State v. Gillespie
| Decision Date | 19 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. COA05-1182.,COA05-1182. |
| Citation | 638 S.E.2d 481 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Marion Preston GILLESPIE. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Glover & Petersen, P.A., by James R. Glover, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.
In June 2003, Marion Preston Gillespie ("defendant") and Linda Faye Smith Patterson ("the victim") resided together and were in a dating relationship. During that time, defendant was unemployed, battling liver disease and diabetes, and taking Peg Interferon, a medication for hepatitis C with severe side effects.1
Early in the morning on 15 June 2003, while at their residence, defendant and the victim began arguing about money. During the argument, the victim grabbed a knife from the top of the commode in the bathroom, and she charged at defendant. Defendant took the knife from the victim and began cutting her with it.
At approximately 4:20 a.m., defendant arrived at the Rowan County Sheriff's Department in bloodstained clothes. Defendant approached Deputy Bradley Bebber ("Deputy Bebber") and told Deputy Bebber that he had been in a fight with his girlfriend at 640 Knox School Road and that he wanted to turn himself in. Deputy Bebber called 911 and reported the incident and the address defendant provided.
In response to the 911 dispatch, Officer Gerald Jones ("Officer Jones") arrived at 640 Knox School Road. Officer Jones entered the residence and found the deceased victim lying on her side in the bathtub. Officer Jones testified at trial that there was a lot of blood in the bathtub and on the wall area around the bathtub. Officer Jones found a knife on the edge of the bathtub.
Officers escorted defendant to the sheriff's department, and once inside, officers advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant then consented to a search of his car and his residence at 640 Knox School Road. After it was confirmed that the victim was deceased, defendant was charged with murder. Defendant requested to speak with Sheriff George Wilhelm ("Sheriff Wilhelm"). Sheriff Wilhelm re-read defendant his rights, and defendant waived his rights and gave a statement.
On 23 June 2003, a grand jury indicted defendant for murder. Initially, the case was to be tried capitally, but on 1 March 2004, the State elected to try the case non-capitally. On 6 July 2004, the trial court scheduled defendant's trial for 29 November 2004.
On 14 October 2004, pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-959, defendant provided the State with notice of his intent to introduce a mental health defense-specifically, insanity and diminished capacity. On 21 October 2004, the trial court committed defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital and ordered Dorothea Dix Hospital to examine defendant's mental capacity to stand trial and his mental health at the time of the offense. The trial court further ordered defendant to provide notice of defenses, expert witnesses, and a witness list to the State and also to produce documentation for the expert witnesses by 15 November 2004. The trial court, however, failed to include this date in its written order. On 17 November 2004, defendant filed a motion for continuance on the bases that defense counsel continued to receive discovery documents from the district attorney, neither the State nor defense counsel had received any reports from Dorothea Dix Hospital or any other experts, and defense counsel needed defendant to be returned from Dorothea Dix Hospital to Rowan County Detention Center to help prepare defendant's case for trial. On 23 November 2004, defendant filed another motion for continuance because defendant still had not been returned to Rowan County Detention Center and defense counsel continued to receive discovery from the district attorney's office. The trial court denied the motion for continuance on 29 November 2004.
On 22 November 2004, Charles Vance, M.D., Ph.D., Forensic Psychiatrist with Dorothea Dix Hospital, sent a letter to the Rowan County Clerk of Court stating that "[t]he medical staff of the Forensic Psychiatry Division has completed their forensic evaluation and observation of [defendant] and found him to be capable to proceed to trial." However, neither Dr. Charles Vance nor the staff at Dorothea Dix Hospital provided a report of defendant's mental health at the time of the offense. On 24 November 2004, defense counsel delivered defendant's psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Noble to the State. On 25 November 2004, defendant's psychiatric evaluation prepared by Dr. Strahl was made available to the State, and defense counsel delivered it to the State on 29 November 2004.
On 29 November 2004, the trial court entered an order prohibiting defendant from introducing evidence at trial from Dr. Noble or Dr. Strahl concerning a mental health defense. Although defense counsel attempted to make an offer of proof of Dr. Noble's and Dr. Strahl's prohibited testimony before opening statements at trial, the trial court allowed voir dire for Dr. Noble and Dr. Strahl after the close of the evidence. The voir dire testimony provided that: (1) defendant's taking Peg Interferon caused defendant to become severely depressed; (2) at the time of the attack, defendant did not know right from wrong; (3) he did not premeditate or deliberate before the killing; (4) the killing was without malice; and (5) defendant was involuntarily intoxicated during the attack. On 8 December 2004, the jury returned a verdict, finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant now appeals to this Court.
We note first that defendant has not appealed the denial of his motions to continue, even though defendant assigned as error the court's denial of his motion for a continuance to allow time for the mental health experts and defendant's counsel to obtain all necessary information. Our Supreme Court has held that State v. Smith, 310 N.C. 108, 111, 310 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1984). In the instant case, defense counsel informed the State that he could not be ready for trial by August, and accordingly, the trial court scheduled the trial for 29 November 2004. The court thus granted defense counsel a three-month continuance, and based on the record, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant any further continuances. Regardless, defendant has not argued this issue in his brief, and accordingly, this assignment of error is deemed abandoned. See N.C. R.App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006).
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in precluding the testimony of Dr. Noble and Dr. Strahl as a sanction for purported discovery violations and that, consequently, the trial court deprived defendant of his due process right to present a defense pursuant to Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). Much as in Taylor, defendant has asserted only a due process violation, but nevertheless, his reliance on the Sixth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause is evident from his citations and legal arguments. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 406 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. at 651, 98 L.Ed.2d at 809. The Supreme Court explained in Taylor that its broad interpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause is "reflected in contemporaneous state constitutional provisions," id. at 408, 108 S.Ct. at 652, 98 L.Ed.2d at 809, and the Court referenced the North Carolina Constitution, noting that "North Carolina combined the right to put on a defense with the right of confrontation, guaranteeing the right `to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony.'" Id. at 408 n. 13, 108 S.Ct. at 652, 98 L.Ed.2d at 809 (quoting N.C. Const. art. I, § 23). Accordingly, we review defendant's constitutional arguments on Sixth Amendment and state constitutional grounds.
North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-910 provides for sanctions for discovery violations. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-910 (2005). Specifically, if the trial court determines that a party has failed to comply with the statutory provisions governing discovery or an order entered pursuant to the discovery statutes, the court may exercise its contempt powers and/or:
(1) Order the party to permit the discovery or inspection, or
(2) Grant a continuance or recess, or
(3) Prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
(3a) Declare a mistrial, or
(3b) Dismiss the charge, with our without prejudice, or
(4) Enter other appropriate orders.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-910(a) (2005).
It is well-established that "[t]he choice of sanction, if any, rests within the [sound] discretion of the trial court." State v. Browning, 321 N.C. 535, 539, 364 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1988). A decision about discovery sanctions will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion, which "occurs when the trial court's ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Moore, 152 N.C.App. 156, 161, 566 S.E.2d 713, 716 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the refusal to allow an undisclosed witness to testify violated the petitioner's constitutional right to obtain the testimony of favorable witnesses in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798. In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court stated that "`criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial...
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