State v. Gill

• Decision Date: 19 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-203,91-203
• Citation: 63 Ohio St.3d 53,584 N.E.2d 1200
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. GILL, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 53

63 Ohio St.3d 53

584 N.E.2d 1200

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. GILL, Appellee.

No. 91-203.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 10, 1991.

Decided Feb. 19, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

R.C. 2913.46(A) does not constitute an unlawful delegation of state legislative authority in violation of Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

On May 9, 1990, appellee, Shinder K. Gill, was indicted for trafficking in food stamps, a violation of R.C. 2913.46(A). On May 30, 1990, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 2913.46.

The trial court overruled appellee's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, appellee entered a plea of no contest to the charge against her. Appellee was convicted and, thereafter, appealed her conviction.

The Court of Appeals for Summit County reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause with instructions to enter a dismissal of the indictment. The court of appeals determined that R.C. 2913.46(A) allowed Congress to, in effect, redefine, alter or even repeal an Ohio crime without any action by the General Assembly, and without reference to any fixed standards or policy set by the General Assembly. Therefore, held the court of appeals, the statutory scheme constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in violation of Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

Finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in State v. Bolar (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 194, 530 N.E.2d 940, the court of appeals certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.

Lynn C. Slaby, Pros. Atty., and Philip D. Bogdanoff, Akron, for appellant.

Kenneth L. Gibson, Stow, for appellee.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

The issue presented to this court is whether R.C. 2913.46(A) delegates state legislative authority to Congress, in violation of Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. ¹ For the reasons that follow, we find that R.C. 2913.46(A) does not violate Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

R.C. 2913.46(A) provides:

"No individual shall knowingly possess, buy, sell, use, alter, accept, or transfer food stamp coupons in any manner not authorized by the 'Food Stamp Act of 1977,' 91 Stat. 958, 7 U.S.C. 2011, as amended." (Emphasis added.)

Appellee contends that the language," * * * as amended," as used in R.C. 2913.46(A), renders R.C. 2913.46(A) unconstitutional. Appellee argues that by including this language, the General Assembly intended to incorporate all amended versions of the federal law subsequent to the time R.C. 2913.46(A) was enacted. Therefore, urges appellee, the General Assembly delegated its legislative authority to Congress in violation of Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. We disagree.

In determining the constitutionality of legislative enactments such as the one in the case at bar, we begin with the well-settled principle that all enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and before a court may declare the statute unconstitutional, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provision are clearly incapable of coexisting. State, ex rel. Dickman, v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus. Further, doubts regarding the validity of a legislative enactment are to be resolved in favor of the statute. State, ex rel. Swetland, v. Kinney (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 567, 23 O.O.3d 479, 433 N.E.2d 217.

In 1964, Congress established a comprehensive food stamp program to aid in the fight against hunger and malnutrition. Section 2011 et seq., Title 7, U.S.Code. R.C. 2913.46(A) became effective on July 1, 1983. Prior to this date, the federal food stamp law had been revised. It is clear to us that the General Assembly, by using the language "as amended," did not intend to adopt amendments to the federal law subsequent to the effective date of R.C. 2913.46(A), but, rather, the General Assembly simply intended to incorporate the federal food stamp law as it existed on the date R.C. 2913.46(A) was enacted. Given its common and plain meaning, the language "as amended" does not anticipate amendments to the federal law after July 1, 1983. This is buttressed by the fact that had the General Assembly intended to incorporate the federal law subsequent to the enactment of R.C. 2913.46(A), it certainly knew how to do so. For example, R.C. 2915.01(AA) provides that the " 'Internal Revenue Code' means the 'Internal Revenue Code of 1986,' 100 Stat. 2085, 26 U.S.C. 1, as now or hereafter amended." (Emphasis added.) There is a notable distinction between the language used in R.C. 2915.01(AA) and in 2913.46(A). In utilizing the language "as now or hereafter amended," the General Assembly obviously intended to incorporate amendments subsequent to the time R.C. 2915.01(AA) was enacted.

