State v. George

• Decision Date: 30 January 1884
• Citation: 18 N.W. 298,62 Iowa 682
• Parties: STATE v. GEORGE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

62 Iowa 682

18 N.W. 298

STATE

v.GEORGE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed January 30, 1884.

Appeal from Polk district court.

The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. He was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. He appeals to this court for a reversal of the judgment against him.Seward Smith, for appellant.

Smith McPherson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

ROTHROCK, C. J.

1. The first point in the argument by counsel for the defendant pertains to certain rulings of the court in passing upon challenges to persons called to serve as jurors in the case. An examination of A. G. Groves, a person called as a juror, was had, and he was challenged by the defendant for cause, and the challenge was overruled. It appears, however, that Groves did not serve as a juror, but that defendant challenged him peremptorily, and did not exhaust all his peremptory challenges. If, therefore, the overruling of the challenge for cause was erroneous, it was error without prejudice. State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 486;State v. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311;Barnes v. Town of Newton, 46 Iowa, 567.

Some objection is made to some remarks of the court defining what is and what is not an unqualified opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. These remarks were made pending the examination of a person called to serve as a juror. We think the definition given by the court was correct. It was to the effect that an opinion that the defendant is guilty or innocent is an unqualified opinion; but that, if the opinion is guarded by the condition that if what the juror had heard about the case be true, then the defendant is guilty or not guilty, then the opinion is qualified in the sense that the juror does not know whether what he had heard is true or false. No prejudice resulted to the defendant by this remark. The person under examination as a juror was challenged by the defendant for cause, and the challenge was sustained.

W. W. Carpenter and H. Parks, upon their examination as to their qualifications as jurors, answered that they had conscientious scruples against inflicting capital punishment. The state challenged them for cause, and the defendant objected to the challenge, because it was not by statute made a cause of challenge. The challenge was overruled, and the court thereupon made the following remarks upon the subject. “* * * They may say: ‘We, the jury, find F. W. George guilty of murder in the first degree, as charged in the indictment, and determine that he shall be hanged by the neck until he is dead;’ or, leaving that out, they may say, ‘and determine that he shall be confined in the penitentiary for and during the term of his natural life.’ Then the governor can pardon him out. But if they find him guilty of murder in the second degree, and they send him to the penitentiary for life, then the governor can pardon him out the very same day, if he thinks best. When the legislature enacted this statute, it seems to me that they ought to have provided for this emergency. If the court should decide here that this is not a good cause for challenge, the supreme court might reverse it. If we should decide that it is a good cause for challenge, and put the juror off, the supreme court might reverse that. It is in just such a tangle that we would not complain, let them decide it whichever way they would. That is the fix it is in. I think that we gather from the statute that when it is proven to a moral certainty that a person is guilty of murder in the first degree,--willful and premeditated killing, especially of an atrocious nature,--that it would be well to hang him. I think that is the idea they (the legislature) had. I believe the statute ought to provide that it should be cause for challenge if a man said he was conscientiously opposed to hanging anybody, and that he would not do it for any kind of murder whatever, it ought to be cause for challenge. Now, if we say that the only causes for challenge are those laid down in the statute, then I do not believe that the statute provides for this case. I do say that when they (the legislature) enacted this statute in regard to capital punishment, they should have provided for that, and, not having done so, is equivalent to saying that no man is to be hanged in this country, no matter how cruel and beastly a murder he may have committed.”

It is claimed that the defendant was prejudiced by these remarks. We are free to say that it would have been better, and more in consonance with our practice, if the court had omitted these remarks. The challenge had been sustained, and that was an end of the matter. What is complained of is not in the nature of an opinion, but seems to be some observations as to what, in the judgment of the court, was the legislative intent, and what the legislature might have done. The court seemed to think that the legislature had the idea that “when it is proven to a moral certainty that a person is guilty of murder in the first degree,--willful and premeditated killing, especially of an atrocious nature,--that it is well to hang him.” It cannot be doubted that the statute authorizes the infliction of the death penalty. But, however the jury may have regarded the remarks last above quoted, the closing part of what was said by the court was favorable to the defendant, because it is there stated that the legislature have said in effect that “no man is to be hanged in this country, no matter how cruel and beastly a murder he may have committed.” And the court, in its instructions to the jury, used this language: “It is your duty as jurors to try and determine this case according to the evidence produced and submitted to you in open court on this trial, and the law is given to you by the court in these instructions, and upon nothing else.” We conclude that under these circumstances, and considering the fact that the remarks complained of were made before the jury was made up and impaneled, and were not addressed to the jury or intended for their consideration, that the defendant was not prejudiced thereby. If the remarks were heard by any of the persons who served upon the jury, their tendency would rather be to create the impression that the state of the law was such that the death penalty could not be inflicted.

One Thomas French was a juror who served in trial of the case. It is claimed that in his examination as to his qualifications as a juror he deceived the court and counsel by false answers to questions as to his knowledge of the defendant and of the alleged crime. This was one of the grounds of the motion for a new trial, and certain affidavits were filed in behalf of the defendant, and the juror was called and examined under oath touching the matter. We need not set out the affidavits or the other evidence taken upon this branch of the case. It is sufficient to say that we think the court did not err in overruling the motion on this ground. We are not prepared to say that the juror did not fully explain all the charges against him, and exculpate himself from any wrong.

2. We come now to the principal question in the case. The defendant claimed, upon the trial, that he should be excused for the homicide upon the ground of insanity, and here it is proper that we should give a statement of the facts attendant upon the alleged crime. The defendant, at the time of the homicide, had been married about 12 years, and had a wife and five children, then residing in Des Moines. He left his family at Altoona on the...