State v. Gibson

• Decision Date: 13 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. S–13509.,S–13509.
• Citation: 267 P.3d 645
• Parties: STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Robert Duane GIBSON, III, Respondent.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

267 P.3d 645

STATE of Alaska, Petitioner,

v.Robert Duane GIBSON, III, Respondent.

No. S–13509.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Jan. 13, 2012.

W.H. Hawley, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Daniel S. Sullivan, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petitioner.

Sharon Barr, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan G. Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent.

Before: CARPENETI, Chief Justice, FABE, WINFREE, CHRISTEN, and STOWERS, Justices.

OPINION

WINFREE, Justice.I. INTRODUCTION

In this appeal we consider the long-standing emergency aid exception to the general requirement that a search warrant be obtained prior to police entry into a residence. Today we establish that the Alaska Constitution's standards for justifying the doctrine's application go beyond those required by the United States Constitution, and we adopt the standards our court of appeals first implemented in Gallmeyer v. State.¹ We then consider whether the court of appeals correctly applied the doctrine when it reversed the trial court's ruling that the doctrine excused the warrantless police entry in this case. Because the police had a reasonable belief of an emergency justifying a warrantless entry into the residence, we conclude the court of appeals did not and we reverse its decision.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGSA. The Incident

In July 2002 Lisa Bevin and Robert Gibson lived together in Gibson's trailer. Bevin became angry when she awoke to Gibson preparing to cook methamphetamine; Gibson reacted by threatening to “stab [her] in the head.” Bevin then called 911. The 911 operator logged the call as: “Female stated male was threatening to stab her in the head,” and noted she could hear a disturbance in the background. Anchorage Police Officers Justin Doll and Francis Stanfield were dispatched to the scene, arriving in separate patrol cars.

When the officers arrived they heard a distressed “female voice crying, upset, screaming, yelling” from inside the trailer. As the officers approached the trailer, Bevin tumbled out the door wearing only a tank top and crying “help me.” Bevin had visible swelling in one eye and a bleeding cut on the back of her head. The officers drew their weapons and called for backup. Against the officers' urgings, Bevin returned inside for more clothing.

As Bevin started back into the trailer, Gibson became visible through the doorway. The officers ordered Gibson out of the trailer, handcuffed him, and put him in a patrol car. Bevin emerged from the trailer fully clothed, but was agitated, argumentative, and uncooperative when questioned by the officers. Worried “she might start to fight” with them or Gibson, the officers put Bevin in a patrol car. The officers then informed the backup officer that he no longer needed to respond at the emergency level “because of the increased danger involved” in such a response.

The officers were not certain at that time who had called 911, whether anyone else lived in the trailer, or who the assailant had been. After Bevin and Gibson were detained, Officer Stanfield did not “hear any evidence of any kind that another party, a third person was in [the] trailer.” Officer Doll similarly did not see or hear anyone inside the trailer, and “saw nothing else that would indicate that there was another person inside.” Bevin, when asked, told the officers nobody else was in the trailer. Neither officer took Bevin's statement “at face value”; in Officer Stanfield's experience people “[r]egularly” lie “in domestic violence situations,” and in Officer Doll's experience “people [had] lied to [him] in the past.”

When Officer Gerard Asselin arrived approximately 25 minutes after Gibson and Bevin were secured, Officers Stanfield and Doll entered the trailer. Officer Doll testified that because the dispatch indicated “a disturbance possibly involving a knife,” the officers wanted “to make sure that nobody [was] ... lying wounded inside the trailer.” Officer Doll further confirmed that entering the premises in domestic violence situations “that may have involved a weapon,” where “the risk is a little higher,” is “standard operating procedure” even when an officer has “no reason to believe somebody is inside” because, as he noted, police “have a duty to provide aid to anybody inside.” While they were “clearing” the trailer, the officers noticed evidence suggesting methamphetamine manufacturing.

