to see that thing out. The case states that there were other circumstances pointing to the prisoner's guilt.
Evidence was offered in defence in regard to the movements of Henry Campbell, husband of Martha, about that time, with the apparent purpose of fixing the homicide upon him; and of his going to the house of the deceased, after his wife on the Wednesday next preceding, where the latter had gone to spend the night; and of his violent conduct there as he forced his wife to return. He was met when coming from the house, by a witness who represents him as being mad, and with a knife in his hand which he repeatedly opened and shut. His wife followed on behind.
The prisoner proposed to show that the said Henry Campbell uttered threats, saying on the same Wednesday night that he had a mind to go back, turn over the cabin and kill both women, and he intended to break up his wife's visiting there, and witness would hear “of hell being played out there some time.”
These declarations, on objection from the State, were excluded, and the prisoner excepted.
The prisoner introduced a witness by whom to prove his own good character, who, after full explanation of this form of evidence, as constituting general reputation, to render the proposed inquiry intelligible, persisted in saying he did not know what it was.
He was then asked what the old master of the prisoner, while he was a slave, said about him. This testimony was also refused.
When the evidence and the arguments were concluded, prisoner's counsel submitted two instructions, which the court was requested to give to the jury.
1. The jury should be as fully convinced of the guilt of the prisoner from the consideration of the circumstances, as if direct proof had been brought.
2. In this case the burden of proof is on the State throughout, and every material circumstance must be fully proved to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The last instruction was given, the first refused, and instead the jury were charged that every material circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; that these circumstances must all point to the guilt of the prisoner, and exclude every reasonable theory of his innocence; and produce moral certainty of his guilt in the minds of the jury before they could convict.
The prisoner excepted to the denial of his first instruction.
After conviction, a motion for a new trial was made for the alleged erroneous rulings and for the further reason, shown on affidavit, that one Tony Williams, a witness for the State, had been examined and testified without having been sworn, the facts of which are found by the judge to be these:
Through an inadvertence, the oath had not been administered, but the witness had been examined and cross-examined without the attention of any one engaged in the trial being called to the omission. The prisoner was represented by two counsel, one of whom had no intimation of the neglect, until after the verdict was rendered. The other, after the case had gone to the jury and an hour before their agreement, was advised of the fact that one of the witnesses had not been sworn; but his informant refused to tell who the witness was. This attorney was not present when the verdict was returned, though he had opportunities to communicate to the court the information he had before the verdict was rendered.
The court acquits the attorney of any improper motive in failing at once to make known what he had heard.
After a verdict of guilty, the prisoner moved in arrest of judgment, because the bill of indictment did not charge that the deceased was in the peace of God, as well as in the peace of the State.
The court refused to arrest the judgment, and pronounced judgment on the verdict, from which the prisoner appealed.
Attorney-General, for the State .
Mr. R. S. Huske, for the defendant .
SMITH, C. J. (after stating the facts).
The exceptions shown in the record are four in number, and these are now to be examined.
1. The rejection of the proof of threats and other declarations of Henry Campbell, offered to fasten the criminal act upon him and in exoneration of the accused.
The inquiry before the jury is as to the guilt of the accused, did he commit the homicide; and full and satisfactory evidence of this was required before there could be a conviction.
The fact that another co-operated and is also guilty, does not disprove the charge against the prisoner, nor absolve him from responsibility.
When the crime is shown to have been committed by a single person, and the question is solely one of identification, it would be competent to prove that another than the accused did the act, because this would directly disprove the charge against the latter. But even in this case the proof must be direct to the fact, and cannot come from admissions, or conduct seemingly in recognition of it. These are but “ res inter alios actæ,'DD' and not under the sanction of an oath.
The adjudications which exclude such testimony are positive, and satisfactory grounds assigned in the opinions for the ruling. State v. May, 4 Dev., 328; State v. Duncan, 6 Ired., 236; State v. Jones, 80 N. C., 415; State v. Boon, Ibid., 461; State v....
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