State v. Gettier, 87-1809
| Decision Date | 22 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1809,87-1809 |
| Citation | 438 N.W.2d 1 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Ray GETTIER, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Raymond E. Rogers, Appellate Defender, and B. John Burns, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Sheryl A. Soich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary E. Richards, County Atty., and Douglas R. Marek, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, SCHULTZ, NEUMAN and ANDREASEN, JJ.
Defendant Robert Ray Gettier was convicted in a jury trial of sexual abuse in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4. He raises two issues on appeal. First, Gettier complains that he was not permitted to introduce evidence of the complainant's statement concerning her involvement in sex acts on the night in question. Second, he urges that it was error to permit expert testimony of post-traumatic stress symptoms commonly found in sexual abuse victims. We find no error and affirm.
Defendant and the complainant had been social friends for several months. They were regular participants in group partying which occurred at several bars and in private residences after bar hours.
The victim spent the evening of June 13, 1987, drinking and playing foosball with her boyfriend at various bars until they closed. The couple argued over whether they should go to an after-hours party. The complainant decided to go to the party alone.
At the party, the complainant testified that she went outside with a group, including the defendant, to smoke a marijuana cigarette in the parking lot. She maintains the defendant invited her to come examine his remodeled van. Once inside, the complainant asserts that the defendant forced her to engage in sexual intercourse.
Defendant disputes this version of the event. Gettier urges that he was attempting to help the complainant find her lost purse. He testified that when he took a break from the search to use the bathroom, the complainant walked in and began talking to him in broken sentences. He maintains that he later found her sitting in someone else's car, complaining about a pain in her knee. He then helped her into his van where she removed his shorts and they engaged in consensual intercourse.
The state's witnesses testified to complainant's physical and mental condition and the appearance of her clothes and hair after the alleged sexual abuse. Defendant's witnesses, on the other hand, testified that at the time complainant arrived at the party, she was babbling, intoxicated, and in a hyperactive state. By their verdict, the jury chose to believe the complainant's version.
Defendant claims that the court denied his due process rights by suppressing a witness' testimony stating that after the complainant had emerged from defendant's van, "she told me she had sex with two men that day."
Defendant sought to introduce this testimony in a motion filed pursuant to our "rape shield law," Iowa Rule of Evidence 412. This rule provides in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is accused of sexual abuse, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is:
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions "c"(1) and "c"(2) and is constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision "c" and is evidence of:
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which sexual abuse is alleged.
....
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which sexual abuse is alleged.
In his motion, defendant sought the aid of rule 412(b)(2)(B). He obtained a hearing "to determine whether the evidence that the defendant seeks to offer is relevant, and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice." See Rule 412(c) ().
At the hearing, defendant's witness stated the complainant made the statement to him after she had emerged from the van. The complainant testified that she did not remember making the statement and denied having engaged in a second act of intercourse either that night or the day before. The defendant urged that the evidence was relevant to the issue of consent. At a renewed hearing, he claimed relevancy because it "goes to her credibility, the credibility of other statements which she makes ... and [defendant's right of] cross-examination of the witness."
The trial court adopted the earlier pre-trial ruling, made by another judge, holding that rule 412(b)(2)(B) is inapplicable and that the unfair prejudice of the purported evidence outweighs its probative value, if any. By grounding defendant's motion on rule 412(b)(2)(B), a confusing and contradictory request was presented to the trial court. Rule 412(b) generally prohibits evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior. However, the exception relied upon, rule 412(b)(2)(B), allows the introduction of such behavior with the accused on the issue of consent. The statement sought to be admitted was, at least in regard to the accused, not past sexual behavior. The rule defines past sexual behavior as "sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which sexual abuse is alleged." Rule 412(d) (emphasis added). Although the statement referred to two sexual acts, it is undisputed that only one act occurred between the parties and presumably this was the act to which the statement referred. Because that act is the basis of the sexual abuse charge, neither rule 412(b) nor the exception apply. Defendant asked for relief under a rule and its exception that are inapplicable to the offered evidence. Because rule 412(b)'s general prohibition is inapplicable, it is improper to suppress the evidence on the basis that the rule's exception did not apply.
The portion of the statement referring to a second sex act, presumably with another person, clearly falls within rule 412(b)'s prohibition of evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior. The only possible exception which would allow the admission of this portion of the statement is rule 412(b)(2)(A), allowing evidence of past sexual behavior to show the source of semen or injury. However, because there is no dispute as to whether intercourse between the complainant and defendant took place, the source of semen is not in issue. Therefore, this portion of the statement is irrelevant and thereby inadmissible.
In summary, the portion of the statement referring to defendant was not rendered inadmissible by rule 412(b). The portion of the statement regarding past sexual behavior with a third person is inadmissible under rule 412(b) with no applicable exceptions. Evidence may be admissible for one purpose even though inadmissible for some other purpose. See Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 860, 871 (Iowa 1969).
A determination that the evidence is admissible under rule 412 does not end our inquiry. The trial court also held the evidence inadmissible on the alternate ground "that the potential unfair prejudice of the purported evidence is so prejudicial as to outweigh the probative value, if any." Iowa Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Defendant urges that the evidence is only prejudicial to the State in the sense that all evidence against an adverse party is prejudicial. Defendant argues this evidence's probative value lies in its reflection on complainant's credibility and is necessary to effectively cross-examine her.
The trial court must perform a balancing process under rule 403. This determination lies in the discretion of the trial court, which we will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 1984); Iowa R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's comment.
We find no abuse of discretion in this case. The statement had some probative value. It could be used to impeach the complainant's credibility by showing her attitude bearing on the issue of consent. Defendant called this witness who testified to the complainant's conduct, attitude, appearance and manner of speaking. However, the complainant testified concerning intercourse with defendant. We do not believe that defendant can complain that he was not allowed to cross-examine the complainant on otherwise inadmissible evidence of past sexual behavior.
We disagree with the defendant concerning the matter of prejudice. The portion of the statement referring to another act of intercourse falls under the rape shield law as evidence of "past sexual behavior." We have stated that the purposes of the rape shield law are to (1) protect the privacy of the victims; (2) encourage the reporting and the prosecuting of sex offenses; and (3) to prevent time-consuming and distracting inquiry into collateral matters. State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161-62 (Iowa 1984) (citing State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1981)). The alleged second act of intercourse had no relation to this act. However, it may have the unfair prejudicial effect of causing the jury to conclude that the complainant was a bad person. Evidence of other acts will...
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