State v. Giles, 7508
| Decision Date | 03 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. L,No. 7508,7508 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Charles GILES. DecisionLawin-94-767. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Geoffrey A. Rushlau, District Attorney, Patricia A. Mador, Assistant District Attorney, Wiscasset, for State.
Richard W. Elliott, Elliott & Elliott, Boothbay Harbor, for Defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ.
Defendant Charles Giles appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Atwood, J.) convicting him of operating a watercraft while under the influence of alcohol in violation of 12 M.R.S.A. § 7801(9) (1994). The basis of Giles' appeal is a ruling entered in the District Court (Wiscasset, Field, J.) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a routine safety check of his boat by the United States Coast Guard. Defendant argues that the random stopping of boats in Boothbay Harbor by the Coast Guard, absent any articulable suspicion of wrongdoing and absent any restraint on the officers' discretion, constitutes a violation of his right, under the United States and Maine Constitutions, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the ruling of the District Court is in accord with the controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court, we affirm the judgment.
The facts developed at the suppression hearing are not in dispute. On the evening of August 21, 1993, defendant was operating his boat in Boothbay Harbor. At approximately 11:30 p.m., a Coast Guard vessel approached his boat and ordered him to stop. Coast Guard officers then boarded defendant's boat and began a routine safety check, to determine whether the boat had the appropriate registration, licenses, and safety devices. The officers performed this duty under the authority granted to them by 14 U.S.C.A. § 89 (1995). 1 The stopping of the vessel was not based on probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, or even on reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. The officers on duty that evening were ordered to stop vessels at random and board them for safety checks.
When the officers boarded the vessel and began the safety inspection, they suspected that defendant was intoxicated, based on his slurred speech, his difficulty keeping his balance, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. After conducting a field sobriety test, the officers concluded that defendant was operating the vessel under the influence of intoxicants. He was taken into custody and transferred to the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department.
After the District Court denied defendant's motion to suppress, he entered a conditional guilty plea in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) (1995). He now argues that the boarding and search of his vessel was a violation of his state and federal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
If the seizure of the vessel was in violation of the United States Constitution, the evidence gathered as a result of the illegal seizure, including the observations made by the officers, could not be used against the defendant in a state criminal prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653-55, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1690-91, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The resolution of this case is controlled by U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). In that decision the United States Supreme Court held that the suspicionless stop of a sailboat, anchored 18 miles inland on a channel that empties into the Gulf Coast, by United States Customs Officials 2, was not an unreasonable search. The Court held that the constitutional analysis applied to random stops of automobiles on our nation's roads is not directly applicable to the random stops of vessels on waters with access to the open ocean. The special exigencies of sea travel, including easy access to international waters and movement not limited to fixed highways, and the historical fact that seagoing vessels have always been subject to boarding by government officials, distinguish vessel stops from vehicle stops.
Defendant's attempt to distinguish Villamonte-Marquez from this case is unavailing. The fact that his boat was stopped by Coast Guard officials, at night, while the stop in Villamonte-Marquez was by Customs officials, in daytime, is a distinction without a difference.
Defendant next argues that the suspicionless stop of his vessel was in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Allen
...152 (Fla.1982); Peruzzi v. State, 275 Ga. 333, 567 S.E.2d 15 (2002); People v. Roe, 48 Ill.2d 380, 270 N.E.2d 27 (1971); State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192 (Me.1996); State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.2003); State v. Pike, 139 N.C.App. 96, 532 S.E.2d 543 (2000); Schenekl v. State, 30 S.W.3d 4......
-
State v. McKeen
...officers whose duties include patrolling and protecting vast territories, such as waterways and wooded areas. See, e.g., State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 193 (Me.1996) (noting the "special exigencies of sea travel" in upholding the routine stop of a boat without articulable suspicion); State v......
-
Commonwealth v. Karash
...describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Or. Const. Art. I, § 9. 13. See also State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192 (Me. 1996) (holding that a Coast Guard officer's conducting a routine document and safety check pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89 did not violate the Fourth......
-
Commonwealth v. Karash
...App. 2003), State v. Pike, 532 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), Schenekl v. State, 30 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), and State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192 (Me. 1996).3 These cases found, at a minimum, that random, suspicionless boat stops to conduct safety inspections do not violate the Four......