After exiting the trailer Officer Doll told Officer Asselin that there “could be a meth lab” inside. As Officer Asselin was more familiar than Officers Stanfield and Doll with methamphetamine labs, and because he “[knew] them to be dangerous in nature,” he entered the trailer to determine whether “it need[ed] to be dealt with right at that moment.” Observing chemicals, glassware, and other evidence of methamphetamine production, Officer Asselin concluded that “production of methamphetamine was occurring.”

Based on Officer Asselin's conclusion, Detective Bruce Bryant and another detective from the Anchorage Police Department's Metro Drug Unit were dispatched to the scene. Following a brief walk-through of the trailer, Detective Bryant applied for and obtained a search warrant. The police executed the warrant that night, seizing methamphetamine production evidence from the trailer.

B. The Superior Court

In September 2002 the State of Alaska indicted Gibson on four counts related to the manufacture of methamphetamine. Bevin was indicted on the same four counts. In May 2003 the State added one count of fourth-degree assault against Gibson for “recklessly caus[ing] physical injury” to Bevin. The State later dropped one of the methamphetamine-related counts against Gibson and amended another.

Bevin moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the warrantless searches of the trailer. Gibson filed his own motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the indictment against him. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motions over five days in 2003. Officers Stanfield, Doll, and Asselin testified, along with Detective Bryant and others. The court held oral argument on the motions in February 2004, ultimately denying them with a written order making factual findings. The court concluded Officers Stanfield and Doll's “warrantless entry was justified by the emergency aid doctrine.” The court confined its findings and conclusions “to the facts of this case” recognizing that there is not “a general warrantless search exception for all domestic violence cases.”

Analyzing the emergency aid doctrine under the three-prong test the Alaska Court of Appeals adopted in Gallmeyer,² the court determined that all three prongs were satisfied. First, the court found the reasonable grounds factor was met because “the officers arrived at the scene of a domestic disturbance reportedly involving a weapon,” “heard a female screaming,” and “saw a woman stumbling out of the trailer half naked and injured”; Bevin was “hysterical, uncooperative and argumentative,” and the officers were not “certain about how many people were involved.” The court therefore concluded the officers' belief that an injured party might be inside and in need of emergency aid was objectively reasonable. The court determined the second factor was met, as “[t]here was absolutely no evidence ... that something outside the trailer led [the officers] to suspect that there could be a meth lab inside,” and the officers' subjective motivation for entering the trailer was to determine whether there was anyone inside in need of emergency aid. The court further determined the final factor was met, as the search was sufficiently “restricted in time and scope to the nature and duration of the particular emergency.” Additionally, the court concluded exigent circumstances justified Officer Asselin's subsequent search and the inevitable discovery doctrine justified Detective Bryant's later search.

Following a two-week trial a jury found Gibson guilty on the three methamphetamine-related counts and of disorderly conduct, a lesser included offense of the assault charge.

C. The Court Of Appeals

Gibson appealed, arguing the superior court erred in denying his suppression motion.³ The court of appeals applied the Gallmeyer three-prong test and reversed, holding Officers Stanfield and Doll's initial entry was not justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement and was therefore unlawful.⁴ The court concluded “the circumstances surrounding the search ... would not ‘have led a prudent and reasonable officer to perceive an immediate need to take action in order to prevent death or to protect against serious injury to persons or property.’ ” ⁵

The court further explained:

In order to enter a home based upon the emergency aid exception, we believe that the State must show “true necessity—that is, an imminent and substantial threat to life, health, or property.” In addition, although Gallmeyer emphasizes that a showing of necessity does not “require absolute proof that injury would necessarily have occurred,” this test implies that a mere possibility that an emergency exists will ordinarily not be sufficient.[⁶

Finding “[t]he State justifie[d] the police entry into Gibson's home based on speculation,” the court expressed concern that if it “were to authorize the police to enter someone's home based on these facts, the police would routinely be able to search a residence in most cases where there was a report of a serious domestic dispute.” ⁷ It reversed the conviction and remanded the case for the superior court to determine what evidence should be suppressed.⁸

We granted the State's petition for hearing.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We generally “review a denial of a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling.” ⁹ “The trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” ¹⁰ But “[w]e independently determine whether ...