State v. Girard

Citation276 Or. 511,555 P.2d 445
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Petitioner, v. John Stephen GIRARD, Respondent.
Decision Date21 October 1976
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and W. Michael Gillette, Solicitor Gen., Salem.

John Henry Hingson, III, Oregon City, argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.

O'CONNELL, Justice.

This case is before us on a petition by the state for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Girard, 25 Or.App. 169, 548 P.2d 505 (1976).

The facts are fully set forth in that decision. They may be summarized as follows. Because defendant's truck was spotted in the vicinity of the McGahan residence at a time when it had been burglarized, police officers began an investigation of defendant. Officers Congdon and Bradshaw went to defendant's home at 255 Ivy Street in Estacada, and spoke with the defendant and Catherine Clancy. Mrs. Clancy produced a letter from the McGahans which indicated that the McGahans were Mrs. Clancy's landlords and that they were evicting her from the Ivy Street residence. Defendant stated that they had gone to the McGahan residence to resolve the rental problems. However, the letter, mailed from Hawaii, recited that the McGahans would not return from their vacation for another two weeks.

The police officers requested but were denied entry to the home. They informed the occupants that they planned to stake out the house and obtain a search warrant. After calling for the assistance of a surveillance car, they noticed a shadow in the backyard and, upon closer scrutiny, saw defendant carrying a box toward the back fence. After spotting the police, defendant returned to the house with the box. The officers then found a tape recorder and a partially spilled carton near the rear boundary of the yard revealing some silver, china and an afghan blanket.

Officer Congdon then knocked on the back door of the house and heard a male voice say, 'Hurry, they are coming.' Congdon identified himself, and demanded entry. Receiving no response, the door was forced open. After searching the home, the defendant was found hiding under a bed and was arrested. A struggle followed during which defendant and Mrs. Clancy, armed with a wine bottle and hammer, attacked the officers. Following the affray, defendant escaped through a bedroom window. The officers then searched the house and seized several articles.

Defendant was later taken into custody. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from the Ivy Street residence. The trial court found that the arrest was without probable cause and that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence and suppressed the evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the arrest was with probable cause but that the lack of exigent circumstances necessitated the exclusion of the evidence.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the officers had probable cause to effect a valid arrest; however, we disagree with the court's conclusion that there were not exigent circumstances justifying the officers' entry into the residence.

We have not previously decided the question of the right of an officer having probable cause to arrest to seek out the accused in a private dwelling and enter to effect a warrantless arrest where no exigent circumstances exist. 1 Even if we assume that entry to effect a warrantless arrest must meet a similar requirement of exigent circumstances as a warrantless search, we are of the opinion that the requirement was met in the present case. 2 Here, the police officers, after knocking, heard the accused say, 'Hurry, they are coming.' Hearing this, it was reasonable for the officers to assume that the accused was hurrying to conceal evidence of the burglary or that he was about to escape. That the latter assumption is not unreasonable is borne out by the fact that the accused did escape shortly after the police gained entry into the house.

The Court of Appeals took a different view of the matter saying, 'We do not find these circumstances so compelling as to justify the state's failure to secure a warrant before searching defendant's residence.' 3 It is true that defendant's admonition, 'Hurry, they are coming' may not have given the officers reason to enter to prevent evidence from being concealed or destroyed because the burglary evidence was not easily disposable. However, the officers still could have understood the statement to mean, 'Let's get out of here; the officers are coming,' in which case entry would be justified to effect an arrest to avoid escape.

Defendant argued that the two officers could have 'surrounded' the house to avoid escape while they waited for reinforcements. That involves a large measure of speculation, depending upon a variety of factors relating to the feasibility of 'surrounding' the house or otherwise preventing escape, including the size of the house, the number of exits, the proximity of the house to cover for a person bent on...

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28 cases
  • People v. Yates
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1983
    ...further endangered the lives of the officers as well as any passersby. (See State v. Page (N.D.1979), 277 N.W.2d 112; State v. Girard (1976), 276 Or. 511, 555 P.2d 445; United States v. Campbell (2d Cir.1978), 581 F.2d 22, 26; 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure sec. 6.1, at 395 (1978) ("the ques......
  • State v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1991
    ...danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect's escape or the destruction of evidence. State v. Girard, 276 Or. 511, 514 n. 2, 555 P.2d 445 (1976). The first of those circumstances--imminent danger to life--is called into play In evaluating whether the warrantless ......
  • State v. Saunders
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • October 3, 1990
    ...as circumstances giving rise to an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent destruction of evidence. State v. Girard, 276 Or. 511, 555 P.2d 445 (1976). It is a rule of practical necessity to search or seize evidence before a warrant can be obtained. State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255......
  • State v. Ritz
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • May 9, 2018
    ...where the defendant sped away from a traffic stop, drove to a house, and then ran on foot into the house), and State v. Girard , 276 Or. 511, 514-15, 555 P.2d 445 (1976) (exigency where police saw the defendant carry stolen items away from a house and police also heard someone say, "Hurry, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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