State v. Gingell

Decision Date27 October 1982
Citation455 N.E.2d 1066,7 Ohio App.3d 364
Parties, 7 O.B.R. 464 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. GINGELL, Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1.There exists no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that a rape victim's testimony be corroborated as a condition precedent to conviction.

2.An averment of the precise date and time of an offense need not be included in an indictment or bill of particulars where the precise date or time is not an essential element of the offense charged, and the failure to provide such exactitude in such circumstances does not transgress defendant's constitutional rights to due process of law and to a fair trial.

3.Notwithstanding the above, the state ought to supply specific dates and times where it possesses such information, probably when it is requested by a bill of particulars and certainly when it is demanded in discovery procedures.

Simon L. Leis, Jr., Pros.Atty., Christian J. Schaefer and Thomas P. Longano, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Hal R. Arenstein, Cincinnati, for appellant.

PALMER, Presiding Judge.

Defendant-appellant, Ronald Gingell, was indicted on May 19, 1981, by a Hamilton County Grand Jury on three counts of rape of a child less than thirteen years of age in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(3), for a series of incidents in which defendant was alleged to have engaged in sexual conduct, as defined in R.C. 2907.01(A), with his eight-year-old stepdaughter, Tracy.More particularly, count one of the indictment averred that during the period December 1, 1979 to May 31, 1980, defendant purposely compelled Tracy by force or threat of force to submit to sexual activity.Similarly, count two recited the identical offense, but averred that this offense occurred sometime between May 31 and September 30, 1980; and, finally, count three averred that the offending sexual activity was committed sometime between October 1, 1980 and February 3, 1981.In response to defendant's subsequent motion for a bill of particulars, the state further disclosed that the evidence at trial would demonstrate that the respective time periods set forth in each count corresponded to the times during which defendant lived at three separate residences, all within Hamilton County, and that at each such residence defendant purposely compelled his stepdaughter to submit to oral and vaginal intercourse, as well as certain other sexual contact.

Defendant's timely motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the inexactitude in times and dates of the alleged offenses violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial by failing to provide adequate notice was overruled, and the cause proceeded to trial before the court upon his plea of not guilty.

Following an extensive voir dire examination of Tracy, the court concluded that she was competent to testify at trial, following which Tracy described on direct examination, credibly and graphically, several instances of sexual activity with defendant at each of the locations.For his part, defendant denied the accusations, stating specifically that he had never been in the bedroom of any of the residences alone with Tracy, a defense that was generally corroborated by defendant's wife.On rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of Tracy's seven-year-old brother who contradicted the testimony of defendant by asserting that defendant had, in fact, been in the bedroom with Tracy on several occasions at each residence while his mother was at work.

Following closing arguments, the court found defendant guilty of each count charged in the indictment, sentenced him to serve three consecutive terms of four to twenty-five years in the state penitentiary and entered judgment accordingly.From this judgment, defendant has taken this timely appeal in which he asserts two assignments of error.

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the judgment of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.In this regard, defendant challenges the verdict on the specific ground that it was based in large measure on the uncorroborated testimony of the child-victim.We disagree.In the first instance, there exists no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that a rape victim's testimony be corroborated as a condition precedent to conviction.See, e.g., State v. Tuttle(1903), 67 Ohio St. 440, 66 N.E. 524;Butler v. State(App.1926), 4 Ohio Law Abs. 236;State v. Moore (C.P.1956), Ohio Com.Pl., 139 N.E.2d 381, 74 Ohio Law Abs. 116.Moreover, it is apparent that key circumstantial corroboration of the victim's evidence was in fact presented by the state in the testimony of the victim's younger brother.Thus, the record in the instant case clearly reveals that the court had before it substantial and credible evidence of probative value from which it could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had, on three separate occasions, engaged in sexual conduct with a child under thirteen years of age, as charged in the indictment and in contravention of R.C. 2907.02(A)(3).See, e.g., State v. Collins(1977), 60 Ohio App.2d 116, 396 N.E.2d 221[52 O.O. 97];State v. Phillips(1951), 90 Ohio App. 44, 103 N.E.2d 14[46 O.O. 343].Under such circumstances, it is quite clear that it is not the province of this court to disturb that finding by substituting its judgment for that of the finder of fact.E.g., State v. Eley(1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 383 N.E.2d 132[10 O.O.3d 340];State v. DeHass(1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212[39 O.O.2d 366].The first assignment of error is without merit and is accordingly overruled.

In his second assignment of error, presenting the principal challenge of this appeal, defendant disputes the trial court's refusal to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that neither it nor the bill or particulars sufficiently alerted defendant to the specific dates and times upon which the charged offenses were alleged to have occurred.Specifically, defendant contends that while neither Crim.R. 7(B) nor R.C. 2941.08(B) mandates that precise time averments be contained in an indictment, the failure to provide such exactitude under the instant facts deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.For the reasons stated herein, we disagree.

At the outset, it must be noted that this court has very recently reaffirmed the time-honored and well-established principle enunciated in Tesca v. State(1923), 108 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 629, that averments of the exact time and date of an alleged offense are unessential to an indictment.SeeState v. Elliott (Oct. 6, 1982), HamiltonApp. No. C-810685, unreported.In Elliott, this court affirmed the conviction of a defendant charged with several counts of rape, despite the fact that the indictment had been amended to enlarge the time period during which the crimes were allegedly committed, on the dual grounds that the accused failed to request a bill of particulars demanding temporal specificity and that such amendment did not in any event offend the applicable statutory authority contained in Crim.R. 7(B)andR.C. 2941.08(B).

