State v. Gilbert

• Decision Date: 15 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 100,150.,100,150.
• Citation: 254 P.3d 1271,292 Kan. 428
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee,v.Brian A. GILBERT, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

292 Kan. 428

254 P.3d 1271

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Brian A. GILBERT, Appellant.

No. 100,150.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

July 15, 2011.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREWest CodenotesRecognized as UnconstitutionalWest's K.S.A. 22–2501

Syllabus by the Court

1. Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised for the first time on appeal.

2. A passenger who is neither an owner nor in possession of an automobile lacks standing to challenge a search of that automobile under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.Natalie A. Chalmers, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jamie L. Karasek, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

Brian A. Gilbert was the passenger in a parked car he did not own. Law enforcement officers saw him in the vehicle and confirmed there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. He was taken into custody, and the car was searched incident to his arrest. Inside the car, drugs and drug paraphernalia were discovered. The State concedes the search was unconstitutional. The dispositive issue is whether a passenger who does not own or have a possessory interest in the vehicle may challenge the vehicle's search incident to the passenger's arrest.

The Court of Appeals held Gilbert had standing to contest the search under Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (traffic stop is a seizure of a passenger as well as the driver). State v. Gilbert, No. 100,150, ––– Kan.App.2d ––––, 2009 WL 2902575, at *5 (Kan.App.2009) (unpublished opinion). It reversed Gilbert's convictions and ordered suppression of the evidence seized in the vehicle search. The State petitioned this court for review. We find Gilbert lacks standing to challenge the vehicle search. We hold the outcome is controlled by Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through introduction of evidence obtained by search of third-person's premises has not had his or her Fourth Amendment rights infringed). We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and dismiss Gilbert's appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 17, 2006, Gilbert was in the passenger seat of a parked car when a Topeka police officer approached and asked for Gilbert's identification. The officer recognized the person sitting in the driver's seat, Kate Land, because the officer had met Land and her parents a week earlier when they reported some jewelry stolen. During that meeting, Land's parents described Gilbert and told the officer they suspected Gilbert was the thief. As part of that investigation, the officer learned Gilbert had an outstanding warrant for his arrest on an unrelated matter. The warrant alleged Gilbert had failed to appear in court for a tail lamp violation; driven while his license was suspended, cancelled, or revoked; driven under the influence of alcohol or drugs; and refused to take a preliminary breath test.

The officer asked Gilbert whether he had taken care of the arrest warrant, and Gilbert said he did not know about it. While awaiting verification that the warrant was outstanding, the officer observed a Crown Royal bag on the floor beside Gilbert's feet, which the officer testified was “infamous” for being used to conceal drugs. Once the warrant was confirmed, the officer arrested Gilbert and secured him in the back of a patrol car. The officer then returned to search the car, which was registered to Land and Jane Tillman. He discovered drug paraphernalia in the Crown Royal bag, and several baggies containing crystal methamphetamine under the front passenger seat. Gilbert was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65–4160(a) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65–4152(a)(2). Gilbert denied ownership of the seized items.

Before trial, Gilbert filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. He argued suppression was required on two grounds. First, Gilbert claimed he was illegally seized because the officer testified at the preliminary hearing that the warrant was unconfirmed when the officer first ran the warrant check while investigating the stolen jewelry. As such, Gilbert contended, the officer lacked grounds to request identification or run the warrant check a second time while standing beside Land's vehicle. The district court found the evidence did not support these claims and that the officer had probable cause to believe the warrant was outstanding when he questioned Gilbert. That ruling was not appealed.

Second, Gilbert argued the officer was not authorized to search the vehicle after the arrest because the officer was not searching specifically for evidence of the traffic offenses for which Gilbert was arrested, i.e., the crimes that resulted in the warrant. This argument was based on a previous version of K.S.A. 22–2501, the statute authorizing warrantless searches incident to arrest, which restricted such searches to “evidence of the crime.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22–2501(c) (Furse). But an amendment to K.S.A. 22–2501(c) became effective a few weeks before the Gilbert search that more broadly authorized officers to search for “evidence of a crime.” (Emphasis added.) L. 2006, ch. 211, sec. 8. The district court denied Gilbert's motion to suppress because the amended statute was in effect at the time of the search and authorized the officer's action. The evidence was admitted at trial.

A jury convicted Gilbert of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Gilbert filed a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals. He initially argued the evidence should have been suppressed because the statutory amendment did not expand an officer's authority to engage in a warrantless search incident to arrest. He also argued there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the methamphetamine.

But before oral argument was heard on those claims, this court held that the amended version of K.S.A. 22–2501 was unconstitutional. See State v. Henning, 289 Kan. 136, 137, 209 P.3d 711 (2009) (following Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 [2009] ). The Court of Appeals then ordered supplemental briefing on whether Henning applied retroactively to Gilbert's case. In response, the State conceded the search was unconstitutional based on the later court rulings but asserted for the first time that Gilbert lacked standing to challenge the search. The standing argument was premised on the fact that Gilbert was only a passenger in the parked car and did not have an ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle. For his part, Gilbert argued only that the search was unconstitutional under Henning; he did not respond in writing to the State's standing argument.

The Court of Appeals held Gilbert had standing to contest the search under Brendlin and declared the vehicle search unconstitutional under Henning. It then reversed Gilbert's convictions. Gilbert, 2009 WL 2902575, at *5. Notably, the Court of Appeals did not address the State's additional argument that suppression of the evidence was not required even if the search was found later to be unconstitutional because there was a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This is an argument our court recently accepted in a later case. See State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 500, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) (good-faith exception applies to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on K.S.A. 22–2501[c] ).

The State petitioned this court for review, which we granted. Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 20–3018(b) (review of Court of Appeals decision).

Analysis

The first issue presented is whether Gilbert has standing to challenge the vehicle's search. This requires us to resolve Gilbert's preliminary claim that the State did not preserve this issue because it was raised for the first time in response to the Court of Appeals' request for supplemental briefing after our Henning decision. We hold that Gilbert's argument misses the mark. Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Ernesti, 291 Kan. 54, 60, 239 P.3d 40 (2010). Whether standing exists is a question of law subject to unlimited review. Mid–Continent Specialists, Inc. v. Capital Homes, 279 Kan. 178, 185, 106 P.3d 483 (2005).

The State's argument that Gilbert lacks standing to contest the vehicle's search because he did not own or have a possessory interest in the vehicle is founded squarely on Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. 421. In that case, the defendants were passengers in a car driven by the vehicle's owner. The police stopped and searched the vehicle, believing it was involved in an armed robbery. The police discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. The defendants later moved to suppress the evidence, contending the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because they were the “victim[s]” of the search or seizure. 439 U.S. at 132, 99 S.Ct. 421. The United States Supreme Court rejected the defendants' “target theory” for standing because Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights. 439 U.S. at 133–34, 99 S.Ct. 421. The Court stated: “A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” 439 U.S. at 134, 99 S.Ct. 421 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 [1969] ). The Rakas Court held that the defendants lacked standing to challenge...