In one of our sister states, the Supreme Court of South Dakota has recognized that the language, "as amended," as used in a state statute incorporating federal law, refers only to the existing federal legislation at the time the state statute was enacted. Independent Community Bankers Assn. of S. Dakota v. State (S.D.1984), 346 N.W.2d 737. The court in Independent Community Bankers considered whether the state legislature improperly delegated its legislative authority to Congress by providing in a statute (S.B. 256) that the meaning of the term "bank holding company" would be " 'as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1841, et seq.' " (Emphasis added.) 346 N.W.2d at 743. The court concluded that S.B. 256 adopted the federal definition of a bank holding company at the time S.B. 256 was enacted and, therefore, the state statute did not delegate state legislative authority to Congress. 346 N.W.2d at 744. The court reasoned that " * * * [t]he language used to incorporate 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq., when given its ordinary meaning, indicates an intent to adopt the existing definition. SB 256 adopts the federal definition 'as defined' and 'as amended'; this language is structured in the past tense. * * * " Id.

Considering the foregoing, we conclude that a reasonable interpretation of R.C. 2913.46(A) is that the General Assembly intended to prohibit any activity involving food stamps in a manner inconsistent with the federal food stamp law as the federal law read on the date R.C. 2913.46(A) was enacted. The General Assembly may adopt provisions of federal statutes that are in effect at the time the state legislation is enacted. Thus, we hold that R.C. 2913.46(A) does not constitute an unlawful delegation of state legislative authority, in violation of Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

Appellee further contends that to interpret and limit R.C. 2913.46(A) as incorporating Section 2011, Title 7, U.S.Code, as it read on the date R.C. 2913.46(A) was enacted, would create an unworkable situation. Appellee argues that since the enactment of R.C. 2913.46(A), the federal food stamp law has been revised and some present lawful recipients would commit an Ohio crime by obtaining food stamps.

Appellee makes a valid point. However, to avoid this problem, the General Assembly may update and revise R.C. 2913.46(A) to incorporate amended versions of the federal food stamp law.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the trial court's judgment is reinstated.

Judgment reversed.

MOYER, C.J., and HOLMES, HERBERT R. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.

SWEENEY and WRIGHT, JJ., dissent.

WRIGHT, Justice, dissenting.

I must respectfully dissent. My review of the pertinent law on this subject reveals no support for the position taken by the majority. It almost goes without saying that it is an accepted principle that the General Assembly cannot delegate legislative power to an agency of the federal government. In Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, paragraph one of the syllabus states that "[t]he legislative power of the state is vested in the General Assembly by Section 1, Article II of the Constitution and that body may not abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is vested."

In the case before us the General Assembly set forth no guidelines and imposed no limitations on the statute before us, and, in my view, clearly delegated the determination of what constitutes a criminal offense in this area to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Congress of the United States. I cannot improve on the reasoning enunciated by Judge Markus in the case of State v. Bolar (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 194, 530 N.E.2d 940:

"Only the Ohio General Assembly can exercise this state's legislative authority. Section 1, Article II, Ohio Constitution. It can define crimes by determining the elements for those offenses. State v. Healy (1951), 156 Ohio St. 229, 239-240, 46 O.O. 110, 114, 102 N.E.2d 233, 239; State v. Woods [1982], 8 Ohio App.3d 56, 8 OBR 87, 455 N.E.2d 1289. It cannot delegate this important legislative power to another governmental entity. State, ex rel. Foster, v. Evatt (1944), 144 Ohio St. 65, 29 O.O. 4, 56 N.E.2d 265. The legislature can properly authorize another governmental agency to promulgate rules or regulations which further define an offense and thereby implement the statutory purpose. See State v. Switzer (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 47, 51 O.O.2d 69, 257 N.E.2d 908 (R.C. 1533.63 validly allows wildlife director to regulate the minimum length of legally possessed fish, even though possession of shorter fish is a crime). See, also, State v. Messenger (1900), 63 Ohio St. 398, 59 N.E. 105 (R.S. 4904 validly allowed county commissioners to determine vehicle weight limits, even though driving a vehicle which exceeded those limits was a crime); State v. Reed (1983), 14 Ohio App.3d 63, 14 OBR 75, 470 N.E.2d 150 (R.C....