In the instant case, a somewhat different question is posed.Unlike Elliott, we are not presented with a question as to the appropriateness of an amendment to an indictment or a challenge predicated upon purely statutory grounds.Moreover, defendant in the instant case moved for and received a bill of particulars from the state, a fact of some consequence to the Elliott court.We are rather presented with the question of whether, under the instant circumstances, the accused was denied his constitutional rights to due process of law when compelled to stand trial on the basis of an indictment and bill of particulars which averred merely that the alleged offenses occurred during broadly specified intervals over a fourteen-month period.

Under the respective provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions, an individual accused of a felony is entitled to an indictment setting forth the "nature and cause of the accusation."See, e.g., Wong Tai v. United States(1927), 273 U.S. 77, 47 S.Ct. 300, 71 L.Ed. 545;State v. Davis(1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 355, 397 N.E.2d 1215[14 O.O.3d 315];Dinsmore v. Alvis(1950), 88 Ohio App. 32, 96 N.E.2d 427[43 O.O. 397].These provisions are designed to compel the government to aver all material facts constituting the essential elements of the offense so that the accused may not only have adequate notice and an opportunity to defend, but also to protect himself from any future prosecution for the same offending conduct.E.g., Harris v. State(1932), 125 Ohio St. 257, 181 N.E. 104;State v. Hearn(1926), 115 Ohio St. 340, 154 N.E. 244;State v. Joseph(1926), 115 Ohio St. 127, 152 N.E. 186;Furman v. State(1918), 10 Ohio App. 157.It is not, however, necessary that an indictment contain a recitation of the evidence supporting the various facts; it is enough that the indictment contains language sufficient to alert the person named therein that certain generally specified conduct constitutes a violation of an existing statute.E.g., State v Yudick(1951), 155 Ohio St. 269, 98 N.E.2d 415[44 O.O. 269];State v. Hahn(1938), 59 Ohio App. 178, 17 N.E.2d 392[11 O.O. 560].See, also, State v. Zaras(1947), 81 Ohio App. 152, 78 N.E.2d 74[35 O.O. 460].

Under this rubric, then, an averment of the precise date and time of an offense generally need not be included in an indictment, since, generally, precise times or dates are not essential elements of offenses.As the United States Supreme Court noted in Glasser v. United States(1942), 315 U.S. 60, 66, 62 S.Ct. 457, 463, 86 L.Ed. 680:

"The particularity of time, place, circumstances, causes, etc., in stating the manner and means of effecting the...

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205 cases
  • State v. Whitt
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • Junio 13, 2011
    ...Lewis (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 624. There is no requirement that a rape victim's testimony be corroborated as a condition precedent to conviction. Id. citing to State v. Love (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 88, 91 and State v. Gingell (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 364, 365. See also In re: Fisher (June 25, 1998), 10thDist. Nos. 97APF10-1356 & 97APF11-1552, unreported where the court held that the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction for rape. Accord, State...
  • State v. Leonard
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • Abril 11, 2013
    ...requirement, statutory or otherwise, that a victim's testimony be corroborated as a condition precedent to a rape conviction. State v. Sklenar, 71 Ohio App.3d 444, 447, 594 N.E.2d 88 (9th Dist.1991), citing State v. Gingell, 7 Ohio App.3d 364, 365, 455 N.E.2d 1066 (1st Dist.1982); State v. Love, 49 Ohio App.3d 88, 91, 550 N.E.2d 951 (1st Dist.1988). "Sexual conduct" does not requireproof of trauma. State v. Barnes, 1st Dist. Nos. C-790595, C-790622, and C-790636, 1980...
  • State v. Paul Baisden
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • Mayo 19, 1987
    ...information does not describe particular conduct, but only when that conduct is alleged to have occurred, knowledge of which^as we have seen^is generally irrelevant to the preparation of a defense.' (Emphasis added.) Gingell, supra, at 367. The Gingell court recognized a difficult problem balancing the accused's need for all discoverable information provided by law to enable him to defend his case with the need for the state to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crime. The courtdifficult problem in balancing the accused's need for all discoverable information provided by law to enable him to defend his case with the need for the state to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crime. The court stated in Gingell, supra, at 368: "The real problem arises in cases, like the where the state is simply unable to comply with times and dates more specific than those found in the instant indictment. With all the best will in the world, information more specificconduct with a twelve year old "between January 1, 1979 and July 1, 1979'); People v. Morris (1984), 61 N.Y. 2d 290, 473 N.Y.S. 2d 769, 461 N.E. 2d 1256 (rape of a young girl "during the month of November, 1980'). The appellant court in Gingell, cited with approval the Ohio Supreme Court in Sellards, stated when temporal information is specifically requested by the accused in a bill of particulars or in a demand for discovery the specific dates and times with regard to an alleged...
  • State v. Joseph A. Wright
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • Marzo 21, 2002
    ...argues, although in Ohio there is no requirement statutory or otherwise, that the testimony of a rape victim be corroborated as a condition precedent to a conviction, referring to State v. Gingell (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 364 and State v. Love (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 88, 550 N.E.2d 951. Wright's reliance is misplaced. In Love, the defendant similarly argued the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the victim's testimony was uncorroborated....
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